

The Princeton Theological Review

CONTENTS

The Background of Daniel	R. D. WILSON	I
Ezekiel's Division of Palestine among the Tribes	C. M. MACKAY	27
The Problem of Mental Evolution	F. D. JENKINS	46
The Philosophy of Substance	CHARLES A. S. DWIGHT	72
The Message of the Catacombs	CHARLES F. DEININGER	79
The Adopting Act of 1729 and the Powers of the General Assembly	J. ROSS STEVENSON	96
John DeWitt (1842-1923)		107
Notes and Notices		108
Critical Note on Exodus vi. 3, R. D. WILSON; Dr. J. Leighton Stuart's <i>New Commentary on the Apocalypse</i> , OSWALD T. ALLIS		
Reviews of Recent Literature		129
Survey of Periodical Literature		171

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1924

The Princeton Theological Review

EDITED FOR
THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
BY
OSWALD T. ALLIS

Each author is solely responsible for the views expressed in his article
Notice of discontinuance must be sent to the Publishers; otherwise subscriptions will be continued
Subscriptions \$2.00 a year, 60 cents a copy, for the U. S. A. and Canada
Foreign postage 50 cents additional
Entered as Second Class Mail Matter at Princeton, N. J.

BOOKS REVIEWED

BERGUER, G., <i>Some Aspects of the Life of Jesus from the Psychological and the Psycho-Analytic Point of View</i>	142
CHARLES, R. H., <i>The Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce</i> ..	148
DE LATALLE, M., <i>Mysterium Fidei de augustissimo corporis et sanguinis Christi sacrificio atque sacramento</i>	156
FINDLAY, J. A., <i>The Realism of Jesus</i>	162
FISHER, G. M., <i>Creative Forces in Japan</i>	170
FOOTE, H. W., <i>The Minister and His Parish</i>	169
GARDNER, P., <i>The Practical Basis of Christian Belief</i>	136
GRAY, J. M. M., <i>An Adventure in Orthodoxy</i>	161
GREEN, P., <i>Personal Religion and Public Righteousness</i>	158
JOHNSTON, H. A., <i>Scientific Christian Thinking for Young People</i> ...	135
JOSEPH, O. L., <i>The Dynamic Ministry</i>	164
LEROY, A., <i>The Religion of the Primitives</i>	131
MACARTNEY, C. E., <i>Twelve Great Questions about Christ</i>	141
MACAULEY, J. H. C., <i>The Reality of Jesus</i>	137
MACCOLL, A., <i>The Sheer Folly of Preaching</i>	169
MCDANIEL, G. W., <i>Churches of the New Testament</i>	165
MERCER, S. A. B., <i>Assyrian Grammar with Chrestomathy and Glossary</i>	155
MOORE, G. F., <i>The Birth and Growth of Religion</i>	131
MORRILL, G. L., <i>Life as a Stewardship</i>	158
MOTT, J. R., <i>Confronting Young Men with the Living Christ</i>	159
NASH, A., <i>The Golden Rule in Business</i>	160
NAVILLE, E., <i>The Higher Criticism in Relation to the Pentateuch</i> ...	139
NELDAU, F. J., <i>The Miracle Man and The Wonder Book</i>	160
PACE, C. N., <i>A Candle of Comfort</i>	159
PRINGLE-PATTISON, A. S., <i>The Idea of Immortality</i>	127
QUAYLE, W. A., <i>The Healing Shadow</i>	167
RANDOLPH, C. A., <i>Book for Catechumens</i>	159
ROBERTSON, A. T., <i>Studies in Mark's Gospel</i>	158
SANDERS, F. K., <i>Old Testament History</i>	153
SANDERS, F. K., <i>Old Testament Prophecy</i>	153
SNOWDEN, J. H., <i>The Making and Meaning of the New Testament</i> ..	144
TALMAGE, T. DEW., <i>Fifty Short Sermons</i>	168
THOMAS, W. H. G., <i>Christ Pre-Eminent</i>	160
TILROE, W. E., <i>Sent Forth</i>	161
WILSON, C. T., <i>The Divine Right of Democracy</i>	171

The Princeton Theological Review

JANUARY, 1924

THE BACKGROUND OF DANIEL

The critics are in the habit of making one or more unfounded assumptions and then basing upon these unproved and unprovable assumptions still others equally baseless. In the case of Daniel they have assumed that the book is unhistorical, that its miracles are impossible, and that its presumably predictive prophecies are dim recollections of long past events. They even assume that there was no man called Daniel living in the time of Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus,¹ and that the customs, objects, and events mentioned or not mentioned in the book, as well as the language in which they are mentioned, indicate the age of Judas Maccabeus. That there is no ground for denying the existence and the deeds of Daniel as recorded in the book named after him has been shown in *Studies in the Book of Daniel* where the harmony between the life of the man and his surroundings has been maintained. The existence of such a Daniel is upheld by the testimony of his great contemporary Ezekiel who mentions him three times as a model of wisdom and righteousness (xiv. 14, 20, xxviii. 3). No other man worthy of being placed alongside of Noah and Job, as is done by Ezekiel, is known to history, or would, so far as we know, have been known to the Jews whom Ezekiel addressed. The critics, in their endeavors to account for this singular prominence given by their favorite author to an otherwise unknown person, are reduced to the most absurd conjectures. Hitzig supposed that Daniel was another name for Melchizedek.² Prince conjectures that he was "really a well known character under the disguise of another name," probably "some celebrated ancient

¹ Prince, *Commentary on Daniel*, p. 28.

² *Commentary on Daniel*, p. viii.

prophet," but which one "cannot possibly be known, as there is not a single trace to guide research as to his origin and date." Bevan says it is "impossible to decide who the Daniel was to whom reference" is made by Ezekiel,³ but he qualifies this statement with the remark: "Presumably Ezekiel believed him to be, like Noah and Job, a person of the remote past." Professor Bevan here assumes that Ezekiel believed Job to be a person from the remote past. This is an example of a kind of assumption frequently indulged in by certain critics, that is, that they can tell exactly what an ancient prophet *believed*. Professor Cornill maintains that the book of Job was written after Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Proverbs and P.⁴ If this be so, then we would have Ezekiel citing as models two men not known to have existed before his time, and of whom his readers could have known merely the names and an indefinite number of traditions, as the works describing them had not yet been written. We could understand this concerning Job, since the book gives no indication of time; but we cannot see why a writer later than Ezekiel would have taken traditions current among the people before the time of Ezekiel and have centered these traditions about a contemporary of Ezekiel. According to the critics, the writer of Daniel knew the prophets. According to some of them he got the name of Daniel from these very passages in Ezekiel. Why then did he not place Daniel at the court of some Pharaoh, or of some Assyrian or Elamite king, instead of making him a younger contemporary of Ezekiel? We leave the critics to conjecture why, and returning to our subject, we sum up by saying that we have two first class witnesses to the fact that Daniel lived at the time of Nebuchadnezzar; first, the book of Daniel itself, and secondly, the book of Ezekiel. They both testify also that he was a man of wisdom and righteousness. Further, another first class witness, the First Book of the Maccabees, testifies that the two most notable events recorded in Daniel (the fiery furnace and the den of lions) were known

³ *Commentary*, p. 12.

⁴ *Introduction*, p. 433.

to the Jews in 169 B.C., when they were cited by Mattathias in the climax of his great speech in which he stirred up his compatriots to rebellion. This speech is reported to have been delivered five years before the date at which the critics assign the composition of the book of Daniel. Josephus, also, testifies that the book of Daniel was shown to Alexander the Great in 336 B.C. Dare we ignore the testimony of such a scholar?

Now compared with this direct evidence in favor of the existence of Daniel in the sixth century B.C., and of a knowledge of some of the contents of his book before the time of the Maccabees, what direct evidence have the critics to offer in favor of the year 164 B.C. as the time of the composition of the book? Absolutely none. Not a single word, or intimation, or opinion, can be produced from any source before the third century A.D. in favor of the view that Daniel was written in Maccabean times. The New Testament in its references to Daniel the prophet and to the fiery furnace and the den of lions implies at least that Daniel is what it appears to be, a record of historic facts enacted in the sixth century B.C. Josephus treats the book as reliable and the author as the Daniel of the book, and one of the greatest of the prophets. It is not till the third century A.D. in the writings of a heathen assailant of Christianity that we find the first expression of the *opinion* that the book may have been a fabrication, full of pseudo-predictions written *post eventum*. This opinion was never accepted by Origen or any of the scholars claiming to be of the Jewish or Christian faith, till the beginning of the nineteenth century. Bertholdt and Gesenius were the proponents of the view that Daniel was neither authentic nor genuine, that its historical parts were a pure fabrication, and that its alleged predictions were written *post eventum*. These professors were both German rationalists of the most pronounced type. They based their opinion of Daniel upon the assumption that miracles and predictive prophecies are impossible, that the historical statements are largely false, and that the language, customs, and ideas are those of the age of Antiochus Epiphanes. Like Bevan and other living members

of their school, they preferred the opinion of the neoplatonist Porphyry in his virulent and prejudiced assault on Christianity, and especially on the book of Daniel, to the opinions of Eusebius of Caesarea, Origen, and Jerome in their answers to Porphyry; although these three are justly esteemed the greatest scholars and critics of the early church and had before them all the sources of information and all the evidence possessed by the heathen Porphyry; neither is there any proof that they were more prejudiced in favor of Christianity than he was against it. Besides, in Josephus, that great Jewish scholar of the first century A.D., we have a better judge of the reliability of Daniel than any of these third and fourth century critics. For, in the first place, he lived two hundred years earlier than Porphyry and Origen. Secondly, he had access to many more and much better sources of information as to Seleucidian times than the later writers give evidence of. Of the sources which Jerome says to have been used by Porphyry, Josephus names Polybius, Posidonius, and Hieronymus. Of Polybius, Josephus speaks in high praise in general,⁵ but differs modestly with him in regard to the death of Antiochus Epiphanes.⁶ Posidonius, who lived about 300 B.C., he accuses of telling lies about the Jews and of "framing absurd and reproachful stories about our temple,"⁷ and cites against him the testimony of Polybius, Strabo, Nicolaus of Damascus, Timagenes, Castor the chronologer, and Apollodorus.⁸ Of Hieronymus he asserts that he "never mentions us in his history, although he was bred up very near to the places where we live."⁹ The other sources of Porphyry mentioned by Jerome are not named by Josephus; and since the

⁵ As in *Antiquities*, XII. III. 3, XII. IX. 1, and *Contra Apion*, II. 7.

⁶ *Antiquities*, XII IX. 1.

⁷ *Contra Apion*, II. 7.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ *Contra Apion* I. 23. The question naturally arises, whether Jerome was wrong in saying that Hieronymus was one of the authorities of Porphyry. Even if he was an authority, it could have been only for the time of Alexander's immediate successors, since he was a friend of Antigonus and a contemporary of Hecateus.

works of most of them have been lost, we can form no correct opinion as to their merits. Callinicus, we know, lived about 300 B.C., and consequently can have testified only as to matters concerning Alexander and his sons and his generals who immediately followed him. Diodorus flourished in the reign of Augustus and can only have written at second hand. Having access to the same sources, Josephus may have thought it unnecessary to allude to him. As to Claudius, Theon, and Andronicus, not only are their works lost, but nothing is known of their age or histories. On the other hand, Josephus had the use of many sources that are not mentioned as having been known to Porphyry. Aside from official documents from Jerusalem, Tyre, Sparta, Rome, and from the kings of Egypt and Syria, he cites among others Hecataeus of Abdera, Nicolaus of Damascus, Menander of Tyre, Berosus for Babylon, Manetho for Egypt, Epistles of Alexander, Ptolemy Soter and the succeeding kings, Agatharcides, Posidonius, Lysimachus, Aristeus, Theopompus, Theodotus, Apollodorus, Apollonius Molo, Timagenes, Strabo, Polybius, Hieronymus, Castor, Theophilus, Mnasia, Aristophanes, Hermogenes, Euhemerus, Conon, Zopyrion, Eupolemus, Demetrius Phalereus, the elder Philo, and others. In addition to these, he would know, of course, the books of the Macca-bees, and a large number of the apocryphal and pseudepigraphical works of the Jews. His mention of the elder Philo implies his knowledge of the younger.

In the third place, Josephus was not an aspiring publicist seeking to gain a livelihood, nor an ambitious writer hoping to win an Olympian crown by his rhetoric and patriotic utterances, regardless of truth and reckless of consequences; but as the learned Scaliger justly says, "he was the greatest lover of truth of all writers" and it is safer to believe him, not only as to the affairs of the Jews, but also as to those that are foreign to them, than all the Greek and Latin writers; and this because his fidelity and compass of learning are everywhere conspicuous." Besides, his writings were a challenge and an affirmation. He defied the world to deny or refute his

statements and he affirmed the incontestable truth of his history. Nor was he an unknown author hiding in a corner, unrecognized by his contemporaries or unworthy of their acceptance as an opponent. Educated as a priest in all the learning of his people, versed in Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek, and Latin, and in a measure in Babylonian, Egyptian, and Phœnician, he cites his authorities at first hand, and uses them with a skill that betrays on every page the hand of the master. The laws and literature of all the preceding ages seem to have been at his command, mostly in the original languages in which they were written. Homer and Hesiod, Herodotus and Thucydides, Plato and Pythagoras, Berosus, Menander, Nicolaus, Manetho, and Polybius were known to him. He compares the laws of Moses with those of Draco, Lycurgus, and Solon. He discusses the histories and the historians of the different states of Greece and condemns forgeries and lies in the most unsparing terms. His purpose in all his writings was to vindicate the truth and to correct and instruct the ignorant.

The accuracy and truthfulness with which Josephus wrote his histories was attested in his own time by the emperors Vespasian and Titus and by king Agrippa. Titus subscribed the *Wars* with his own hand and ordered them to be published. Agrippa wrote a letter to Josephus in which he said: "I have read over thy book with great pleasure, and it appears to me that thou hast done it much more accurately and with greater care, than the other writers."¹⁰ Besides, the accuracy of the transmission and the truthfulness of the subject matter of his writings are attested by an almost unbroken succession of the most brilliant scholars from his own time up to the present. Tacitus and Justin Martyr seem to have used his statements and certainly Origen, Eusebius, Ambrose, Jerome, Isidorus, Sozomen, Cassiodorus, Syncellus, Photius, and Suidas cite him and attest his works as reliable.¹¹ According to the ordinary laws of evidence, these giants of old were

¹⁰ *Life of Flavius Josephus*, 65.

¹¹ See Dissertation I, in Whiston's *Josephus*.

better able to testify as to the text and veracity of Josephus than any scholars of today. For they lived nearer to the time of Josephus by a thousand to fifteen hundred years. They were the brightest men and the most accomplished scholars of their respective generations. They did not read laboriously a musty manuscript, or a classical author, with the aid of grammar and dictionary; but were to the language born. They had not merely fragments and desultory references and short descriptions concerning the events to which Josephus alludes, but possessed many complete works which since have perished. We may safely conclude, therefore, that Josephus knew what he was writing about and that he told the truth.

Knowing, then, all the sources of information that we have today and a great many more than either we or Porphyry can claim, and animated by the highest principles of veracity and the strongest desire for accuracy, Josephus agrees with both Porphyry and his opponents as to the exactness with which the narratives in Daniel harmonize with the events that occurred in the time of the Maccabees. But he does not on that account consider that Daniel was a forgery written *post eventum*. On the contrary, he narrates at length the history of Daniel at the courts of Nebuchadnezzar, Belshazzar, and Darius the Mede, following herein the book of Daniel. He says that Daniel was one of the greatest of the prophets; that the several books that he wrote were still read in his time; that Daniel conversed with God; that he did not only prophesy of future events, as did the other prophets, but that he determined also the time of their accomplishment, and that by their accomplishment he secured belief in the truth of his predictions. He emphasizes especially the vision of Daniel at Susa, recorded in the 8th chapter, and says expressly that the Jews suffered in the days of Antiochus Epiphanes the things predicted there so many years before they came to pass.¹² He says, further, that the book of Daniel was shown to Alexander who supposed that himself was the person intended to destroy the empire of the Persians, as Daniel had pre-

¹² Bk. X. xi. 7.

dicted in chapter xi.3.¹³ And again he states that in the same manner Daniel wrote also concerning the Roman government and that his country should be made desolate by it.¹⁴ "All these things," he says, "did this man leave in writing, as God had showed them to him, insomuch that such as read his prophecies, and see how they have been fulfilled, would wonder at the honor with which God honored Daniel; and would thence discover how the Epicureans are in error, who cast providence out of human life, and do not believe that God takes care of the affairs of the world."¹⁵ Finally, Josephus says that the desolation of the temple by the Macedonians had been predicted by Daniel four hundred and eight years before it was accomplished.¹⁶ It is possible, also, that when Josephus¹⁷ calls Jesus *Christ* he derived the title *Christ* from Daniel; for we have shown elsewhere,¹⁸ that, contrary to the common opinion, the title *Messiah* or *Christ*, as applied to the Saviour was a very unusual one, being found in the Old Testament only in Ps. ii. 2, and Daniel ix. 25, 26, and in the other pre-Christian literature of the Jews in Enoch xliii. 10, lii. 4, Pss. of Solomon xviii. 6, 8, alone.¹⁹

It is evident, then, that Josephus must have thought that the background of Daniel was that of the times of Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus and not that of the Maccabees. If there had been any indication of the later time, surely one of his knowledge and opportunities and methods and love of veracity would have detected it, whether it was in the sphere of history, customs, or language. Surely, also, he, if anyone, was in a position to know that it was written in the second century B.C., if that had been the age of its composition. But neither

¹³ Bk. XI. viii. 5. Prince, p. 14.

¹⁴ Bk. X. xi. 7.

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ Bk. XII. vii. 6.

¹⁷ Bk. XVIII. iii. 3.

¹⁸ This REVIEW for October, 1923, pp. 553, 563.

¹⁹ Since Josephus never elsewhere pays any attention to this apocryphal literature it is possible at least that he derived the title *Christ* from Daniel directly, as the people of New Testament times seem to have done.

he, nor any of his sources, nor any source possibly unknown to him, gives any intimation that anyone even thought that it was written then. More than 500 years after the death of Antiochus Epiphanes, a heathen philosopher antagonistic to Christianity startles the world with his opinion that it was composed shortly before the death of Epiphanes, and lo! the German critic puts this forth as *evidence* that it was written then. Let him follow Porphyry who will, but let him cease to say that he does so on the ground of evidence. Let him be honest enough to say that he does so because like Porphyry he does not believe in the possibility of miracles, nor in predictive prophecy,—at least in that kind of predictive prophecy which is found in Daniel.

But, since Josephus was not infallible, let us look at some of the other alleged evidence that the background of Daniel is that of the second century B.C. Professor Cornill re-asserts²⁰ the old opinion that the fact that Daniel is said to have prayed three times a day with his face turned to Jerusalem shows that Daniel was written in the second century B.C. rather than in the sixth. He gives no evidence in support of this assertion and for the very good reason that there is none to give. He says only that "all this would have been unintelligible at the time of the Babylonian exile," a statement of the kind frequently indulged in by special pleaders of Professor Cornill's school, but which has absolutely no value as evidence. How can we know that it was unintelligible? To pray three times a day is a very simple act. To pray with one's face toward Jerusalem, the place of Jehovah's residence, is another very simple act. Why could either of these acts be more intelligible in the second century B.C. than in the sixth? What is unintelligible is, that a German professor of the 20th century A.D. should make such an unfounded statement.

For, in fact, no better illustration of the falseness of the critical method can be found than this very case. As to praying toward Jerusalem, the practice is referred to three times

²⁰ *Introduction*, p. 388.

in the prayer of Solomon (1 Kings viii).²¹ That this prayer of Solomon was known to Daniel seems evident from the fact that in his own prayer he uses such significant phrases of Solomon's as "prayer and supplication," "we have sinned, we have done iniquity, we have transgressed," "keeping the covenant and the mercy."²² It is immaterial as far as Daniel's use of the direction is concerned, whether this prayer was really made by Solomon, as the book of Kings affirms, or was written during the captivity as the critics assert.²³ Since according to Dr. Driver the compiler of Kings was "a man like-minded with Jeremiah, and almost certainly a contemporary,"²⁴ the prayer of Solomon was written before the reign of Cyrus when Daniel's prayer was made. After a hundred years of diligent search, no other trace of this custom has been found by the critics, till we come to Mohammedan times in the 7th century A.D., unless with Hitzig we find an allusion to the custom in Tobit iii. 7, where Sarah is said to have "stretched forth her hands toward the window and prayed." However we may attempt to account for this failure of the immense Jewish literature to mention the fact that the direction in Solomon's prayer had become a custom, certain it is that no argument for the late date of Daniel can be based upon the fact that he alone of all men in the long period from

²¹ The three places are 1 Kings viii. 30, 38, and 48, which read as follows:

And hearken thou to the supplication of thy servant, and of thy people Israel, when they shall pray toward this place: yea hear thou in heaven thy dwelling-place; and when thou hearest, forgive. . . .

What prayer and supplication soever be made by any man, or by all thy people Israel, who shall know every man the plague of his own heart, and spread forth his hands toward this house. . . .

If they return unto thee with all their heart and all their soul in the land of their enemies, who carried them captive, and pray unto thee toward their land, which thou gavest unto their fathers, the city which thou hast chosen, and the house which I have built for thy name.

²² Daniel ix. 3, 4, 5 compared with 1 Kings viii. 28, 47, and 23.

²³ Thus Hitzig in his *Commentary on Daniel*, p. 94; Bevan in *The Book of Daniel*, p. III.

²⁴ LOT, 199.

550 B.C. to 600 A.D. is recorded to have followed the direction of Solomon.

As for the statement that Daniel prayed three times a day, the case for the critics is not much better. In Psalm lv. 18 the Psalmist says: "Evening and morning and at noon will I pray and cry aloud." In the heading this Psalm is ascribed to David; but the critics place it as probably from the time of Jeremiah.²⁵ The next reference to the custom is found in the Acts of the Apostles, x. 9, a work written about 70 A.D.; so that if we suppose that Jeremiah died about 550 B.C. there were at least 620 years between these two only allusions to the custom that the critics can find outside of Daniel. As far as this custom is concerned it is evident, therefore, that Daniel may have been written at any time between 550 B.C. and 70 A.D. In other words the custom proves nothing as to the date of the book.

Professor Cornill makes the importance placed upon fasting in Daniel another evidence of its late date. In favor of this importance he cites ix. 3 and x. 3. The former reads: "And I set my face unto the Lord God, to seek by prayer and supplications, with fasting and sackcloth and ashes." The latter reads, beginning with verse two, "In those days I, Daniel, was mourning three whole weeks. I ate no pleasant bread, neither came flesh nor wine into my mouth," etc. Professor Cornill might have added vi. 18, where we read: "Then the king went to his palace and passed the night fasting; neither were instruments of music brought before him." In the first of these passages the Hebrew word for fasting is *šôm* from a root found in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic. The verb is found twenty-one times in the Old Testament Hebrew, and the noun twenty-six times. Neither of them is found in the Hexateuch; but one or the other occurs in Judges once, Samuel eight times, Kings thrice, Chronicles twice, Ezra twice, Nehemiah twice, Esther four times, Isaiah seven times, Jeremiah thrice, Joel thrice, Jonah once, Zechariah seven times, Psalms thrice, and Daniel once. In Isaiah it occurs only

²⁵ Prince, *Commentary on Daniel*, p. 126.

in chapter lviii. 3, 4, 5, and 6, where we find the verb three times and the noun four times. In Zechariah the verb occurs three times in chapter seven and the noun four times in chapter eight. In 2 Samuel xii, the verb is found four times and the noun once. In the literature classed by the critics as late, the verb is found once in Chronicles and that in a passage found also in Samuel, once in Ezra, once in Nehemiah, and twice in Esther; while the noun occurs once in Chronicles, once in Ezra, once in Nehemiah, twice in Esther, three times in Joel, once in Jonah, and three times in the Psalms. Altogether, therefore, even granting the claims of the critics as to the dates of the books, the verb occurs in the late literature five times to sixteen in the earlier and the noun twelve to fourteen times. According to the traditional view of the dates, the verb occurs in the early literature sixteen times to five times in the later literature, and the noun eighteen or nineteen times to seven or eight. It should be noticed that verb and noun occur eight times in Samuel, seven times in Zechariah vii-viii, seven times in Isaiah lviii. Wherein any special importance can be found in Daniel's single and appropriate act of fasting from which to determine the late date of the book named after him, the superman professor of Koenigsberg has not made known to us. Presumably, he has willed it thus to be and so it must be! When the lion roars, let all the beasts of the forest keep silence.

Our German professor has discovered another important act of fasting in chapter x. 3, where Daniel says that because he was mourning he ate no pleasant bread nor partook of meat or wine for three weeks. Surely no one but an eminent professor in the school of Kant could have the penetration into the evolution of nature and history to perceive that a man depressed with mourning might have abstained from his ordinary diet 2100 years ago but could not or would not have done so 2500 years ago. Nor is it clear to the writer how the phrase "I ate not, I drank not" could have been used by the Sumerian author of the *Nimrod Epic*²⁶ hundreds of years

²⁶ See Haupt, *Nimrod-Epos*.

before the time of Darius the Mede and still could be an important factor in determining the late date of the book of Daniel. Is it not probable that in all the ages since man has lived upon the earth deep grief has taken away the desire for the ordinary pleasures of the palate? Real mourning does not express itself in champagne suppers and pâtés de fois gras, and disgust with life has driven many a hermit to a lonely cave and a beggar's fare.

The third instance of fasting mentioned in Daniel (to which Professor Cornill has failed to allude) is found in vi. 18, where Darius is said to have passed the night fasting because of the predicament of Daniel who had just been cast into the den of lions. Since this chapter is in Aramaic, the word for fasting is in Aramaic also, and is not found in Biblical Hebrew.²⁷ While the word is not found in Babylonian, a parallel to the whole passage occurs in an inscription of Ashurbanipal where it says that Ishtar of Arbila said to him: "Where the place of Nebo is, eat food and drink wine, let music be made, and honor my divinity."²⁸ Numerous parallels can be found, also, in the *Arabian Nights*, which show clearly that to oriental kings eating and drinking and music were the ordinary means of distraction and dissipation. Abstention from them was a sign of low spirits. Haroun ar Rashid is represented as frequently refusing these common enjoyments and as demanding some extraordinary means of relieving the gloom and ennui of life. That Darius should have been sorely grieved because of his friend Daniel was natural and commendable and that he should have abstained from the nightly routine of pleasures was to have been expected, because he was a man as well as a disgruntled king made helpless by his own thoughtless decree; but to assert that his fasting was an important event or an indication of

²⁷ The root occurs in Arabic, where it means "to be hungry." In Syriac the verb means to "roast," but the noun has the sense of fasting. The usual word for fast in both Aramaic and Arabic is the same as the Hebrew *šum*.

²⁸ Ašar maškani Nabu akul akalu šiti kurunnu ningutu šukun nu'id iluti (KB. II. 252).

the date of the book that records it, would be preposterous. It was simply human. Had he done otherwise, he would have been a monster.

The phrase "to afflict one's soul" which is employed in the so-called Holiness and Priestly codes as an equivalent of the words for fasting, is not found in Daniel; but even if it were, it would not indicate the late date of Daniel, inasmuch as the Holiness code at least is usually assigned by the critics to the time of the captivity.²⁹

The conclusion from the review of fasting, as far as it is mentioned in the Old Testament, can only be that the writer of Daniel does not attach an importance to it superior to that to be found in Samuel, Isaiah and Zechariah, and that no indication of date can be derived from the reference to it in Daniel. In works antedating the New Testament writings the only sure evidence (aside from the special "affliction of the soul" that characterized the services of the Day of Atonement) of any particular importance imputed to the act of fasting is to be found in the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*. This book according to Professor Charles was written between 109 and 107 B.C.³⁰ According to this document "Reuben practices abstinence for seven years (i. 10), Simeon for two (iii. 4), and Judah till old age (xv. 4, xix. 2), in expiation of their sins. Joseph fasts seven years to preserve his chastity (iii. 4). Issachar in his righteousness and self-control abstains from wine all his life (vii. 3). The righteous man combines fasting with chastity (ix. 2), the double-hearted man superstitiously combines fasting and adultery, ii. 8, iv. 3."³¹ None of the other pre-Christian writings even so much as mention fasting. To be sure, Professor Charles finds in the second chapter of Tobit a fasting that had "not reached the culmination of its development." To show how far this fasting of Tobit's was from a culmination it is only necessary to quote the passage in full:

²⁹ See Lev. xvi. 31, xxiii. 27, 29, 32, Num. xxix. 7. Compare Cornill, *Introduction* p. 132-36.

³⁰ *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, II. 290.

³¹ *Id.*, p. 296, note to vs. 10.

"When Esarhaddon was king, I came home again, and my wife Anna was restored unto me, and my son Tobias. And at our feast of the Pentecost, which is the holy head of the Weeks, there was a good dinner prepared for me; and I laid me down to dine. And the table was set for me, and abundant victuals were set for me, and I said unto Tobias my son, Go my boy, and what poor man soever thou shalt find of our brethren of the Ninevite captives, who is mindful of God with his whole heart, bring him and he shall eat together with me; and lo, I tarry for thee, my boy, until thou come.

"And Tobias went to seek some poor man of our brethren and returned and said, Father. And I said to him, Here am I, my child. And he answered and said, Father, behold, one of our nation hath been murdered and cast out in the marketplace, and he hath but now been strangled. And I sprang up and left my dinner before I had tasted it, and took him up from the street and put him in one of the chambers until the sun was set, to bury him. Therefore I returned and washed myself, and ate food with mourning, and remembered the word of the prophet which Amos spake against Bethel, saying: Your feasts shall be turned into mourning and all your ways into lamentation."

The Oxford professor who can discern the undeveloped custom of fasting in this story of Tobit³² is evidently not the editor of *Punch* nor a lecturer on the humor of Dickens and Jerome K. Jerome. One can imagine him sitting down to an abundant repast in honor of the king of England's birthday, while a captive in Broussa or Iconium, and sending out a messenger to invite to his dinner some stranded countryman. The messenger returns with the terrifying announcement that while going out at the front gate he stumbled over the dead body of an Englishman just slain by the Bashi Bazouks. The nice fresh corpse is brought in. But the professor says in sang froid: On with the dinner. Let joy be unconfined. And so he gorges himself with soupe a la reine, and ros-bif and chilton cheese and plum pudding and gooseberry tart and a cup of Mocha with a glass of Benedictine and a Sumatra cigar (or a half dozen Memnon cigarettes), while the company drink their port and raise the rafters with the chorus: Britannia Rules the Waves. According to him Harpagus would have sent up his plate for some more little boy soup

³² Tobit, chap. II, 1-6.

after he had been informed that the soup had been made from his own little boy; and Hannibal would have celebrated the unexpected arrival of the head of Asdrubal. As for your humble servant, he would have done like the judge when the lightnings began to play. He would have crawled under the feather bed and cried to God for mercy. When Tobit saw the dead body of his countryman, he simply did not eat. Reader, what would you have done? And is it not absurd to express a belief that in this natural loss of appetite on the part of Tobit one can see the undeveloped germs of a custom of religious fasting for the good of one's soul?

Another late custom which Professor Cornill discerns as proving the late date of Daniel is that of Almsgiving. The only statement that can possibly support his view is the clause in iv. 24 (27) where Daniel advises Nebuchadnezzar to "break off his sins in righteousness and his iniquities by showing mercy to the poor." He follows the Septuagint, Peshitto, and Talmud by rendering the Aramaic word usually translated "righteousness" by "almsgiving," and then argues that this use of the word is later than the sixth century. In view of the use of this word in the Teima Aramaic inscription from the fifth century, it is doubtful if a good case could be made against the early date of Daniel, even if it were admitted that the word meant almsgiving here in Daniel.³³ This, however, would not prove that it was used in this sense in Daniel, nor does the fact that the early translators into Greek and Aramaic interpreted it as meaning alms. No one disputes that when these translations were made the word had acquired this meaning. In fact, in Aramaic the common word for sin denoted originally "debt," and so the word for righteousness came to mean the means of getting rid of the debt by payment. It was a *quid pro quo* system of redemption; so much sin, so much righteousness, a system of indulgences on a universal scale. But that it is not so used in

³³ Compare Bevan (*Commentary*, p. 94) who says that its use on the Teima inscription shows that the Aramaic word had acquired the sense of a "payment for religious purposes" long before the second century.

Dan. iv. 24 appears from the following reasons. First, righteousness or right conduct suits the connection. Secondly, a king would more naturally be asked to be righteous than to give alms. Thirdly, the parallel clause "showing mercy" favors the judicial rather than the beneficiary interpretation. Fourthly, many of the radical critics hold to the sense of righteousness.³⁴ Fifthly, in ix. 7, 16, 18, the only other places where Daniel employs the word, it is admitted by all to be used in the sense of righteousness, or righteous deeds.

The last custom which Professor Cornill cites as indicating a late origin for Daniel is that of abstaining from flesh and wine in intercourse with the heathen.³⁵ In regard to this abstinence Professor Prince says that it is a "distinctly Maccabean touch."³⁶ "We have," he adds, "only to refer to 1 Macc. i. 62-63 to see how such a defilement [as that of eating unclean food] was regarded by the pious Jews of that period. The persecuting Syrian king was particularly importunate against the ritualistic requirements of the Jewish Law and especially against the regulation forbidding the Jews to touch a strange food (see l. c. I. 60). The author of Daniel, therefore, in emphasizing this act of piety on the part of his hero, is plainly touching on a point of vital importance to his readers."³⁷

Since this passage in First Maccabees is the only one in pre-Christian literature outside the Bible bearing upon uncleanness of food, we shall give it in full before proceeding to comment on the subject. We shall quote the passage from the 54th verse to the 64th, inclusive:

³⁴ So, Von Lengerke, *Das Buch Daniel*, p. 185; Prince, in his *Commentary*, p. 88, makes it mean "kind acts."

³⁵ *Introduction*, p. 288: Objection must be made to Cornill's translation of *patbag* by "flesh." In none of the derivations for this word suggested by the eminent Persian scholars and by the translators and lexicographers who have attempted to give its meaning is the sense confined to flesh. Prince's "dainties" is better but his "food" is better still, since the writer of Daniel defines it in verse 12 by *ma'akal*, a term which means "anything that is eaten." The good old word "victuals" is, perhaps, as correct an equivalent as the English language affords.

³⁶ *Commentary on Daniel*, p. 61.

³⁷ *Id.*, p. 61, 62.

"And on the fifteenth day of Chislew in the one hundred and forty-fifth year [*i.e.* 168 B.C.] they set up upon the altar an abomination of desolation, and in the cities of Judah on every side they established high places; and they offered sacrifices at the doors of the houses and in the streets. And the books of the Law which they found they rent in pieces and burned them in the fire. And with whomsoever was found a book of the covenant and if he was consenting unto the Law, such an one was, according to the king's sentence, condemned to death. Thus did they in their might to the Israelites who were found month by month in their cities. And on the twenty-fifth day of the month they sacrificed upon the altar which was upon the altar of burnt-offering. And, according to the decree, they put to death the women who had circumcised their children, hanging their babes round their (mothers') necks, and they put to death their (entire) families, together with those who had circumcised them. Nevertheless, many in Israel stood firm and determined in their hearts that they would not eat unclean things, and chose rather to die so that they might not be defiled with meats, thereby profaning the holy covenant; and they did die."

Upon this passage from Maccabees it may be remarked:

First, it is the only place in the book in which unclean foods are mentioned.

Secondly, abstention from wine is not expressed in it.

Thirdly, it was the law as a whole and in all its parts that Antiochus was attempting to destroy, the laws against eating certain meats being only a part of it.

Fourthly, the laws about clean and unclean animals occur in Deut. xiv as well as in Lev. xi. They were in existence, therefore, according to the critics, before the sixth century B.C., so that they would be as binding on Jews in Babylon in the time of Nebuchadnezzar as on those in Palestine in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes.

Fifthly, a strange inconsistency is latent in this assumption of the anti-biblical critics with regard to the alleged emphasis placed upon unclean foods in the second century B.C. It is a fundamental assumption of those who believe in the natural evolution of religion that fetichism and totemism, with their involved distinctions of holy and unholy, clean and unclean, are to be found in the first stages of religious development, and yet these critics of Daniel would have us believe that the

importance attached to it arose in the second century B.C.! To carry one point they argue that the distinction is among the earliest of all customs. To carry another point, they argue that it is among the latest.

Sixthly, there was no more reason for a pious Jew's abstention from unclean meats in the second century B.C. than there was in the sixth. The Law of God was just as binding at the earlier as at the later period. And this Law, according to the critics themselves, contained the injunctions and regulations with regard to clean and unclean animals and with regard to the eating of blood. According to these same critics the man Daniel is represented in the book named after him as a pious Jew living in Babylon in the sixth century B.C., but the ignorant author makes him in fact live like a pious Jew of the time of the Maccabees. No proof of this opinion can be found either in the law or the custom of abstention from unclean animals. Besides, the inscriptions of Nebuchadnezzar clearly show that no man was ever a more ardent and faithful and munificent worshipper of the gods than he and hence would be more likely than he to require conformity to the religious customs prevailing in his palace. The numerous temples which he built or renovated and the bountiful gifts with which he endowed them are the theme of his tireless boastings and the ground of his repeated prayers. In some cases he has enumerated his donations toward the support of the temple service. Thus in the Grotefend Cylinder³⁸ he says that he had increased his fat offerings and clean free-will offerings of Marduk," among which he names "for every day one fat ox, a perfect ox, . . . fish, birds, various kinds of vegetables, honey, butter, milk, the best oil and a dozen different kinds of wine and strong drink," which he made to abound "upon the table of Marduk and Zarpinat my (his) Lords." In the same inscription, he is said to have offered substantially the same things to Nebo and Nana. Now, from what we know of all ancient nations and their religions we are certain that they all had rules as to what was a proper of-

³⁸ KB. III. II. 32 f.

fering to make to the gods and how it should be offered. Their offerings were usually the best of what they allowed themselves. Reasoning from analogy, it is certain that the Babylonian court would have its etiquette and the priests their observances, and that every courtier and servant of the king would be compelled to submit to them, especially if he had an order of the king to that effect. Daniel and his three companions at court were therefore in an apparently inescapable dilemma. They must either obey the law or the king. By a permissible subterfuge they circumvented the king. By confining themselves to a diet of cereals and possibly, fruits and herbs, they escaped the danger of eating blood, eels, swans, and other unclean things, and of drinking strong or mixed drinks, perhaps mixed with blood; and especially they avoided the outward appearance of honoring the gods to whom possibly all of the meats and drinks on the king's table had first been offered.³⁹ In short, so true to what the life of a pious Jew at the court of Nebuchadnezzar in Daniel's circumstances must have been is this first chapter, that the author of it, if he really lived in the second century, must have had the genius of an historical novelist of the first order. The injunction about clean and unclean foods had been given long before the sixth century. The observance of the injunction by a pious Jew of the sixth century was to be presupposed. Daniel is represented as such a pious Jew. Therefore he must have observed the injunction. And consequently, to use the statement that Daniel observed this injunction as an argument for the late date of the book is absurd.

Thus far we have been on the defensive with regard to the customs referred to in Daniel which are said to have been emphasized, also, in the time of the Maccabees and thus to indicate an origin of Daniel at that time. Now, before concluding this matter, a few offensive, or offensive-defensive,

³⁹ So, at least, thinks Hitzig: "Sie wollten keine Speise genießen, von der möglicher Weise den Götzen geopfert werden, oder die vielleicht noch obendrein von einem unreinen Thier herrührte." See *Das Buch Daniel*, p. 10.

counter charges along this line of customs must be made. Take, for example, the custom of magnifying the importance of the law which is the outstanding feature of First Maccabees and Jubilees, and compare it with the fact that the Law is never mentioned in Daniel except in ix. 11 and 13.⁴⁰ Jubilees is really a sort of commentary on the laws of Moses, and First Maccabees again and again represents the great war of liberation as a revolt against the attempt of Antiochus Epiphanes and his successors to suppress the law and to Grecize the Jews. Thus in 1 Macc. i. 42, Epiphanes writes to his whole kingdom that everyone should give up his usages, and letters from the king were sent to Judea to the effect that they should practice foreign customs, cease the offerings in the sanctuary, profane the Sabbaths, feasts, and sanctuary, build high-places, sacred groves, shrines for idols, sacrifice swine and other unclean animals, and leave their sons uncircumcised, *so that they might forget the Law*. In accordance with this decree, high places were established in the cities, sacrifices were offered at the doors of the houses and in the streets, the books of the Law were rent in pieces and burnt, whoever had a copy of the Law was put to death, and the women who had circumcised their children were put to death with their families.⁴¹ In ii. 21, Mattathias proclaimed the principle of the rebels when he said with a loud voice: Heaven forbid that we should forsake the Law and the ordinances. He showed his zeal for the Law by killing the king's officer who had come to Modin to enforce the king's decree and fled to the mountains after he had cried: Let everyone that is zealous for the Law and that would maintain the covenant come forth after me.⁴² Afterwards there were gathered unto him the mighty men who willingly offered themselves for the Law,⁴³ and they went round about and pulled down altars and circumcised children by force and rescued the Law out of

⁴⁰ In verse 10 the laws of the prophets are spoken of.

⁴¹ i. 44-61.

⁴² ii. 19-28.

⁴³ ii. 42.

the hand of the Gentiles.⁴⁴ In his great speech delivered just before his death he says among other things: "My children, be zealous for the Law and give your lives for the covenant of your fathers, be strong and show yourselves men on behalf of the Law, take all who observe the Law and avenge the wrong of your people, and render a recompense to the Gentiles and take heed to the commandments of the Law."⁴⁵ After the death of Epiphanes, when his commander Lysias wanted to make peace with the Jews, he said: "Let us settle with them that they be permitted to walk after their own laws as aforetime; for because of their laws which we abolished were they angered and did all these things."⁴⁶ In comparing the references to the Law and laws in Daniel with what is said in Maccabees, it must be noticed, also, that in the former it is the wilful transgressions of them by the fathers that are always in mind; whereas in Maccabees, it is the attempted annulment of them by an alien, and an enforced transgression of them by the living Israelites to which allusion is made.

What is true of the Law in general is true of circumcision and the Sabbath in particular. The book of First Maccabees contains numerous and scattered references to the Sabbath and one to the sabbatic year, and the first two chapters describe at length the endeavors to suppress the usage of circumcision and on the part of apostate Jews to conceal even its traces; whereas Daniel never mentions either Sabbath or circumcision. If Daniel were a fiction with Maccabean background, it certainly seems a great defect that the author failed to show how his heroes refused to work on the Sabbath day or that they were tempted to hide their circumcision.

One other feature that is conspicuous in the background of the Maccabees is utterly ignored in Daniel, that is the use of the phalanx and of elephants in war. The Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian armies never employed the elephant;

⁴⁴ ii. 45-48.

⁴⁵ ii. 49-68.

⁴⁶ vi. 55-60. For other references to the Law and the laws, see iii. 29, 48, 56; iv. 42, 47, 53; x. 14; xi. 21; xiii. 3; xiv. 14, 29.

and in harmony with this fact, the books of the Old Testament never mention it. Alexander the Great was the first of the Greeks to come in contact with the elephant as an instrument of warfare. This was in his battle with Porus in the Punjab. Seleucus Nicator introduced it first in the battles of Western Asia. Pyrrhus and the Carthaginians used it in their wars with Rome and it continued to be a much dreaded arm of service until at the command of Scipio Africanus the Romans at the battle of Zama which sealed the fate of Carthage discomfited his great rival Hannibal by opening up the legions so that the elephants would pass between the serried ranks. In the wars against Antiochus the Romans triumphed by using the same tactics, and we hear nothing of their use in battle after the fall of Carthage and of the Seleucid kingdom. In the wars of Antiochus Epiphanes and his successors against the Jews, however, they were still the main arm of the service and at first they struck terror into their rebellious adversaries. Eleazar, one of the brothers of Judas Maccabeus, was crushed by the falling on him of an elephant which he had stabbed from underneath in an endeavor to kill the king.⁴⁷ They are mentioned, also, elsewhere⁴⁸ as constituent and important parts of the Syrian armies.

The phalanx, that great Greek rival of the Roman legion, was the ordinary formation of the heavy armed troops of the Syrian as well as the Macedonian armies, and the word is found in 1 Macc. vi. 35, 38, 45; ix. 12; and x. 82. In Daniel, however, neither elephant nor phalanx is mentioned, but simply the old time horses and chariots of the Persian and pre-Persian period. It seems to be incumbent on the critics to explain how an artist of the ability of the writer of Daniel could be so correct in some parts of his background and so defective in others,—that is, if this artist really lived in the second century, and painted the background of his fiction with the colors of his time. This wonderful accuracy of his in describing what existed in the sixth century confirms us in

⁴⁷ 1 Macc. vi. 36-46.

⁴⁸ In i. 17, iii. 34; viii. 6; and xi. 56.

our belief that the author of the book really lived in that period. For we cannot see how one who was so ignorant of the history of Babylon, Persia, and Greece, as the critics assert that this author was, could have known that the elephants and phalanxes were not in existence in the time of which he feigned the history. He is supposed (?) to err on such important and easily ascertained matters as who was the last king of Babylon, who was Darius the Mede, and how many were the kings of Persia, and yet he knows enough about their times to steer clear of any mention of elephants in his description of the great army of the king of the north referred to in xi. 40. He describes so accurately the history of the wars between the Ptolemies and Seleucids that the critics say that the account must have been written *post eventum*, and yet he knows so little of their armies as to speak of their chariots, and horsemen, and fleet and never mention their phalanxes and their elephants.

One other custom is mentioned in Daniel which seems eminently fitted to a Babylonian background in the sixth century B.C., but for which we will look in vain in the Palestine of the second century. This is the custom of closing and sealing documents. As is well known, the Babylonian clay tablet or brick was first prepared and inscribed and then was covered with an envelope of clay upon which a docket or endorsement was written, and the whole was stamped with a seal.⁴⁹ The statements of Dan. ix. 26 and xii. 4, 9 would then be clear. Daniel's visions were to be written on tablets, closed up, and sealed, until the time of the end.⁵⁰ The endorsement

⁴⁹ It is possible that the Babylonian word *šatam*, used to denote an official of the temples, may be derived from the root "to close, or shut up." The man who closed up the inside tablet and endorsed and sealed it would be a more important individual than the scribe who wrote the document. Hommel's translation "secretary" would be a very good equivalent. One *šatam* might have a dozen tablet-writers under him, it being his business to read over, and close up, endorse, and seal the letters and contracts.

⁵⁰ One is tempted to take the word *ḫeš*, usually meaning *end*, as an infinitive from *ḫašaš* meaning "to break off," and to translate "until the time of breaking off," *i.e.*, of taking off the clay envelope which contained the tablet on which the vision was written.

on the envelope may have directed when the tablet was to be uncovered. Two tablets of the size of the creation tablets would contain the whole of Daniel. The first tablet may have contained the part in Aramaic and the second that in Hebrew (*i.e.*, chapters viii-xii) or there may have been nine or ten tablets. The injunction of the prophetic writer to keep the vision secret would then be not a "mere literary device to explain to the readers of Daniel why the book was not known before their time"; but it would be a real part of the vision, repeated on the endorsement, and designed as it says to preserve the contents of the vision from the prying eyes of the curious. That the keeping of the contents of a document "hidden from immediate posterity" was not a difficulty in the view of "the oriental mind" is apparent from the fact that the contents of their contract tablets were concealed by their envelopes from all prying eyes, until the time of breaking off the envelope arrived. That time would be determined either by the instructions on the envelope or by the decision of the custodians or judges. The Assyrian and Babylonian tablets were preserved in the archives of the temples, palaces, and banks. Daniel's tablets would naturally be entrusted to the care of the proper Jewish custodians, to be opened according to the instruction given in the endorsement, or docket, which was inscribed on the envelope. If in chapter xii. 11 we read *dalath* instead of *resh* giving us *husad* instead of *husar*, the endorsement may have read that the tablet was to be opened 1290 years after the daily offering had been instituted at Sinai. If Daniel and the custodians dated this institution at Sinai at 1460 B.C., the time for the opening would be 170 B.C. If the text as it stands is preferred and the 1290 days be interpreted as literal days, it might mean, as Bevan suggests,⁵¹ 1290 days after the desecration of the temple and the taking away of the daily offerings. In 2 Macc. ii. 14, Judas is said to have collected all the writings which had been scattered owing to the outbreak of the war. Among these writings Daniel may have been found still in its original tablets which may then have been broken, translated, and published.

⁵¹ *Commentary*, p. 207.

Whatever may be said of this conjecture, it is certainly as sensible as many of those put forward by commentators. It would eliminate all objections made to the early date of Daniel, in so far as they are based upon the character of the language in which the book is written.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

EZEKIEL'S DIVISION OF PALESTINE AMONG THE TRIBES

To complete the study of the oblation plan in Ezekiel xlviii¹ the new disposition of the tribes must be examined. These are to occupy transverse zones of territory, the order of which is given with all the formality of a legal document. On the north of the oblation are to be seven portions, thus arranged from north to south—Dan, Asher, Naphtali, Manasseh, Ephraim, Reuben, and Judah: each is to lie side by side with its neighbour from east to west, and Judah's portion, next the oblation, is to correspond to it in length (xlviii. 8), and therefore to be 25,000 reeds E. to W. The territory adjacent to the oblation on its remaining sides is to belong to "the prince" (xlv. 7; xlviii. 21-22). South of that the other tribes find place,—Benjamin, Simeon, Issachar, Zebulun, and Gad.

The motive of this arrangement may appear obscure, and the mathematical regularity demanded by the parallel boundaries is certainly a great change from the allotment under Joshua, but with all due respect to the unanimous opinion of commentators,² it is highly unreasonable to refuse serious

¹ Former papers on the subject appeared in the REVIEW, July and October, 1922; July, 1923.

² "It is impossible to delineate on any map of Palestine these ideal sections of territory assigned to each tribe in the ideal land. They could only be represented by horizontal lines drawn across the country, and would not fit in with the natural features of the land."—Redpath, *Westminster Comm.*, p. 263.

"Speaking broadly, we may say that he treats Palestine as a rectangular strip of country, which he divides into transverse sections of indeterminate breadth, and then proceeds to parcel out these amongst the twelve tribes. A similar obscurity rests on the motives which determined the disposition of the different tribes within the sacred territory."—Skinner, *Expositor's Bible*, p. 492.

"His love of symmetrical arrangement now defies all difficulties and lifts him away from anything that could be carried out or even tolerated in actual practice. The twelve tribes are rearranged in parallel strips, stretching from east to west, quite irrespective of the varying fertility and configuration of the country, and the inequality of the length of the strips due to the shape of the coast-line. We are reminded of the diagrammatic boundaries between some of the central and western states of North America."—Lofthouse, *The Prophet of Reconstruction*, p. 209.

study to the prophet's scheme simply on these counts. His expectation of the return of all the tribes to the land was shared by other prophets, and the presumption is that in the case of this deliberate arrangement of the national inheritance, no less than in his description of city and sanctuary, he was acting as the mouthpiece of his fellow prophets, and setting on record a programme whose divine authority their writings recognise.

THE DIVISION OF THE LAND

The fact that Ezekiel does not state the breadth (N. to S.) of a tribal portion has been taken as an objection against the practical intentions of his plan. But when the position of the oblation is fixed as we have found it can be from his data, this measurement is obtained simply by dividing by seven the distance between the oblation and the northern boundary. It is unfortunate from our point of view that there should be much dubiety about the line of this northern boundary, the place-names in it being almost all lost, but this is no objection against the intrinsic practicability of the plan. And the difficulty is largely overcome when it is noted that we can seize with certainty upon one point in the northern boundary, Damascus, and that to the north of this point one tribal portion, and one only, is evidently to lie:

"Now these are the names of the tribes from the north end. Beside the way of Hethlon unto the entering in of Hamath; Hazar-enan, the border of Damascus northward beside Hamath: for these are his sides east and west; Dan, one portion" (xlviii. 1).

It follows that between Damascus and the oblation six portions lie. From Damascus to the oblation is eighty-five miles, which allows each portion a breadth of slightly over fourteen miles: assuming, as we are entitled to do, that in reeds the figure is a round number, we have indicated as the missing measurement 7,000 reeds ($14\frac{1}{2}$ miles).

We shall test this figure (I) by its suitability for the settlement of the five tribes south of the oblation; (II) by the



light which it throws on the description of the northern boundary:

I. The arrangement of the portions south of the oblation is complicated by two factors, (a) the curve in the coast line between Joppa and the southern boundary at El Arish, and (b) the demands of the prince's territory.

(a) In the case of some at least of the southern portions, the uniform parallelogram shape which the northern portions inevitably assume will have to be abandoned: to absorb the transition from the almost horizontal southern border of the oblation to the northwesterly line from Kadesh to El Arish (xlvi. 19; xlviii. 28), some portion or portions require to narrow towards the Mediterranean and open out towards the east. Their area, of course, must remain the same.

(b) The prince's territory consists of the triangular residue left between the oblation and the Mediterranean, of a similar residue on the east, and also of a strip of territory south of the oblation uniting his eastern and western residues: this last is indicated by the direction that his possession is to be "answerable unto the portions" (xlvi. 21), *i.e.*, side by side with the tribal portions; or, as it is more precisely expressed in xlv. 7, "in length answerable unto one of the portions, from the west border unto the east border." This portion, that of Benjamin, must therefore be longer than the 25,000 reeds of the oblation by the extent of the eastern and western residues of the prince.

On the other hand a line drawn between the two inland points given in the southern boundary of the land, Tamar and Kadesh,³ runs parallel to the sea-coast at a distance of 25,000 reeds from it. The inference is that the portions lying between Tamar and Kadesh must be normal in shape, those north of Tamar elongated and irregular. As the distance from Tamar to Kadesh is about forty-four miles, from

³ Tamar is identified with modern Kornub, about 22 miles southwest of the Dead Sea; Kadesh with Ain-Kadeis, about 50 miles south of Beer-sheba. So G. A. Smith's *Historical Atlas of the Holy Land*, which is relied on throughout this study for its geographical data.

Tamar to the oblation forty miles, the number of tribal portions between Tamar and Kadesh must be three; to select any other figure would make impossible the equitable disposition between Tamar and the oblation of the remaining tribes and the prince's possession. Dividing the Tamar-Kadesh line into three equal parts we again get as the breadth of a portion $14\frac{1}{2}$ miles or 7,000 reeds.

II. The northern boundary now becomes a line drawn at a distance of 49,000 reeds (101.563 miles) from the oblation: it is then found to leave the sea-coast at the root of the promontory of Beirut, to follow for twelve miles the course of the road which leads from the Phœnician coast to the valley of Coele-Syria and the northern empire of Hamath, to pass with this road through the Lebanon range between Jebel Kuneiyseh (6825 feet) and Jebel el Baruk (7229 feet), and then, leaving the road, which turns northward towards Hamath, to terminate some thirty-eight miles to the east and about 7,000 reeds north of Damascus. One of the prominent points in Ezekiel's boundary is the famous but unidentified "entering in of Hamath" (xlvii. 20; xlviii. 1). As through this pass between Jebel Kuneiyseh and Jebel el Baruk not only the ancient road from the Phœnician coast to Hamath but also the modern railway runs, it has every claim to be regarded as the natural "entering in of Hamath," and the boundary lies as directed, "beside the way of Hethlon unto the entering in of Hamath" (xlviii. 1).

In the fuller description of the north boundary in xlvii. 15-17, the additional names are all of hazy location,⁴ but if we

⁴ "And this shall be the border of the land toward the north side: from the Great Sea, the way of Hethlon unto the entering in of Zedad; Hamath; Berothah; Sibram [or "the two hills"] which is [are] between the border of Damascus and the border of Hamath; Hazer-hatticon which is by the border of Hauran. And the border from the sea shall be Hazar-enon, the border of Damascus and the north northward, and the border of Hamath. And this is the north side."

Zedad and Hazar-enon are mentioned in Moses' boundary (Num. xxxiv. 8, 9), but their position is uncertain; the "entering in of Zedad" is evidently the same as the "entering in of Hamath." Hazer-hatticon, "the middle village," may be identical with Hazar-enon. Hethlon and Sibram are nowhere else mentioned.

are permitted to identify Berothah with Beirut (Beyrouth)⁵, the correctness of our line is placed beyond doubt.

The boundaries of the land are, therefore, a northern line as just described; an eastern line running southward past Damascus, through the Hauran and trans-Jordanic territory, at a distance of 25,000 reeds from the coast line, until it meets the N.E. corner of the oblation, after which it must be decided according to the necessities of the eastern residue for the prince and of adjacent southern portions ("Ye shall measure it," the prophet says; xlvii. 18); a southern line resuming at Tamar its parallel course to the coast at a distance of 25,000 reeds, continuing so to Kadesh, and then turning northwest to run into the sea at El Arish. Within these bounds the twelve tribes must each occupy an area equivalent to 25,000 by 7,000 reeds, and all, except Benjamin and Simeon, have a portion of parallelogram form.

The land is now extended to its widest bounds, from the entering in of Hamath to the brook of Egypt. These had always been its borders in theory,⁶ but in practice Dan and Beersheba had been found a more accurate description. The Vale of Shechem, which is equidistant from Dan and Beersheba, is also equidistant from Ezekiel's north and south lines, the distance in each case being 112 miles.

THE ORDER OF THE TRIBES

In the historic territory between Dan and Beersheba now lie only six tribal portions, those of Manasseh, Ephraim, Reuben, Judah, Benjamin, and Simeon, while Levi has his

⁵ Berothah is mentioned also in 2 Sam. viii. 8. G. A. Smith, *Historical Atlas*, Map 34, places it about 30 miles east of Beirut, which, so far as the definition of Ezekiel's northern boundary is concerned, gives much the same result as if it were identified with Beirut. The chief objection to this identification lies in the present passage of Ezekiel, where the order of its mention—"Hamath, Berothah, Sibram"—appears to forbid its being on the sea-coast. But this need not be decisive,—compare the east boundary (xlvii. 18), where we have Hauran, Damascus, Gilead, although the Hauran lies to the south of Damascus. Possibly the sense is "Hamath, from Berothah to Sibram."

⁶ Numb. xxxiv. 5, 8; Josh. xiii. 3, 5; 1 Kings viii. 65; 2 Chron. vii. 8.

portion within the oblation. As its immediate bodyguard the sanctuary therefore has what may be termed the "big six" among the tribes,—the sons of Rachel and the four elder sons of Leah. These played a predominant part both in the narrative of Genesis, where personal adventures of each are related, in contrast to the silence concerning Issachar, Zebulun, Dan, Asher, Gad, and Naphtali, and in the history of Israel, where Ephraim, Judah, Levi, and Benjamin hold the center of the stage. In his arrangement the prophet appears in the first place desirous of paying due honour to this "big six," each of whom is stationed nearer to the sanctuary than any of the remaining six.⁷

The place of honour among the tribes is given to Judah, side by side with the priests' or most holy territory. If it is a Mosaic priesthood of which Ezekiel speaks, the explanation of this association is not obvious: but if the "sons of Zadok" are of the order of Melchizedek, it is natural that they should be neighboured by the tribe out of which sprang the High Priest of their order. Zechariah's prediction that "The Lord shall inherit [or "assign"] Judah his portion beside the holy land"⁸ is surely a reminiscence of this position allotted to Judah beside the holy oblation.

After Judah, the place of honour outside the oblation is taken not by a tribal portion but by the possession of the prince, which surrounds the reserved land on three sides. It is clear that the prince (*nasi*) is a ruler with all the weaknesses of a mortal, not to be confounded with the King (*melek*) on Zion: he is the representative head of the people and presents offerings on their behalf (xlv. 17; xlv. 1-15); he is warned against violence and unjust exactions (xlv. 8-

⁷ Cf. Joshua's settlement, where the mountainland of Israel, with all the holy places from Shechem to Beersheba, was allotted to Manasseh, Ephraim, Benjamin, and Judah, while the erring tribes, Simeon and Reuben, lay adjacent to them.

⁸ Zech. ii. 12. The preposition is '*al*', the preposition used in Ezekiel xlviii to describe the relation of each tribal portion to its neighbour, and there translated "by." The application of the phrase "the holy land" to all Palestine is a modern convention.

10; xlv. 18) ; it appears that it is a dynasty, not an individual, that is referred to (xlv. 8, 9; xlv. 16-18). But there is no reason to doubt that, as Dr. Skinner says, "He is the heir of the Davidic house and holds his office in virtue of the divine promise which secured the throne to David's descendants."⁹ Ezekiel states that "My servant David" shall be both king (*melek*, xxxvii. 24) and prince (*nasi*, xxxiv. 24; xxxvii. 25) among the restored people.

As David's line was of the tribe of Judah, the oblation is thus surrounded on all sides by territory of that tribe. The domain of the Davidic prince also acts as a connecting link between the two tribes which were always faithful to David's house, Judah and Benjamin. Benjamin's long association with Judah explains his separation from the other Rachel tribes, and his position here between Judah and Simeon. To the kingdom of Judah, as opposed to the Ten Tribes, is given the place of honour in the land.

Benjamin's situation is additionally appropriate both from the significance of his name, and from his birth. His place as the first of the tribes on the south, or right hand, of the city, fulfils the promise of his name, "Son of the right hand," while his position nearest the city of all recalls the fact that he alone of the sons of Jacob was born within its bounds, a little way from Ephrath. Between his territory and the city comes the prince's possession, but David also was born in the city, in Ephrath:

"Yea, of Zion it shall be said, This one and that one was born in her. . . .

The Lord shall count, when He writeth up the peoples,
This one was born there" (Ps. lxxxvii. 5-6).

For the rest, the situation of Reuben is noteworthy. He now takes a position more in consonance with his birth than ever before, having precedence over Joseph to whom his birthright had been forfeited, and standing next to Judah: the union of the two tribes who had disputed the headship, Ephraim and Judah, by the actual first-born, Reuben, is prob-

⁹ *Expositor's Bible*, p. 447. See Jer. xxxiii. 14-26.

ably intentional. Joseph is still distinguished, however, by being given two portions, and Ephraim is still on the right hand of his elder brother Manasseh.

Beyond the portions of Manasseh and Simeon, the outermost of the "big six," are accommodated the two younger sons of Leah and the sons of the maidservants, in land with few sacred associations but nevertheless always Israelite *de iure* if not *de facto*. Dan, Asher, and Naphtali are grouped together in the north, as in the former settlement, Dan retaining the northernmost position which he originally won on his own initiative. In the south are Issachar and Zebulun, associated as was customary, with Gad in the extreme position. The separation of Gad from his brother tribes in the north, and his relegation to the last portion, recalls the first settlement when Gad voluntarily separated himself from the others in order to seize land east of the Jordan; in the territory then occupied by him was a strip of land fifty miles by ten which is included in the oblation, and to this there is a plain reference in the blessing of Moses on Gad:

"He teareth the arm, yea, the crown of the head.
And he provided the first part for himself.

For there was the lawgiver's portion reserved"
(Deut. xxxiii. 20-21).

THE TERRITORIES OF THE TRIBES

The three tribes in the north, Dan, Asher, and Naphtali, inhabit territory originally allotted to Israel but held by powerful foes whom Joshua and his successors failed to eject,— "all Lebanon, toward the sunrising, from Baal-gad under Mount Hermon unto the entering in of Hamath" (Josh. xiii. 5-6; Judg. iii. 1-3). Lebanon was always regarded by the prophets as part of Israel's final inheritance: "I will bring them into the land of Gilead and Lebanon" (Zech. x. 10); "the glory of Lebanon shall be given unto it" (Is. xxxv. 2; lx. 13).

Damascus, never part of the inheritance of Israel, is two miles outside the southeastern corner of Dan's portion, but the great cities of Phoenicia, Zidon and Tyre, fall to Asher

and Naphtali respectively. It was to Asher that Zidon was originally given (Josh. xix. 28), but the conquest of the Zidonians was never made (Judg. i. 31); Zidon was left as a thorn in the side of Israel to prove them, and was still a powerful city when Asher disappeared into captivity. But the blessing on Asher had been, "As thy days, so shall thy strength be" (Deut. xxxiii. 24); and the measurements of the plan implement the terms of Ezekiel's burden for Zidon: "Behold, I am against thee, O Zidon; and I will be glorified in the midst of thee. . . . And there shall be no more a pricking brier unto the house of Israel" (xxviii. 20-26).

Manasseh and Ephraim inhabit land held of old by the three tribes now north of them, and in addition extend into the former territory of the half tribe of Manasseh in Bashan: they "feed in Bashan and Gilead, as in the days of old" (Mic. vii. 14; *cf.* Jer. l. 19¹⁰). Ephraim and Reuben share the land of Galilee between them. Tabor and the "excellency of Carmel" fall to Reuben's portion, which is centered upon Nazareth.

The portion of Judah excels in interest, as it does in fertility of soil and advantage of position, any of the other tribal portions. To the Jews is given the valley lying beneath the head of the oblation mountains, the Plain of Esdraelon or Armageddon so overshadowed by apocalyptic associations. There in the past the crucial scenes of national life had been staged: there more than once the presumptuous enemies, "who said, Let us take to ourselves in possession the folds of God" (Ps. lxxxiii. 12), had been shattered before they could reach the sacred mountainland: "when the Almighty scattered kings in it, it was white as snow in Zalmon" (Ps. lxxviii. 14). In the future it was expected to play a similar rôle; in the valley of Jezreel Hosea visioned the revival of the national life (i. 10-11); to Armageddon John saw the kings of the earth gathered; and it is also in all probability the

¹⁰ "I will bring Israel again to his fold, and he shall feed on Carmel and Bashan, and his soul shall be satisfied upon Mount Ephraim and in Gilead." The distinctive position given to the territory within the holy oblation,—Mount Ephraim and Gilead,—is noteworthy.

valley of Jehoshaphat, or valley of decision, to which Joel saw all nations assemble to judgment.¹¹

Coming to the portions south of the sanctuary, we find several points of interest concerning the prince's possession. The principal town there is Hebron, which was the first capital of David and saw the Davidic line chosen with one heart by all Israel. The western residue of the prince falls in the ancient land of the Philistines, and includes the towns of Joppa, Ashdod, and Ashkelon: "he also [the Philistine] shall be a remnant for our God: and he shall be as a chieftain in Judah." So Zechariah predicted (ix. 7), surely with reference to Ezekiel's plan, for he added, "And Ekron shall be as a Jebusite"; Ekron alone of the Philistine towns falls within the bounds of the holy oblation, being absorbed in the new Jerusalem as Jebus was in the old.

The presence of the town of Mareshah in the prince's inheritance justifies mention of a hitherto unexplained prediction of Micah concerning this his native town: "I will yet bring an heir unto thee, O inhabitant of Mareshah: the glory of Israel shall come unto Adullam" (i. 15). The southern boundary line of the oblation actually passes through the town of Adullam, seven miles northeast of Mareshah; the prophecy recalls the predictions that Jehovah shall be to the future Jerusalem "a wall of fire round about" (Zech. ii. 4-5), and that "over the whole habitation of Mount Zion, and over her assemblies, . . . the glory shall be spread a canopy" (Is. iv. 5).

The portion of Benjamin also occupies Philistine territory

¹¹ The traditional identification of this valley of judgment (*Jehoshaphat*, "the Lord judgeth") with the ravine of the Kidron must be rejected. The word used for "valley" by Joel (*emek*) "denotes a wide depression between mountains, not a narrow gorge or ravine as the term *gai*' in connection with Hinnom does. For the gathering of all nations a wide, capacious valley was needed." (Bewer, *Internat. Crit. Comm., Joel*, p. 128; so also Stanley, *Sinai and Palestine*, p. 481). As the evident nearness of the valley of judgment to Jerusalem formerly led to its identification with the valley of the Kidron, it now, on the understanding that the future Jerusalem corresponds to the oblation, suggests the historic valley beneath the sanctuary portion.

on the west, between Ashkelon and Gaza, and in agreement with the extent of the prince's possession stretches eastward beyond the Dead Sea into the territory of Moab around the River Arnon. Isaiah in a Messianic prediction foretold that "As wandering birds, as a scattered nest, so shall the daughters of Moab be at the fords of Arnon" (xvi. 2); and Obadiah in visioning the future settlement definitely declared, "Benjamin shall possess Gilead"¹² (vs. 19).

To the south of Benjamin, Simeon likewise dispossesses an ancient enemy of Israel, Edom. Simeon's position is unique among the tribes inasmuch as his new allotment is identical with his former holdings. But the cities of the Negeb formerly given him out of Judah's superfluity are now his by full title. He also holds Mount Seir, the hill-country of the Edomites which the Simeonites at one period in their history conquered and inhabited (1 Chron. iv. 42-43). Ezekiel's resentment at the conduct of the Edomites who, at the time of the Exile, "appointed My land unto themselves for a possession" (xxxvi. 5) and overran the Negeb, is elsewhere strongly shown (xxxv), and his plan is a concrete expression of the anticipated triumph of Israel over her hereditary foes: "They [the re-united tribes] shall fly down upon the shoulder of the Philistines on the west; together shall they spoil the children of the east: they shall put forth their hand on Edom and Moab; and the children of Ammon shall obey them" (Is. xi. 14); or, in the words which continue the description of the oblation in the Psalms,

"Moab is My washpot:
Over Edom will I cast My shoe;
Over Philistia will I triumph" (Ps. cviii. 9).

Obadiah, probably a contemporary of Ezekiel, was likewise inspired by the depredations of Edom to proclaim the eventual triumph of the house of Jacob and the house of Joseph over the house of Esau, as over all their historical enemies, and to describe this in terms which make reference

¹² A term applicable to all trans-Jordanic territory; Num. xxxii. 29; Josh. xxii. 9; Jud. xx. 1; 2 Sam. ii. 9; 1 Chron. v. 9.

to Ezekiel's plan, one would say, unavoidable: modern criticism has, however, avoided it:

"And the South (*negeb*) shall possess the Mount of Esau; and the Lowland (*shephelah*) the Philistines. And they shall possess the field of Ephraim and the field of Samaria: and Benjamin [shall possess] Gilead. And the captivity of this host of the children of Israel, Asher, [shall possess] the Canaanites unto Zarephath; and the captivity of Jerusalem which is in Sepharad shall possess the cities of the South" (vss. 19-20).

The conquest of the territories of Edomites, Philistines, Samaritans, Moabites, and Phoenicians is here predicted, the prophet beginning and finishing with his burden, the humbling of Idumaea. The Mount of Esau is to be included in the possession of the cities of the Negeb, which, in turn, are to be inhabited by "the captivity of Jerusalem which is in Sepharad": that this should refer to Simeon, who became isolated from his brother tribes of the southern kingdom, Judah and Benjamin, is a reasonable suggestion. Similarly, the Shephelah and Philistia are to be held by the same owners,—fulfilled in the portions of the prince and Benjamin. A reference to the holy oblation can hardly be refused in "the field of Ephraim and the field of Samaria" which they—the house of Jacob and the house of Joseph—are said to inherit in common. In two further points the recognition of Ezekiel's plan is unmistakable: no explanation of Benjamin's dwelling in trans-Jordanic territory can be suggested apart from it; and in that plan Zarephath, between Zidon and Tyre, marks the limit of Asher's possession of the Phoenician coast.¹³ As in the south Simeon will yet call the borrowed cities his own, so in the north Asher will take possession of his long-de-

¹³ The word in the Massoretic text is the relative pronoun *asher*, containing the same consonants as the tribal name. But it is impossible to understand the verse thus. Both A. V. and R. V. introduce prepositions, admittedly without warrant, for many changes may then be rung. R. V. has ". . . Israel, which are *among* the Canaanites, shall possess even unto Zarephath"; A. V., ". . . Israel shall possess that *of* the Canaanites, even unto Zarephath"; so also R. V., margin, ". . . Israel shall possess that which *belongeth to* the Canaanites." But the sentence as it stands reads, ". . . Israel which [are] Canaanites," and every commentator has a different suggestion to make.

ferred Zidonian inheritance: "I will cause you to be inhabited after your former estate, and will do better unto you than at your beginnings" (Ezek. xxxvi. 11).

South of Simeon, the three remaining tribes, Issachar, Zebulun, and Gad, lie between Beersheba and the brook of Egypt, in territory whose desert character prevented its settlement during Israelite history. The chief associations of the district are with Isaac in his rôle as well-digger; promises are not lacking throughout the prophets that "the parched ground shall become a pool and the thirsty land springs of water," that "He will make her wilderness like Eden and her desert like the garden of the Lord."

JACOB'S JOURNEY

It can now be stated as a matter of fact that every geographical prediction concerning Palestine in the Old Testament, whether made before or after Ezekiel's time, is to be explained on the basis of his plan. No exception has to be noted to the complete agreement which every reference to Palestinian localities affords. One awaits with some curiosity the explanation which modern criticism will offer of such disconcerting unity amongst Old Testament writers in connection with a scheme which critics declared incomprehensible even to its author. Meanwhile a further coincidence relating to the division of the land must be noted, which on the one hand appears too remarkable in its bearings to be dismissed as a mere coincidence, and on the other impossible to credit to man's ingenuity.

From the final settlement of the children of Israel let us turn to their first settlement, when Jacob and his eleven sons entered from Syria. Many points in that journey relate it to Ezekiel's conception. Jacob proceeded from Galeed, the boundary of the land, to Mahanaim, on the northeast approach to the oblation, where a vision of the angels of God caused him to exclaim, "This is God's camp,"¹⁴ and he called

¹⁴ The word regularly used for the camp of the Israelites around the tabernacle. Cf. Zech. ix. 8; xiv. 15.

the place "Two camps."¹⁵ Thence he came to Penuel, which is just on the border of the sanctuary portion, at its south-east corner; Penuel means the "presence [or "face"] of God"; there he wrestled with "a man," received his new name of Israel, and as he crossed the mountain into the most holy territory "the sun rose upon him." The next stopping place, well within the "greater and more perfect tabernacle," was Succoth, "booths" or "tabernacles." From there he proceeded to Salem, "peace," the seat of Melchizedek, the recurrence of the name Salem for the second and last time in Old Testament narrative indicating that upon Israel the duties of warden of the sanctuary now fell. From the Vale of Shechem, the center of the most holy portion, he journeyed to Bethel, the "house of God" and center of the holy portion. From Bethel the next stage was to Ephrath, the center of the city, near which Rachel died and Jacob encamped, beyond the tower of Eder or "tower of the flock." Finally he removed to Hebron, the burying place of his fathers, and after this Joseph becomes the hero of the narrative.

The book of Genesis treats of the journey in two sections, that from Syria to Shechem, which was the entrance to the oblation (ch. xxxii-xxxiii), and that from Shechem to Hebron, which was a progress from center to center of the oblation portions (xxxv). This second part of the journey which practically completes the story of Jacob as Israel, would seem to have been of great significance; it was preceded by a special order for purification and by the burial of Rachel's gods which had so far accompanied her household, while "the terror of God was upon the cities that were round about." The fulness with which each stage of this journey is identified is noteworthy: at "Salem, a city of Shechem" the altar called El-elohe-Israel was erected, and the field purchased which, as the place of Jacob's Well and Joseph's Tomb, is recognizable to the present day (xxxiii. 18-20); another landmark is mentioned in the oak of Shechem (xxxv.

¹⁵ The sanctuary and the city? Cf. Rev. xx. 9, "the camp of the sanctuary (τὴν παρεμβολὴν τῶν ἁγίων) and the beloved city."

4).¹⁶ At "Luz, which is in the land of Canaan (the same is Bethel)," an altar was erected called El-beth-el (vss. 6-7); a pillar of stone was set up (vs. 14); and a second famous oak is spoken of, under which Deborah was buried, "and the name of it was called Allon-bacuth" (vs. 8). The third stage was marked by Rachel's burial "in the way to Ephrath (the same is Bethlehem). And Jacob set up a pillar upon her grave: the same is the Pillar of Rachel's grave unto this day" (vss. 19-20). Lastly, Jacob comes "to Mamre, to Kiriath-arba (the same is Hebron), where Abraham and Isaac sojourned" (vs. 27), and the chapter concludes with a third burial, that of Isaac in the historic cave of Machpelah.

No imagination is required to see a design here on the narrator's part to fix beyond question the spots referred to. Indeed he twice goes outside the bounds of his story to do so: Rebecca's nurse is not elsewhere mentioned by name, and this careful indication of the grave of a subordinate character requires explanation; similarly the account here of the burial of Isaac interrupts the historical sequence, for Isaac was alive during the happenings of subsequent chapters.¹⁷ The narrator in fact waymarks the key-points of the journey with the tombs of Israel,—with Israel's burying-ground at Shechem, with the grave of Israel's nurse, with the grave of the mother of the children of Israel, and with the tomb of the fathers of Israel. Now, nothing could mark a spot so permanently as a sepulchre,—witness the event in this case: altars, pillars, oaks have vanished, but Joseph's tomb at Shechem, Rachel's sepulchre near Bethlehem, and the cave of Machpelah at Hebron are sites whose authenticity is the most undisputed in Palestine; while the position of Bethel, though Deborah's lesser fame has not sufficed to preserve her exact resting-place, is also unquestioned. We are therefore still in

¹⁶ See Gen. xii. 6 (R. V.); Josh. xxiv. 26; Judg. ix. 6, 37 (R. V.).

¹⁷ Jacob was 120 years old when Isaac died (Gen. xxv. 26; xxxv. 28): he was 130 when he went down to Egypt (xlvii. 9). Joseph had then been over 20 years in Egypt (xxxvii. 2; xli. 46, 47). Isaac was therefore alive during the events of ch. xxxvii.

a position to appreciate what significance there may be in the emphatically given stages of this journey.

Now it is undeniable that right from the entrance to the oblation at Penuel a connection between the stages and Ezekiel's measurements manifests itself. From Penuel to Succoth is precisely 5,000 reeds (10.36 miles); from Succoth to Shechem is 10,000 reeds (20.72 miles); while from the Vale of Shechem to Bethel is, as already seen, 10,000 reeds: this gives a total of 25,000 reeds, the breadth of the oblation, made up of the breadth of each of the three sections of the oblation. What then of the carefully delimited final stages of the journey, from Bethel to Rachel's sepulchre, and from Rachel's sepulchre to Hebron? In the first place, the distance in each case is the same; and in the second, that distance is $14\frac{1}{2}$ miles, or 7,000 reeds, the breadth of a tribal portion.

Thus the tombs of Jacob and Rachel define the inheritance of their children, and the measurement necessary to complete the settlement of Israel in the land, forced upon us originally from purely mechanical considerations, is found again in duplicate in the stages of this journey which reveals so close a relation to Ezekiel's plan. Personally we find it impossible to believe that this double-marking of such a crucial measurement at the conclusion of Israel's entrance and as the climax of his story is mere coincidence; neither can it be credited to man's ingenuity, for the measurement depends entirely on the position of Rachel's sepulchre, and Rachel was buried where death unexpectedly overtook her by the wayside. It appears to place above cavil the divine and eternal intention behind Ezekiel's plan.

"Refrain thy voice from weeping," said the prophet Jeremiah in his address to Rachel: ". . . There is hope in thine end, saith the Lord, that thy children shall come again to their own border. . . . Set thee up grave-marks,¹⁸ make

¹⁸ *Šiyyun*, E. V. "waymarks." In the only other passages in which the word occurs it is used with reference to burial; in 2 Kings xxiii. 17, of the "monument" or "title" over the grave of the prophet at Bethel; in Ezek. xxxix. 15, of the "sign" over an unburied skeleton.

thee guide-posts: set thine heart toward the high way, the way by which thou wentest: turn again, O virgin of Israel, turn again to these thy cities" (xxxix. 16-17, 21). The only highway which Rachel trod in Palestine was the way which we have been studying, on which the graves appear as guide-posts. If Rachel's tomb indeed marks the breadth of the portions of her sons, the riddle of the prophet's succeeding verse would seem to be solved: "A woman shall compass a man."

ENVOI

The discussion of the main points in Ezekiel's plan is now complete, and it may be well at this stage to sum up the general position:

(a) There is in our Bible today a plan for the division of Palestine which has never been studied, and which is regarded by modern criticism as unworthy of study.

(b) That plan is the climax to the work, the final legacy, of one of the greatest of Old Testament prophets, whose canonicity has never been seriously questioned and the authenticity of whose writings is undisputed: the section of which it forms part is regarded by modern criticism as the key of the Old Testament.

(c) The plan, we claim to have shown, is simple and practical, provided it is approached without prepossession; it respects the natural features and historical associations of Palestine, and throws into relief its salient localities; it anticipates subsequent events and is in line with the course of history down to the present day.

(d) All geographical prophecies concerning Palestine in the Bible are found to be based on this plan. Critics who have arraigned and condemned the unity of Scripture have therefore done so without calling a chief witness for the defence.

(e) The central sanctuary of the plan is at Shechem: unless critics are prepared to show that Jewish priests fabricated the sacred documents in the interests of the Samaritan sanctuary, the modern hypothesis of the origin of the Old Testament must collapse.

(f) The relation to the plan of Israelite history and hopes opens up a new field in Biblical study.

Against these claims the most powerful argument is their novelty. But it must be remembered that, in the past, study of Ezekiel's plan has been hindered by lack of knowledge concerning Biblical localities, by want of suitable maps, by inability to conceive of a temple elsewhere than on its former site, and by the obsessions of allegorical interpretation: and it is impossible to acquiesce submissively in the verdict of the past when that verdict has been that the prophet's work is valueless. In many ways the time is ripe now for study of the plan in all its bearings. We claim at least that throughout these papers we have never departed from a solid basis of facts open to the investigation of anyone possessed of a Bible and a map of Palestine. We leave it to our readers who have the interests of the Bible at heart to weigh these facts, and, if convinced, to use them.

Glasgow, Scotland.

C. M. MACKAY.

THE PROBLEM OF MENTAL EVOLUTION

The scientific layman who by unreflecting judgment assumes the fact of a generic mental difference between the animal and the human orders of being as did Aristotle and Socrates centuries ago, may look upon any attempt to demonstrate or defend this assumption quite indifferently. The theologian, taking his stand on Genesis i. 27, might likewise be disposed to disdain the attempt. But the Christian thinker, played upon by the current winds of scientific doctrine, cannot as an apologist ignore with light *hauteur* the claims of the recent science of Comparative Psychology. He must above all detect any illicit inference and misleading speculation, any imaginative constructions, and misrepresentations, particularly of the human mind, so often characteristic of evolutionary savants who would preserve a mental *continuum* throughout all orders of life.

Believers in the Christian truths must recognize the fact that not only is man today being genetically connected with the animals *κατὰ σάρκα* but *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, at the very point where sages for all time past have confidently interposed their *non liquet*, and theologians have lifted up their excluding *noli me tangere*. Whatever biological science establishes as to the origin of man's *σῶμα* is of minimum importance in comparison with the pronunciamientos of other scientists upon the origin and nature of the human *ψύχη* or *πνεῦμα*. It is the difference of a destiny.

It is a stock observation of the Romanes school that between the highest animal and the lowest human (i.e. savage) intelligence, there is no appreciable difference, the now thirty years extinct Tasmanians being chosen as representing the lowest species of man. Says McCabe,¹ "It is at once apparent why scientific men so readily assume the evolution of the human mind. The development from the level of the earliest prehistoric man to the level of the cultivated European is greater than the distance between the earliest prehistoric

¹ *Evolution of Mind*, p. 253.

man and ape." Even when rigorous experimental psychologists such as Haggerty pronounce animals bereft of intelligence and reason they doughtily bridge the "impossible gulf," "not by showing the presence in animals of clear cut intellectual processes, but by demonstrating that the sort of learning that does hold in animals is the very root of all that is developed in man."² "Man has as the central core of all his bodily and mental life the fund of habits that he first learned in the trial-and-error fashion of the world below him."³ Romanes⁴ illustrates the other method of bridging the gulf. He rather exalts animal intelligence to the human level than doing the converse of reducing human intelligence to the animal level. Yet the converse is found also to inevitably obtain. Both types hold that the difference, in Romanes' words, "is not of kind but of degree."⁵

Even where genetic connection is disavowed by individual exponents of comparative psychology they unduly exalt the animal mind to a point which threatens the uniqueness of human mentality; and then reduce the complexity, independence and quality of the human mind till it is not far removed from the highest animal mentality. The problem becomes therefore a general one also, of preserving the *sui generis* nature and qualitative transcendence of the human mind from these demeaning analyses, and of evincing that the difference is not of "degree" but of "kind," if this can be done.⁶

² *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 107 (1914), p. 606.

³ Cf. the most prominent experimentalist, Thorndike (*Animal Intelligence*, p. 294), "Man's intellect we have seen to be a simple though extended variation from the animal sort. . . . Amongst the minds of animals that of man leads not as demigod from another planet, but as a king from the same race."

⁴ Cf. McCabe (*Evolution of Mind*, p. 265), "If we take perception, judgment and reason as the three standards of intelligence—or, more simply, the perception of these objects, their qualities and their relations—we find these admitted by nearly all authorities in higher animals at least."

⁵ "It is difficult to see anything more than a difference of degree between the ideas of the primitive humans and those of the highest animals" (McCabe, *op. cit.* p. 249).

⁶ An apposite illustration of the modern attitude may be found in

For the theologian the peculiar significance of this tendency is seen from the fact that with the exaltation of animal and depreciation of human rationality the uniqueness (if not existence) of the human religious and moral natures is inevitably explained away and with them the revealed truths that befit them. For intellectual capacity is the warp on which the woof of a fine moral and religious sense is interwoven. It is fair to say that the causal sequences introducing naturalism into theology in this present time are to be traced here. It is evident then, that we are dealing with the most ultimate and crucial question for conservative theology today in deciding what man's psychic origin and hence nature, really are. The sententious "as a man *thinketh* in his heart so is he" has taken on the meaning "as a man *is* so thinketh he in his heart," or, as scholastics say, his *esse* precedes his *posse*. If he *is* the peripatetic brute psyche of a naturalistic Comparative Psychology, he cannot plausibly or perfectly think religiously, morally, biblically or theologically, nor know sin and salvation, and much less be a Calvinist or Arminian. If theism has anything to do with what and whence he is, if he is "after the image of God in righteousness and true holiness," he will then "think" religiously, morally, and theologically and know the supernatural through kinship of mind and heart with the divine; and theology can then claim a *raison d'être*. The logical law of the excluded middle relentlessly forces these two alternatives upon all who think. Let any man tell you what his view of the origin of man's psychic nature is and you may readily conjecture what his theology is, i.e., naturalistic or supernaturalistic. It is true however, that certain forms of

Chauncey Wright's animadversion upon what he calls the "scholastic method," which seeks "to establish an impassable barrier between the minds of men and those of lower animals, being actuated by the naïve though generous motive of rendering the former more respectable, or else of defending a worth in them supposed to be dependent on such a barrier. This aim would be confusing at least, if not a false one, in a strictly scientific inquiry" (*Philosophical Discussions*, p. 222). Elsewhere he designates modern psychology which rests upon the assumption of the "superior worth of self consciousness" as a species of mysticism.

monism attempt to maintain the supernatural along with mental evolution by eliminating the distinction between the natural and supernatural. The success of the attempt may be asserted only if, and so far as this definition of the supernatural be true.

It is the present purpose to inquire into the demonstrability of the claims of this movement of mental evolution or Comparative Psychology. Is the human mind different in "kind" and quality from that of the animal so that its origin must be accounted for by postulating some break or discontinuity in the processes of nature, on analogy with other generally admitted breaks such as the introduction of organic life into inorganic matter and of sensation⁷ into mere protoplasmic tropisms, to mention a more disputed instance? Or is it different only in "degree" thus allowing the genetic theory of its origin full sweep? Are self-consciousness, personality, free-will, intuitions of "first and fundamental truths," conception, generalization, abstraction, judgment (synthetic and analytic), inference, reason (inductive and deductive), association by similarity, difference and contiguity, and constructive imagination, all derived principally from simpler, less independent or flexible "powers of association" in the animal kingdom (Thorndike), or are they expansions of rudimentary self-consciousness in the animal kingdom, i.e., "external self-consciousness" (Romanes), or of "perceptual" (Ribot), or "sensuous" or "practical" (Mivart) reasoning, or of incipient powers of abstraction and imagination (Romanes) in the higher animals? Does the power of speech produce the difference between the human and animal intelligence (Max Müller, Romanes), or is this a *hysteron proteron*? That is, does intelligence not create the power and means of speech? Does all human learning take

⁷ Although Wallace, e.g., postulated the appearance of "new causes or powers" at the origin of life, of sensation, and man, Romanes and his present followers deny it at the second point. It is asserted by a recent biologist for example, that simple undifferentiated protoplasm reacts from all the chemical, physical, electric and light stimuli from which organisms possessing a nervous organization and nerve-ends react.

place by the random "trial-and-error" method, and the "stamping in" of various sensori-motor and ideational-associational trains as in animals (Thorndike)? Further, do or can we know enough about the processes of the deceptive and varying animal psyche, whether from rigorous experiment or from observation, to confidently ground a fundamental qualitative identity between it and the human psyche at all? Finally, does an animal have a soul?

Before pursuing such questions we must limit the subject by excluding consideration of the volitional and emotional functions of the human and animal self, confining ourselves to the intellectual powers, for, if they may be permitted to be thus dissociated, emotional and volitional refinement and organization depend indispensably upon the presence and degree of the intellectual function. Further, although man's uniqueness might be established quite unquestionably by full consideration of his moral and religious consciousness (as the eminent French naturalist Quatrefrages admits),⁸ this will be likewise excluded, for their clearness and strength are likewise dependent on the intellect.

The questions above proposed require for satisfactory solution the canvassing of the science of Anthropogeny which assumes to lay before us the intermediate anthropoid skulls (e.g., the so-called Java, Neanderthal, Heidelberg man, etc.) and show us the gradual psychic transition by computing the brain mass and shape and, thereby, the degree of mental advancement. With this, various prehistoric cave drawings, utensils, and weapons are considered. It is assumed that sufficient "missing links" on the physical side have been discovered to enable us to reconstruct the chief ages and stages of the physical evolution from the highest ape to the lowest

⁸ Quatrefrages, strange to say, while admitting this, declares with Romanes that the intellect is generically the same as that of the animals. He might just as well expect a camera tripod to stand on two feet! Romanes, more consistently, reduces religion and morality to "more particular instances or detailed illustrations of the more intelligent order of ideation which belongs to mankind" (*Mental Evolution in Man*, p. 19, and note).

savage species. Following the biological law that structures and function are correlate and develop *pari passu*, comparative psychologists and anthropologists conceive that likewise the psychical equivalent can be ideally traced. But important as it may be, this research must be foregone as constituting a collateral investigation fraught with such unsearchable details, fragmentary data and varied interpretative possibilities as to require separate discussion. Further, the assumption that the general morphological and psychological lines are parallel in their development may be roundly challenged. The one often cuts the other line at right angles, according to Haggerty, as will appear later. We shall treat Anthropogeny as a "no-man's land" while it is subject to so much speculative uncertainty and dispute, and treat the genetic problem on the independent ground of the science of Comparative Psychology.⁹ Further, the whole question of biological evo-

⁹ Haeckel's is an example of the type of speculation necessary to bridge the gulf. In his Berlin lectures (1905) he gives what Wasmann regards as a purely imaginary pedigree of the Primates, sketching fictitious forms between the real ones to maintain the continuum. He postulates an imaginary *Archiprimus* as the forefather of the present ape, from whom descend in unbroken line the fictitious *Archipithecus*, which evolves into a primitive gibbon (*Prothylobates atavus*) which begets in time the *Pithecanthropus alalus*, a speechless primitive man, who, Wasmann says, never existed. From this alalic man the *Homo stupidus* comes forth and evolves into *Homo sapiens*. Following this production of Haeckel's creative imagination various discoveries were made which were hailed as verifications of this general projected scheme. The Java man is most primitive. (Only three pieces of a skeleton were discovered, and these were found so far apart as to make their relationship questionable.) Klaatach, Schwalbe, Alsberg, Virchow, Hertwig, McNamara, *et al.*, declare it to be a true ape and not an ape-man as others hold. Next came the Neanderthal skeleton, called *Homo primigenius*. This became a storm-centre of guesswork. Twelve different opinions were pronounced on it. It was called an idiot, a German, a paleolithic man and an ape-man, among other things. It is very uncertain whether it was found in the alluvial stratum as claimed for it. Schwalbe, its discoverer, first called it merely a new species. And Wasmann calls it merely a sub-species or variety of the true human race, as Kramberger also leads one to believe. The history of other skeletons has been more or less a repetition of this speculative effort. The very uncertainty that scientists like Osborne seem to betray in calling all these discoveries "missing links" should be a good commentary and sign for inhibition and reservation in forming esti-

lution will be excluded even though it be ever so indivorceable from the problem of psychic evolution. An exponent of mental evolution would pronounce this an arbitrary separation which gives up the whole case in a question-begging fashion. For many of the most representative mental evolutionists are materialists explicitly or implicitly; others are materialistic in principle but not fully conscious of it, as Romanes appears to be. As the history of the mind is for them the history of the formation of the cerebral cortex, such an exponent may regard its omission in any such discussion as the present one as he would the attempt to play Hamlet with Hamlet left out. It is, however, to be assumed (1) that mind is more than an "epiphenomenon" or sublimated phase of the matter; (2) that, as such a distinct entity, it is not necessarily measurable by its material proportions. Body and brain not only modify thought but thought modifies the brain. The human mind has often greater power over the brain and body than conversely. Craniology, despite its great development, has not reached the point where all psychic functions in fineness, accuracy, and strength can be measured through the contour and volume of the cerebrum.¹⁰ (3) Even granting that mind were in this way

mates (*vide* McCann's *God or Gorilla*, p. 77 ff., concerning Prof. Osborne. This book was written from the logical, or lawyer's viewpoint and not from the scientific primarily; but its critique is keen). By use of these fossil specimens, however, McCabe informs us, "instead of having to explain some miraculous and sudden appearance of the human faculties, we have merely to suggest how in the course of half a million or a million years, the anthropoid brain rose to a level below that of the lowest existing savage" (*Evolution of Mind*, p. 253). McCabe in these words evinces to us how speculation begets and demands speculation. He, like Darwin and Haeckel (who postulated 300 million years for the evolution of life), is required by his sense of proportion and of time required for producing these intermediary skulls, to assume this vast stretch of time, one hundred times greater than others estimate the term of man's existence on earth to be.

¹⁰ Wasmann (*Instinct and Intelligence*, p. 134) quotes Edinger as authority for the fact that birds have a less developed brain cortex than reptiles, yet the power of association is superior in birds not only to reptiles but to lower mammals whose brain cortex has far more perfect development. Further, the ants have no brain cortex whatever, only two separated ganglia. Yet Solomon and psychologists rate ant intelligence

measurable by its material investiture, it is a flagrant *non sequitur* to claim that it is genetically traceable unbrokenly through the *scala naturae* by its uniformly ascending cerebral formations. The rocks do not preserve the soft brain matter for us where we expect the postulated "missing links," and though the fossil cranium does afford computation of its size and general shape, it cannot be a reliable index to the number, size, depth and superficial exposure of the all-important cortical convolutions, nor to the relative amount of gray matter in the brain, nor in fact to the fineness of organization of any of the neural centres. The archaeological crania can at most only afford a very general or rough estimate of brain and hence the prehistoric mental capacity. Hence we find the better reputed scientists very continent in speculating on the cerebral quality and organization of these reconstructed "missing links" of the *Homo primigenius*, etc. For example, Huxley¹¹ pronounces on the skull found by Dr. Schmerling, that "it is a fair average skull which might have belonged to a philosopher or might have contained the thoughtless brains of a savage"; and Sir John Lubbock¹² says only, "it might have been a European." Thus, not only the structure but therewith the function seem necessarily indeterminate.

But even granting for sake of argument, that these var-

higher than many other orders of organisms. Some class them higher than the lower vertebrates. The logic of many biologists, however, requires us to conclude, "no brain-cortex, no intelligence, or power of association." Ed. Claparede, editor of the *Archives de Psychologie* ("Consciousness of Animals," *International Quarterly*, Vol. VIII, p. 313) discriminately states: "the physiological explanations of the processes of cerebration in spite of their appearance of scientific rigorism and of mathematical precision, frequently amounting to nothing more than a translation into physiological language of the psychological facts themselves. What do we know of the cerebral mechanism of the association of ideas, of perception—to take only the simplest mental facts? Nothing. And the cerebral theories, whether anatomical or psychological, which we have attempted to construct are simply tracings over the positive data of psychology."

¹¹ *Man's Place in Nature*, p. 156.

¹² *Prehistoric Times* (1910), p. 137.

ious "missing links" may be verified and the brain morphology of the intermediary man be reconstructed in its entire serial development by biologists, the origin of the human soul is not even yet accounted for. Abstractedly or hypothetically viewed, man's animal ancestry in body and brain might be conceded without this necessarily involving the soul in the same origin. There are other alternatives even apart from theistic interests. For the scientist, the sudden origin of the human spirit is *a priori* possible in analogy with the mysterious appearance of new qualities elsewhere in the history of nature; it is *a posteriori* possible and probable on the general basis of the disparate nature of the animal and human mind, both in degree, as all admit, and in kind, as we small hope to see. Only a rigorously conceived "block-universe" squared off on pure naturalistic lines forbids such a possibility. For the Christian theist, the supernatural origin of the soul is of course assumed.

Of course the comparison of the brains of the lowest living man and those of the highest living ape is another and trusted recourse of particularly materialistic evolutionists. But even here, where the brains are at hand, though "the difference in the weight of the brain between the highest and lowest man is far greater both relatively and absolutely, than that between the lowest man and the highest ape," yet, "regarded systematically, the cerebral differences of man and ape are not of more than generic value—his family distinction resting chiefly on other" and bodily facts.¹³ The difference may lie much more in function than is apparent or discoverable in the structure. The transcending difference is where Mivart places it (and Romanes agrees with him),¹⁴ not in the weight of the brain, but in the intelligence. And for intelligence, cerebral gravity and form are no index nor open sesame. Even Chauncey Wright¹⁵ and Charles Darwin assert a great

¹³ Professor Huxley.

¹⁴ Vide *Mental Evolution in Man*, p. 16.

¹⁵ *North American Review*, Oct. 1870, p. 205, "A psychological analysis of the faculty of language shows that even the smallest proficiency in it

superiority in savage intelligence and then reason backwards to a necessarily finer brain quality and organization,¹⁶ and thus reason the precisely converse way, viz., from a given type of intelligence to a certain quality or organization of brain, and not¹⁷ from a certain shape and weight of brain to a certain postulated intelligence.¹⁸

While granting that it is the psychic quality of intelligence in the savage which is to be compared with that of the ape, certain geneticists will maintain that even here the transition between the two is smooth. The untrustworthiness of this tenet may be inferred from the following facts: (1) Hitherto very little and superficial study has been expended upon the mental (as well as moral and religious) phenomena of the lowest savage tribes. The much mooted Tasmanians who could not count, and who had practically no language, or abstract ideas, became extinct thirty years ago, "before," McCabe himself concedes, "exact and searching inquiry was made into their qualities."¹⁹ We join forces with McCabe when he deplores "that comparative psychologists have not made a severe and exhaustive analysis of the mind of the lowest savage"; and that it would "be the indispensable starting point of any speculation on the differences between the human and infra-human intelligence, and that unhappily we

might require more brain power than the greatest proficiency in any other direction."

¹⁶ *Descent of Man*, p. 48. After describing the ingenuity, art, skill, etc., of the savage he concludes, "I cannot therefore understand how it is that Mr. Wallace maintains that natural selection could only have endowed the savage with a brain a little superior to that of an ape."

¹⁷ Mr. Wallace argues from the fact of a low intelligence but a distinctly larger brain in the savage that mere evolution could not have produced that brain. This is not only bad logic, i.e., in lowering the intelligence and exalting the difference in brain size simultaneously, but it is not modern science, which tends to homologize the savage and the ape brain.

¹⁸ Vide foot-note II *supra*.

¹⁹ "And others," he adds, "the Aetas, Andamanese, rock Vedahs, Yahgans and sundry Central Africans, whom lack of culture or proper language or tribal organization stamps as very primitive, are either dying or being rapidly altered by contact with higher races" (*The Evolution of Mind*, p. 265).

have not nearly complete material for this study.”²⁰ However we would anticipate our speculation by this study of facts and not conversely. (2) Mental evolutionists do not consider the potentialities of these peoples, potentialities which have been developed by educating a child taken from them, in a civilized environment. Would not a cultured European individual have become an approximate Tasmanian intellectually if he had been brought up in the Tasmanian environment and with Tasmanian external history behind him, we ask? (3) The alternative explanation of these tribes, that they represent degenerate offshoots of the genus *homo*, and not persisting ancestral or evolutionary stages seems never to occur to McCabe and his congeners.

With these summary considerations the problems of anthropogeny, of biological evolution, and the comparative intelligence of the ape and lowest man are to be waived, and attention now given to the mentality of the typical civilized human being in relation to that of the animal orders as a whole.

The science which undertakes this special investigation, to wit, Comparative Psychology, has but recently taken its place in the encyclopedia of sciences. As a rigorous science it requires its investigators among other things to be thoroughly furnished with an appropriate and severely accurate methodology. As the methodology of this particular science forms the most vital problem, the first and preliminary procedure before dealing with the data of the subject-matter itself must be the fixing of an appropriate and ideal methodology so far as this in the nature of the case is possible.

The very first step in such a methodology is the negative one which the founder of modern scientific method, Francis Bacon, laid down, viz., the preliminary ridding the mind of all historical and individual presuppositions or “idols.” The scientist is primarily a mere describer, and, as Harnack says

²⁰ Yet, *mirabile dictu*, McCabe adds later on; “it is difficult to see anything more than a difference of degree between the ideas of these primitive humans and those of the highest mammals.”

of the historian, "hat keinen Standpunkt." It is at this initial point that the mental evolutionists, with whom we have to deal, appear to commit their consequence-fraught error and would disqualify themselves for authoritative judgments concerning human and animal mentality. Special consideration of the insidious *a priori's* of certain doctrinaires will therefore be instructive.

The *idola theatri* of Bacon, or the philosophical and metaphysical prepossessions, are the first of the three "idols" and most productive of perversion of fact in Comparative Psychology. Of such philosophies there are two extremes, the monistic or the idealistic which tends to overrate the animal consciousness, and the materialistic which underrates its higher functions. Between these lie the psycho-physical parallelists (Claparede and Uexkull) who maintain the separate existence of soul and body but deny their causal interconnection *in toto*, and who therefore tend toward skepticism.

The monistic or "identity" theory is held by August Forel the eminent Swiss animal psychologist, and by C. Lloyd Morgan, the still more prominent English comparative psychologist. Forel holds a crasser form of it than C. L. Morgan. But they both represent a philosophical atavism traceable back to Schelling and Spinoza, and in science, to Fechner the founder of "Psychophysics." Like them, Forel and Morgan view mind and matter, subject and object, brain and psyche, as two *Erscheinungsforme* of one and the same reality, "distinguishable but not separable."²¹

Forel, however, so tends to confound the psyche with the cerebral process and energy that he takes rank practically with Bethe, Beer, H. E. Ziegler, Uexkull, and J. P. Nuel, the neurologists who telescope mind and Comparative Psychology into cerebral physiology. Yet, *mirabile dictu*, he seeks to defend Comparative Psychology from the unknowing hands of the purely physiological interpreters. "By the term 'iden-

²¹ Vide L. Morgan's *Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, Chapter XVIII, The Evolution of Consciousness, and his *Monistic Theory of Knowledge*, Chapters I, II, XVII.

tity' or Monism we mean that every psychological phenomenon is the same identical thing as the molecular or neurocym activity of the brain cortex which lies at the bottom of it, and which is only considered in a two-fold way. Only the appearance is dualistic; the thing, however, is monistic. In the phenomena of our cerebral life, wonderful as they are, lies absolutely nothing which contradicts the laws of Nature and justifies the invocation of a mystic supernatural 'psyche' ".²² That the soul should be viewed as exempt from the laws of energy, which he evidently confounds with the laws of causation, is described as a "belief in miracles" (*Wunderglaube*). Still more significantly he says,²³ "consciousness does not exist at all in and for itself, but only through the cerebral activity of which it is an "inner reflex." Consciousness is only "an abstract idea which vanishes with the cessation of cerebral activity." It must then be seriously asked if this psychological doctrine is aught more than itself an *Erscheinungsform* of a fundamental underlying materialism, and the pretended duality aught more than a distinction without a difference. The very "two-sides" theory has its own two sides: it is poetic, attractive—but logically dark! Is the brain the soul? or the converse? Forel expressly maintains neither and has juggled therefore with the vagaries of an "excluded middle," vainly conceiving himself as neither a materialist nor a psychist. "Consciousness has the power to change the form of energy, and is neither a form of energy nor a state of protoplasm," C. S. Minot, President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,²⁴ authoritatively declared; and until Forel accepts this he is mercilessly ground between the upper and nether millstones of the spiritualist and materialist respectively. We may and must recognize the close interdependence of cerebral structure and function and of the mind, yet without accepting Forel's monistic

²² "Über die psychischen Eigenschaften der Ameisen und einiger anderen Insekten" in the documents of the Fifth International Zoological Congress of 1901.

²³ P. 144, *op. cit.*

²⁴ Vide *Proceedings of Psychological Meeting*, July 1, 1902.

identification of the two. Two conclusions follow Forel's constructions: (1) Though he assumes to champion the rights and possibility of a Comparative Psychology and the reality of consciousness, he virtually loses the soul in its material substrate thereby classifying himself more as a materialist as E. Wasmann²⁵ and J. Reinke relentlessly insist. He cannot qualify, then, for the role of an authority on Comparative Psychology. (2) If the self is a mere illusory reflection of these cerebral processes, there can be neither a psychology, nor certainty of knowledge of any kind. There is not a logical subject to be studied for there is none to actively study. The subject-object relation is the prerequisite of all knowledge. This epistemology then breeds skepticism.

C. Lloyd Morgan is a more philosophical exponent of this type of monism. All reality is deduced from simple practical experience, he tells us; and this experience gives us an epistemology in which originally there is no existential difference between subject and object. It is only the later analysis of the reflecting mind which distinguishes out the two. So that "the apparent dualism is a dualism of aspect, not a dualism of existence."²⁶

The dualism of mind and body is likewise docetic, yet Morgan more incisively than Forel, differentiates the organic or cerebral aspect of this latent *tertium quid* from the psychic aspect as mere material "energy" as opposed to self-consciousness. Self-consciousness evolves, but not from the mere biological energy of the amoeba, he very vigorously maintains. Only the neural or cerebral aspect does this. It evolves independently from a latent "infra-consciousness" associated with the mere organic matter or "energy" of the amoeba. Mind has thus a self-consistent, independent linear development *pari passu* with the evolution of the brain-energy. But just as certainly as Forel, he annuls this difference (1) by postulating some inscrutable entity which he calls an "activity," and a "synthetic synthesis" as an underlying *ter-*

²⁵ *Instinkt und Intelligenz im Tierreich*, Chapter XII.

²⁶ *Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, "Prolegomena."

tium quid embracing mind and body. It "is neither subject nor object, but underlies and is common to both."²⁷ (2) He regards subject and object, mind and brain, not only as manifesting this underlying something, but he regards these correlates as manifesting each other: "the states of consciousness in the dog's mind are the subjective aspect of what from the objective aspect are the molecular vibrations of his brain tissues." There is a "close association of brain-energy and states of consciousness" in which "they are *distinguishable* but not *separable*."²⁸

Aside from a difference of emphasis, Forel and Morgan agree.²⁹ Mind is a rarified phase of matter, and brain energy an objective phase of mind, both of which have an underlying synthetic activity as a common *fundamentum*.

It must now be indicated how prejudicial to an objective Comparative Psychology this psycho-physical monism is. Not merely its bad psychology but a more subtle and effective assumption which it holds must inevitably modify the investigator's attitude to the whole animal phenomena of life. That assumption is the belief that there lies back of, or in connection with, all matter both organic and inorganic, a sort of *anima mundi*, or an "infra-consciousness" (as Morgan) or a sub-latent psychic aspect, or, with Haeckel,³⁰ an "atom-soul." "Infra-consciousness is associated with all forms of energy"; and "all modes of energy of whatever kind, whether organic or inorganic, have their conscious or infra-conscious aspect," Morgan puts it. With this highly "ejective"³¹ or animistic *Weltanschauung*³² little wonder is it that both Forel and Mor-

²⁷ *Op. cit.* p. 332.

²⁸ *Op. cit.* p. 329.

²⁹ Despite Morgan's sense of the uniqueness of his own monism; vide his "Prolegomena."

³⁰ Darwin and Haeckel seem to impute a certain selective intelligence to matter. The first molecules are already endowed with consciousness and will, Haeckel posits.

³¹ Taken in the sense of Morgan and Romanes as expressing the projection of the human mind and feeling into the objective world, especially into animals.

³² If one cannot call it "panpsychism," which Forel stoutly disallows,

gan take very optimistic views of animal mental capacities, despite the caution and rigor of especially Morgan himself.³³ If consciousness or infra-consciousness is already imputed to inert matter what sane limit can be guaranteed to the exercise of this "ejective" tendency in the organic kingdom?

From psychological monism, and from the parallelism of Geulincx and Malebranche on the other hand, psycho-physical parallelism or a strict dualism arose, and constituted a second *idol theatri* among Comparative Psychologists. It is represented by Uexkull and Edouard Claparede.³⁴ The docetic dualism of the psycho-physical monists becomes a realistic dualism, viz. mind and brain are two entirely distinct substances, and such disparate realities as to exclude all mutual causal connection and interdependence. The physiological or cerebral causal series runs, in a self-contained way, parallel with the psychical series, neither series influencing the other.³⁵ An individual might thus, as a corollary truth, live, move, and have his being in mere cerebral co-ordinating activity in total indifference to his thoughts, volitions or feelings. His psyche might just as well be ensconced in some other person's mortal coil. While thinking pain and evil he might act, physiologically, pleasure and good. It is plain that Comparative Psychology is then impossible. Claparede's advocacy of it to the contrary notwithstanding. For the consciousness and intelligence of animals is manifested only through, and by means of, the instrument of this physiological organism. He unwittingly perhaps, surrenders his claim when in a brilliant article³⁶ he wields the cudgel against con-

one may aptly term it "polypsychism," as E. Claparede does (*International Quarterly*, Vol. VIII).

³³ Forel, e.g., says of his specialty the insects, that "it is possible to demonstrate the existence of memory, association of sensory images, perceptions, attention, habits, simple powers of inference from analogy, the utilization of individual experience and hence distinct plastic individual deliberations or adaptations," p. 36, *op. cit.*

³⁴ Even Forel holds one form of it.

³⁵ One form of the theory holds that there is no psychical causal series, there being a mere succession of conscious states (Forel).

³⁶ "Les Animaux ont-ils Conscients?" in the *Revue Philosophique*.

sciousness as a possible criterion for Comparative Psychology. The third group, composing the lower extreme, are the materialistic monists, empirical and physiological in their view of the self and mechanistic in their explanation of the function of the self. Their views are sundry and numerous and forbid individual consideration. Suffice it to say that the more exact and scientific the discipline of Animal Psychology becomes the more materialistic and mechanistic do the investigators seem to grow. What is far more serious is the fact that materialism is a lurking element present in more scientific theories or explanations than explicitly avow it. It is a paradoxical truth that even in certain forms of Idealism, as Prof. Mivart indicates,³⁷ it is principally present, and in modern behaviouristic and experimentalistic schools where the external method, as opposed to the introspective method is usual, the most characteristic assumption is that there either is no "mind-stuff,"³⁸ or else that self-consciousness is an unknown terrain³⁹ of which we must confess *ignoramus et ignorabimus*. It is instructive and significant to observe that it has been from investigators adopting or leaning toward materialism that the most telling attempts at identifying the animal and the human types of mind have come, for example, Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, Romanes,⁴⁰ Thorndike,⁴¹

³⁷ *On Truth*, p. 138.

³⁸ As W. James asserts.

³⁹ Romanes very typically envisages it thus. Though he alludes to self-consciousness as the line of demarcation between animal and man, he candidly avers that it is a problem which does not admit solution (*Mental Evolution in Man*, p. 194), and postpones it till the chapter on "Consciousness" where he refuses to grapple with the question, calling himself inconsistently, an Idealist. As Romanes is implicitly a Lockian in philosophy this superstitious aversion to the question is inexplicable, for Locke was virtually an empiricist.

⁴⁰ Though Romanes is professedly an Idealist, he is in logical consequences an empiricist owing to his adherence to Lockian philosophy, as Mivart satisfactorily demonstrates. His positions improved later.

⁴¹ Thorndike asserts the distinctiveness of consciousness but is so enamoured with the behaviouristic, experimental and physiological methods that he is "not far from the kingdom" of outright empiricism. In his *Introduction to Animal Intelligence* he draws a sharp contrast between the study of consciousness as such through introspection and the modern

Haggerty. Another school of thought has assumed to pronounce upon animal intelligence and has made a considerable impression in the purely biological, physiological and neurological fields of science. They represent a reversion to the Cartesian *L'animal-machine* where the brute "functioning in the silence and obscurity of consciousness plays the role of a modest machine." Bethe, Beer, and Uexkull⁴² in Germany, Richet in France, and Professor Loeb in America have all explicitly or inexplicitly banned consciousness from animals. Loeb for instance reduces the actions of at least lower animals to chemico-physical tropisms. They practically agree that Comparative Psychology is impossible as a science. To them L. Morgan's remarks very aptly apply, that "the skilled naturalist or biologist is seldom skilled also in psychological analysis. Notwithstanding therefore the admirable and invaluable observations of our great naturalists we cannot help feeling that their psychological conclusions are hardly on the same level as that reached by their conclusions in the purely biological field. It is necessary . . . that a sound

study of behavior without any relation to the inner states of the mind. Particularly animal psychology is not concerned with the former sphere, which L. Morgan and even W. James partially, and Stout and Titchener entirely confine attention to. Such citations as the following are instructive: "The pretense that there is an impassable cleft between physiology and psychology should arouse suspicion that one or the other science is studying words rather than realities." His researches have given him "the willingness to make psychology continuous with physiology, and a surety that to study consciousness for the sake of inferring what a man can or will do, is as proper as to study behavior for the sake of inferring what conscious states he can or will have." Modern, particularly American psychology, also philosophy, may be characterized, in a safe generalization, as more concerned about the phenomenology of metaphysical reality than that reality in and for itself. The metaphysical existence or non-existence of a psyche is an unproductive question and not compelling enough to really produce a dilemma.

⁴² Bethe, Beer, and von Uexkull have published *Proposals for Objectifying Nomenclature in Physiology* in which all terms like "smell," "see" and "hear" which imply "psychic qualities" are supplanted by purely physiological terms as stibo-reception, photo-reception, phono-reception. "The psychic or subjective is unknowable, and the chemico-physical processes, and these alone, should be the object of scientific investigation," (Bethe).

knowledge of the biological relationships of animals should go hand in hand with a thorough appreciation of the methods and results of modern psychology."⁴³

Between the Scylla and Charybdis of the above psychophysical monism and materialistic monism the dualistic psychology modestly holds its course with but scant recognition as a third philosophical position. Mivart, Erich Wasmann and Stumpf champion it, but the former two are discredited greatly by scientists because they write from the ecclesiastical point of view.

Where then are we to find scientists who can come to the elusive subject of the animal psyche now before us having minds endowed with the properly neutral notions or "apperceptive mass" as Herbart would say? The effect of these various *a priori*'s upon the present subject is seen in the divergence of psychologists on the question whether animals have consciousness or not. The views exhaust the logical alternatives. One school ascribes consciousness to them. A second ascribes it only to half of the animal scale due to their failure to meet certain private criteria imposed. The third (the physiological and biological) denies mind *in toto*. The conception of the human mind is just as varying.

Other *idola theatri* are found in nominalism and in empirical logic. Romanes in advocating nominalism, *i.e.*, that concepts are mere words, is led to repose the signal difference between the human and animal mind in the power of speech, not in conceptional capacity. Again, a disregard of deductive logic for "reasoning by particulars" (J. S. Mill) had led Romanes and others not only to impute this type of reason to animals but to regard it as fundamentally the same type that man exercises; and to deny in consequence the existence of "first and fundamental truths" in the mind.

Again the tendency to react from the trite faculty psychology in which the orthodox three faculties were treated in an artificial abstraction from each other has had the result of producing sundry schools of psychology which either ab-

⁴³ *Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, p. 53.

sorb all the faculties into one or virtually one (as Voluntarism), or else which do not concern themselves with faculties *per se* and the introspective method, but only with "behaviour" and the external method. The seamless garment of a pure psychology has been times galore parted and has fallen into the hostile hands of theorists and fell analysts who fatuously conceive that the fragment they hold is the perfect whole. The voluntarists or pragmatists make a "short circuit" in their "triadic reflex" of perception, intellection and volition, connecting perception with volition directly as means to an end, ruling out reflection or intellection as an independent and self-justified mental process, or faculty if you will.⁴⁴ Equally opposed to the intellectualists are the behaviorists following the Lockian school, whose premises admit of no other than empirical conclusions which extradite in one and the same stroke the subject and object of the science of psychology. Thus the three schools, in which the majority of Comparative Psychologists happen to be numbered, are of such a partisan nature as to constitute themselves antecedently disqualified for the task of judging the animal psyche, particularly in its intellectual functions. If the higher intellectual processes are not part of their *credo* it can not be expected that an admission of considerable transcendency of the human over the brute thinking will be the result of their investigations in that sphere. Other parts of this garment have been apprehended by the experimentalists, the structuralists or the functionalists, or the pure physiologists, leaving to the "physiological psychology" of recent prestige the odd piece.

It is an inevitable consequence of this divergency of persuasion that the psychological law of apperception will come into play. To the pure psychology all phenomena will be pure, but to the perverted and partisan psychology will nothing be pure. To the physiological psychologist, to speak in his accents, will all be neurosis and psychosis; to the physiologist all will be "neurones," "synapses," and "afferent" and

⁴⁴ *Vide* W. James' "Theism," in the *Will to Believe*.

"efferent" excitations; to the behaviorist all will be types of reaction and adaptation. Some of the most illuminating ironies of inconsistency are found in certain texts, where after laying down a pure methodology the author proceeds to the content consciously letting his left hand of psychological theory know what his right hand of scientific investigation doeth. But predetermined theories and objective science have no dealings the one with the other. The animal psychologist must first be a true and well-balanced psychologist. If he does not thoroughly understand the nature and laws of the human soul, or agnostically affirms, as Romanes, that the "problem of self-consciousness does not admit of solution,"⁴⁵ how can he divine the mysterious nature of the brute psyche with which he cannot communicate, and, furthermore, with what right does he so assuredly posit their essential likeness and their genetic connection? When he has thoroughly and justly understood the laws and the nature of human personality he may then claim to be reasonably qualified for the task of Comparative Psychology, and then only.⁴⁶ Justly does L. Morgan observe that "the only fruitful method of procedure is the interpretation of facts observed with due care in the light of *sound psychological principles*."⁴⁷

A final and fundamental "idol" common to all mental evolutionists is the assumption of the theory of not only biological, but cosmic and even monistic evolution as apodictically true. Morgan, who holds the latter, speaks of a monistic evolution which "sweeps through nature," and is "synthetic, selective and tending to cosmos from chaos. *These traits are characteristic alike of inorganic, organic, and mental evolution.*"⁴⁸ "Regarding man as the crowning product

⁴⁵ *Mental Evolution in Man*, p. 195. More abjectly yet he asserts, "I am as far as any one can be from throwing light upon the intrinsic nature of that, the probable genesis of which I am endeavoring to trace." What can he trace and how will he trace it, then, it is to be queried?

⁴⁶ *Vide* the excellent chapter of Morgan (*Introduction to Comparative Psychology*) on "Other Minds than Ours."

⁴⁷ *Introd.*, p. 53.

⁴⁸ *Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, p. 5

of this evolution, I, nevertheless, conceive him to be the self-conscious outcome of an activity selective and synthetic, which is neither energy nor consciousness: which has not been evolved, but through the action of which evolution has been rendered possible; which is neither subject nor object but which underlies and is common to both."⁴⁹ "It is of course true that the laws of inorganic development are not the same as the laws of organic development: and equally true that the study of mind introduces us to a new aspect of the developmental process. Notwithstanding these obvious differences, the evolution that sweeps through nature is, I believe, *one and continuous*." It is herein evident that despite Morgan's reputed candor and objectivity of judgment regarding animal psychology in his voluminous writings, his final decree in favor of mental evolutionism was the logically inevitable outcome of his sweeping metaphysical conception, the actual facts *nolens volens*. Morgan's shall it be said pretended, objective canvas of the facts has been fatalistically smitten a furtive stroke from behind, where in the dark shadow his boon accomplice, monistic evolution, vigilantly lurked.

It was very portentous and characteristic that mental evolution made its appearance contemporaneously with both the sweeping cosmic evolutionism and the biological evolutionism of such doctrinaires as Spencer, Darwin, Lamarck, Carl Vogt, Buchner, and others. Apodictically confident of the truths of their own peculiar theories, when challenged by the argument that evolution could not account for the unique intellectual, moral, and religious superiority of the "King of Creation," they artfully and as a matter of good tactics, sought to work upon the susceptibilities of the people by investing animals with human faculties, as it was less objectionable to do this than to lower the dignity of man. Particularly in animal intelligence was great prodigality evinced. The following plea of Darwin, whose thesis is "to show that there is no fundamental difference between man and the

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 332.

higher mammals in their mental faculties"⁵⁰ reveals this *vera causa* of his propagandism; to admit the distinction of kind between man and animals "*would make the theory of Natural Selection valueless*" so that he himself "*would give absolutely nothing for the theory of Natural Selection,*" and he adds, "I think you will be driven to admit all or reject all." He therefore concludes that this doctrine (of mental evolution) "*rests upon ground that can never be shaken.*" Subsequent history shows how not only mental but social, moral, religious and every evolution except the evolution of evolution have captured the Troy of popularity by being ensconced in Darwin's wooden horse of a particular theory of biological evolution.⁵¹ Having created a great *éclat* over biological evolution, and having, as is asserted, won for it in general a fairly wide acceptance these advocates see that there is no further need for this *tour de force* in the interpretation of the animal mind. And scientists, coming now into their "second eyesight," are bringing animals down many degrees—perhaps too far⁵²—in the scale of intelligence up which they had been formerly injudiciously forced. "How can scientists who write like lawyers defending animals against the charge of having no power of rationality, be at the same time impartial judges on the bench? Unfortunately the real work in this field has been done in this spirit."⁵³

⁵⁰ *Descent of Man*, p. 66.

⁵¹ Ray Lankester (*Encyc. Brit.*, Vol. 24, p. 820) one of the ablest expounders of Darwinism says, "Darwin, by his discovery of the mechanical principle of organic evolution . . . completed the doctrine of evolution and gave it that unity and authority which was necessary in order that it should reform the whole range of philosophy. Its most important initial conception is the derivation of man, by natural process from ape-like ancestors, and the consequent derivation of his *mental and moral qualities*, by the operation of the struggle for existence and natural selection, from the mental and moral qualities of animals. Not the least important of the studies thus initiated is that of the evolution of philosophy itself. *Zoology thus finally arrives, through Darwin*, at its crowning development; it teaches, and may even be said to comprise, *the history of man, sociology and psychology.*"

⁵² *Vide* article by Claparede, *International Quarterly*, vol. VIII, p. 297.

⁵³ Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence*, p. 23.

Yet scientists still hold to the theory of an unbroken mental evolution regardless of the difference in modern interpretation as to matters of detail. And this so thought *fact* rests directly and irremovably upon the supposed fact of biological evolution, they assume with Darwin: "No one could dream of Mental Evolution were it not for the evidence of organic evolution." "If we already believe that all specific forms of animal life have had a derivative origin, we cannot refuse to believe that all the mental faculties which these various forms present must likewise have had a derivative origin. And as a matter of fact we do not find any one so unreasonable as to maintain or even suggest that if the evidence of organic evolution is accepted, the evidence of Mental Evolution within the limits which I have named, can consistently be rejected. The one body of evidence therefore, serves as pedestal for the other, such that in the absence of the former the latter would have no *locus standi*."⁵⁴ And L. Morgan states "we are logically bound to regard psychological evolution as strictly coordinate with biological evolution."⁵⁵ The force of these representations must be admitted as difficult to contest on purely *a priori* grounds. The only alternative questions to be urged are: first, is biological evolution true? secondly, even if true, does the mental evolution that it supposedly involves necessarily obtain without a break at any point? The first question must be left for separate investigation. But granting merely for sake of argument the truth of biological evolution, does it follow that, secondly, the concomitant mental evolution has no historical break or discontinuity?

This is a different and much more unanswerable question; and this much Romanes seems to respectfully allow. For we have not the tangible material evidence (bones, etc) for this that biology claims for biological evolution, nor what Romanes calls "experimental or historical verification" of it. We

⁵⁴ Romanes, *Mental Evolution in Animals*, p. 8, Introduction.

⁵⁵ *Introduction to Comparative Psychology*, p. 37.

must, as he advocates, use the only means of investigation at our disposal, *i.e.*, deductive reasoning from the present phenomena of psychology, to which we might add experimentation.

Haggerty, who is himself a mental evolutionist, significantly admits that "if there is an absolute correlation of structure with intelligence it is of structures that have not yet been made out. The fact is, that in many cases we know more about the behaviour of animals than we do about the minute structures on which that behaviour is supposed to depend. We must construct the tree of mental evolution out of the material which we can gather. In many cases it appears that *such a mental tree would cut at right angles the tree of morphological evolution.*" "The animals will not be on the same level in the scale of mental evolution as in the scale of structural evolution." The apes, highest morphologically, are not always conceded by all as higher than the birds in intelligence.

The lack of a uniform parallelism between structural and mental evolution is a perplexity which is very suggestive. It suggests the possibility of a leap or a gap in mental evolution for the incursion of new mental powers which are untraceable from the angle of their physiological structure. It at least definitely weakens the absolute strength of the argument from biological evolution in its bearings on unbroken mental evolution. Further, Haggerty says, "one thing is sure, . . . that mind did not evolve as a whole." Certain senses, hearing, smell, temperature, and even memory are less acute and perfect in some than in many other animals. Only in vision does man clearly transcend animal sense powers. Thus there must also be certain unprogressiveness and even retrogression if there is a mental evolution. The lack of uniformity, and of parallelism with biological evolution then are two important facts which a rigorous experimentalist has vouched for. His conclusion is that "no matter how much we may believe in the evolution of mind, the materials for the

definite placing of any one of the more complex animals in such an evolutionary scale are absurdly insufficient."⁵⁶

If mind be a distinct entity it must have distinct treatment and independent investigation historically. Mental evolution within the animal borders might theoretically be conceded. But when this is pushed continuously into the human sphere, the theorist either assumes omniscience of the past, or, it has been dogmatically and antecedently assumed that there are no *lacunae* in Nature's processes and activities, a naturalistic conception which might fitly be styled, in W. James' terms, a "block Universe." If Comparative Psychology is a distinct and independent objective science it must not envisage its data to be inducted through the colored glasses of an assumed absoluteness of evolution in general.

A final *idolum theatri*, more pedagogical than philosophical has been the practical one of assuming that the ontogeny of the child recapitulates his phylogeny in respect to learning capacities, and that it therefore affords a chance for working out a new science of education. The appearance of the instinctive and of the imitative and the reasoning stages in the child is charted, and the proper pedagogical "specific" for each is meted out. The true nature of the child's mentality is fostered if it is "the ape and tiger" in him that are treated. It at least stirs the imagination of the educator to assume the underlying truth of mental evolution. Haggerty⁵⁷ openly states that one of the practical purposes in the experimental study of animals is to find out how animals learned, and through this to understand the child, which is to say that he assumes that the knowing processes of the two are generically identical.

The effect of other presuppositions upon the science under consideration remains for further investigation.

Princeton.

FINLEY DuBOIS JENKINS.

(To be continued)

⁵⁶ Art. "On the Threshold of Mind," *Atlantic Monthly*, 1913, p. 246.

⁵⁷ *Atlantic Monthly*, 1911, Art. "Animal Intelligence."

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUBSTANCE

The old story of Atlas carrying the world on his shoulders and the Hindu legend of the tortoise sustaining the cosmos are representative myths betokening, in cosmic terms, the quest for a World-ground. The postulate here may be expressed in one word—support. Something must hold up everything else. Philosophy began in wonder, and the value of the *Thaumazein* (*θαυμάζειν*) was clearly noted in antiquity. The Milesians, the first of the Hellenic true philosophers (for Homer and Hesiod, those “old theologians,” were simply ingenious myth-makers, with a literary genius in connection) felt an inexpressible awe at the processes of the physical world. They were star-gazers rather than mind-readers; their period was cosmological, not anthropological. Their quest was for some sort of unity amid the real or apparent multiplicity—an *Arke*, or Primal Principle, by which to explain all things. Gradually the childish hylozoism of the Milesians was outgrown, and for World-stuff was substituted Thought-stuff, but, whether it were Thales’ Moisture, Anaximenes’ “Air,” Anaximander’s Infinite, Anaxagoras’ matter-moving *Nous*, Heraclitus’ Fire, Pythagoras’ Number-norm, Plato’s Idea of the Good, or Aristotles’ Pure Form, as definite a pointing as then seemed possible was given to the search for a Principle in which all things consist, or from which they have been derived, and—by which they are held up. It was left to Christianity to clarify the haze by declaring that it is in a personal God, in intimate relations with man as well as with nature, that we “live and move and have our being,” for as Paul of Tarsus, quoting from Cleanthes’ Hymn to Jupiter, said on the Areopagus: “We are also his offspring”—a truism which many men have not yet recognized as a truth.

Man now is a world in himself, a microcosm, and must have a principle to explain him. What holds man up—which in his case means together? In the anthropological period of Greek thought reflection turned from the world without to the world within, the Socratic criticism tempering the Sophistic

subjectivism, and showing what kind of a generic (or ideal) man is "the measure of all things." The Protagorean dictum could not be unsaid, but remained to be interpreted. In the first formal psychological treatise on record, *Concerning the Soul*, (περὶ ψυχῆς) by Aristotle, the distinguishing characteristic of man is the rational mind, which is the *Entelechy*, or actualization and formative principle, of the body. Man must have nutrition, and he has sensitivity, but fulfills himself only on the plane of the *Entelechy*—a somewhat poetic yet appealing conception which has not perhaps received the attention it deserves from philosophers and moralists.

The persistent question, then, is this: What is man? Is man more than matter? If so, how can we *mind* man? We must reluctantly decline just now the alluring appeals of epistemological discussion, which is concerned with the question how we know anything, or the validity of knowledge. This debate runs on from Locke's time through Leibnitz, Hume, Kant, and a long list of dialecticians until, by a class of modern scientists who go to work on their problems without ever asking what are we working with and who assume that they have a right to a judgment or opinion without proving it, it has come to be dubbed "hot air." Our question is rather as to the base, or nature, of mind. All of us are conscious of mental states. What now supports them? This brings squarely into view the two rival theories of substantiality and actuality, the former assuming a mind-substance, the latter trying to get on with the view that the acts of consciousness, as immediately given, constitute mental reality. Here, as Kulpe says, we come very close to metaphysics—but how can we help it, for as William James acutely remarked, we may endeavor to keep metaphysics out of psychology, but it leaks in at every pore. (If kept out of psychology it cannot, at all events, be kept out of reflective life.) In the broader philosophic sense the issue here was very neatly joined by the saying of Locke, "There is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses," (*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*), countered by the apt rejoinder of Leibnitz, "Except the intellect

itself," (*Nisi intellectus ipse*). If the question be further raised as to the qualitative nature of mental functions, Intellectualism and Voluntarism offer themselves as alternative views, the former assuming that thought is the essential element in mind, the latter regarding will as the core of mental being. In the history of philosophy we find strange cross-divisions, as the logicians would say, or over-lappings, in the holdings of various metaphysical views, but, as regards the particular issues above mentioned, Spinoza, Herbart, Leibnitz are intellectualists, with Lotze neither intellectualist nor voluntarist, since in a sense he is both: Spinoza, Wundt, and Paulsen are actualists, while Descartes, Leibnitz, and perhaps Lotze, are substantialists.

The time has come, however, to clear this notion of substance of those materialistic trappings with which popular thought so commonly invests it. We take the term as implying that which supports phenomena, and which may be, in its essence, quite invisible, yet imperishable. Coleridge defines substance simply as that which is and abides, as distinguished from accident (whatever that may be!). Augustine derived the term from the Latin *subsistere*, making it to mean that which subsists of or by itself, while Locke referred it to the verb *substare*, importing that which stands under, remarking: "The idea, then, to which we give the name of substance, being nothing but the supposed but unknown support of these qualities (accidents) we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*, which, according to the true import of the word is in plain English (something) standing under and upholding." Locke placed the substance of an object in some essential or fundamental quality, while Fichte made it consist of a synthesis of attributes, but into the discussion whether a thing can consist apart from its attributes we need not enter, except to note that substantiality in psychology, which postulates a permanent substrate of mental life, generally recognizes as characteristic of that substance the qualities of stability, indestructibility (immortality), simplicity,

indivisibility, and immateriality. Here then is found a basis for individualism, which actuality can hardly supply.

In general we may say of the theory of a mind-substance, with Kulpe, that it has been handled (by critics who put next to nothing in its place) with a severity very far from being deserved. Such critical acumen, not to say scorn, would better have been directed to an *Aufklärung* of substantiality, which will leave us some sort of selves, while avoiding pitfalls of uncritical formulation. For what he calls "metacritical remarks" in defense of the reasonableness, to say the least, of some theory of mind-substance, Kulpe¹ deserves to be read with care. As for the difficulty in conceiving of a substance that is both stable and subject to change, or of admitting a *werden* (Becoming) comfortable with an Eleatic Being, that riddle is the great cosmic puzzle. How can identity persist amid change? How can "we" be all the things we have been since childhood, and still be "us"? In the indestructible soul-substance, still doing business at the old stand (but with new goods and mayhap counters), is found the vehicle or conserver of identity, which never exists in things, but in persons. In other words the core of the universe is a spiritual principle, manifesting itself through phenomena, somewhat as Aristotle held that matter alone is not capable of existence, but is shaped up or realized by mind, while only (bodiless) Divinity is Pure Form.

One aspect there is of this question which is of pressing interest today, and that is, the relation of mind-theory to the hypothesis of the unconscious, or subconscious, or foreconscious, or superconscious (we are not solicitous for the prefixes, but curious as to the possibility or fact of the submergence) since the question arises, If there be no "permanent substrate of the mental life," as Dr. Borden P. Bowne used to call it, where is there any place or position for the unconscious—except in one *cul de sac*, the bog of crass materialism?

But why so much interest in the subconscious, which seems

¹ Oswald Kulpe, *Einleitung in der Philosophie*, pp. 174-177.

as a term to be somewhat later than the unconscious? Freud has with a touching modesty claimed that there are three great culture epochs in the world: the Copernican revolution, Darwinism, and his own introduction to the world of the unconscious—forgetting von Hartmann, perhaps because he was missed by academic honors, or was too cosmic in his range. As a mediating view between the extravagant claims that that unconscious (including an obtrusive sex) is practically all-dominant, or constitutes, like the ice-berg which is mostly under water, three-fourths or so of our actual life, that all dreams are wish-fulfillments, that “childhood is polymorphically perverse,” and that Freudianism (like the football of evolution which Spencer caught up, and with which he ran away) is extensible into a half dozen allied domains, and the curt dismissal of this whole business, by Professor A. I. Gates of Columbia, in about the latest treatise of the sort issued,² as really unscientifically unsound, may be read with candor and caution Dr. G. Stanley Hall’s critique, in his *Autobiography*.³

This brings us to the conclusion of the whole matter. Unless there be in some real sense a self-identical, persistent essence which may almost indifferently be called a “soul,” “self,” “individual,” “person,” or “human being,” correlated just here and now, in this present order of being with a body (which fundamentally means a “brain”) there is found no place whatever for an “unconscious.” It may be supposable that a soul or self may by turns be self-aware (conscious) and unconscious, and that in the latter condition the mind, like the liver of Prometheus, gnawed away during the day, grows again by night, but how can mere fleeting “states,” “moods,” and mists-of-the-sea, illustrate any such behavior? As for Behaviorism, which affects the “psychology without a soul” attitude, it either proves too little or too much. If it be simply a method of observing what is going on, it amounts to little if anything more than the scientific method which for

² *Psychology for Students of Education*, pp. 201-203.

³ Pages 409-413.

years has been practiced; if it set up as a philosophy, its barrenness soon appears. "Behavior" without something that behaves is hardly better than William James' feeble "thought-thinks."

If there be no substantial self (taken not in a material, but in a spiritual, though not "astral," sense) the unconscious fades away like academic fog when real thinkers get to work! For the only possible explanation that is left is a purely neurological account of brain-patterns, action-patterns, traces, and the like. If man be only a colony of cells (as he is in part), if he be merely axones, and nuclei, and nucleoluses, ducts, glands, muscles, and blood, just chemistry, physics and anatomy, analyzable in a test-tube, weighable upon "correct weight" scales, and estimable as to height and cephalic index, consciousness and subconsciousness alike are simply the sport of complexes of neurones that chance to function, now one set and again another, so that nothing exists, but there is only the possibility that pretty soon you or I (the neurones in us) will say a word, or do an act, which is a mere capacity and a condition, not a triumphant form of life. This of course is scarcely better than the crass sensationalism of the blundering Hume whom Kant criticized. However, the precise point here is that on the theory of materialism (or even perhaps the "double aspect" view) no states or memories or feelings, conscious or unconscious, exist, but only a "trace" left here and there in the physical brain, in the sole sense of a predisposition or presumption toward further thought or action, so that the Freudian occultisms, symbolisms, and nauseous sexismes are left out in the dark and cold as homeless waifs of an excited imagination. Only as they are regarded as mechanisms, or possibilities of neural activity, will they have further being; and even then they may go out, puff!—like moon-men, whom in phantasy the children like to see extinguished.

The concept of the unconscious ought not perhaps to be utterly discarded or disbelieved, but challenged, criticized and rebased. If however we desire to save such a "store-house

theory" of subconscious preservations, the most reasonable view would seem to be frankly to admit that there is a psyche in psychology, which can dream, and awaken out of dreams, which is as much the creator as it is the creature of circumstance; and if we desire to save ourselves our faith must be broad and deep enough to admit a sentient, full-powered ethical Man with a capital "M," who is not just the fancy of condescending behaviorists, but under God the master of his fate. We will still need to get on with our neurones, but we ourselves—*our true* selves—will some day go where they will never come.

Keuka Park, N.Y.

CHARLES A. S. DWIGHT.

THE MESSAGE OF THE CATACOMBS

The approach to the study of the catacombs is made to the greatest advantage by a consideration of the customs of burial during the first century. Incineration was the common mode of disposition of the dead practiced by the Romans. A handful of the calcined human remains was gathered from the funeral pyre and enclosed in an urn of earthenware, glass, marble, silver, or gold, as the wealth of the deceased permitted or as his rank demanded. A glass, or earthenware, vessel containing salt, oil, or wine, or a few trinkets, was then buried with the urn in a small shallow square outside the city's wall. The law required that the burial of the dead be outside the walls of cities and towns. A gravestone containing an inscription of identification and a warning to passers-by against desecration marked the spot. The more wealthy purchased land along a prominent highway and built tombs. The slaves, suicides, and outcasts, were buried with little ceremony in the deserted sand pits outside the city.

The Jews brought with them to Rome the custom of interring the dead in caves or graves hewn out of the hillside; and as many of the early Christians were Jews it was perfectly natural for them to continue their method of burial as Christians. Furthermore, the very thought of incineration was revolting to them as it was a seeming contradiction of two of their most cherished beliefs, namely, the sanctity of the human body as "the temple of the Holy Ghost," and the resurrection of the body from the dead.

The catacombs are the cemeteries of the Christians. They are vast labyrinths of galleries excavated in the hills outside the walls of the ancient city of Rome. The galleries are cut through the soft rock; they are from two to four feet in width, and they vary in height according to the nature of the rock through which they are cut, rarely exceeding a height of eight or ten feet. The passages run in all directions and cross each other at various angles. They are so numerous that they have been conservatively estimated to total more than five hundred miles in length. On both sides of the pas-

sages long flat compartments like book-case shelves were excavated, and each niche was made to contain one or more bodies. The number of graves on each side of the passage varies according to the height, but usually all of the space to the ceiling has been utilized. Often the galleries run in different levels, connecting with each other by means of inclines or stairways, so there may be two or three or even four "stories" to a catacomb.

In an effort to account for the origin of the catacombs it has been suggested that as the early Christians were largely slaves and outcasts they buried their dead in the deserted sand pits outside the city. Then as the need for burial space became acute they excavated these pits still further. This is quite unlikely from the nature of the catacombs. The substance through which these galleries run is a soft rock unlike the soil of the sand pits. Furthermore, the galleries are only two to four feet wide, whereas the sand pit required passages from ten to twenty feet in width to permit the entrance of a horse and cart. It is also to be remembered that the first catacombs were excavated at a time when there was no need of secrecy for the Roman law protected all burial clubs.

The original meaning of the word "catacomb" is not definitely known. Several different interpretations have been proposed. The one which seems to be most generally accepted at present is that the name "catacomb" was not originally connected with the idea of the burial of the dead, but was rather the name of a particular locality in the environs of Rome where the Christians interred their dead. Due to some peculiarity in the configuration of the ground, possibly a "hollow," the name of the locality was associated with the first burial ground, and as others were located in the nearby hills the "place name" became a "class name."

Protected by the laws of Rome the first-century Christians excavated the catacombs with no attempt at secrecy, but when persecution befell them they were compelled to conceal their activities from the public gaze. These burial galleries became the secret meeting places of the Christians for counsel and worship. Some of the emperors forbade the holding of the

assemblies in the cemeteries; others made efforts to confiscate and destroy them. This necessitated the construction of secret entrances and exits, or various levels connected by secret passages, or the filling in or obstruction of known passages. When, in the fourth century, the empire recognized Christianity as a lawful religion interment was made in the open; although the catacombs continued to be used until the invasion of Rome by the barbarians and its occupancy by Alaric in the year 410, when the use of the catacombs for further burial entirely ceased. During the next two centuries they were visited as shrines and many of the relics were removed: and about the seventh century they sank into oblivion until rediscovered in the fourteenth century. The world was not interested in the find of some Franciscan Friars who uncovered the catacombs late in the fourteenth century, but when some laborers accidentally broke through a gallery in 1578 that discovery attracted universal attention. Antonio Bosio was the authority on the catacombs in the seventeenth century, having labored thirty-six years in them, after which he gave the world a faithful presentation of their content. De Rossi has been acknowledged as the authority of the nineteenth century.

With this brief sketch of the origin and history of the catacombs let us pass on to the consideration of their witness to the beliefs and practices of the early Christians. In passing it would be well to emphasize, what has already been mentioned, namely, the impartiality of the Roman law which gave to Roman Christians, before they were outlawed, the same protection in respect to burial that was accorded the highest in the land. The catacombs, says one writer "are monuments of the tolerance of Rome as well as its persecution." The witness of the catacombs to early Christian thought and practice is to be considered under the four divisions of architecture or construction, paintings, symbols, and epitaphs.

A study of the architecture or physical peculiarities of the catacombs will enable us to note some comparisons and contrasts between the Christians and non-Christians. We have already suggested that the catacombs witness to the abhor-

rence of the pagan practice of cremation, and to the continuation of the Jewish custom of inhumation. Moreover, the Christians differed from the Jews in that they sealed the individual graves and left the tombs, or as they called them "the catacombs" accessible for the purpose of visitation or congregation for prayer and worship.

Scattered along the galleries of the catacombs are frequently found small compartments, or *cubicula*, usually rectangular in shape, although occasionally circular or polygonal. These vary in size but are on the average twelve feet square. Light and air are introduced by means of vertical shafts called *luminaria* usually located in the center of the ceiling of the *cubicula* and running up to the surface of the earth. There are graves or *loculi* around the walls of each *cubiculum* in which are interred the martyrs, or the members of one family, or some official of the church. Quite likely these *cubicula* were used as chapels where the family or intimate friends of the deceased gathered to hear the burial service. They are not large enough for us to infer that the Christians used them for lengthy voluntary residence. Nor were hygienic conditions favorable to sustain healthful life over a long period. No doubt many of the Christians were compelled to take temporary refuge in them during the years of persecution.

The catacomb of St. Agnes contains five rectangular compartments, three on one side of the main corridor and two on the other, connected by a passage that intersects the gallery at right angles. Two of these compartments are supposed to have been used by men and two by women, the fifth being reserved for the altar and its administration. The *cubicula* are too small for us to suppose that they were used extensively for services, but it is probable that in dire times the sacred rites were performed there.

Many of the martyrs were interred in the *cubicula*; so it was not strange that during the years of persecution the believers met in them at the time of burial, and later, to celebrate the eucharist, hold their meetings for prayer and in-

struction, and participate in their love feasts. "That during the time of persecution the bishops performed the divine offices in the catacombs is not only recorded, but many of the chapels fitted up for that purpose remain, especially one in the catacomb of St. Priscilla, where the altar or stone coffin of a martyr remains with a small platform behind it for the priest or bishop to stand and officiate over it according to the practice of the early church." Most authorities agree that the larger chambers cannot be traced back of the years of persecution, leading to the conclusion that the worship of the early church did not find its way into the catacombs until religious services had been prohibited in the homes of Christians or in the established churches. But the fact cannot be denied that at some time there were held subterranean Christian services, as the discovery of chapels, altars, episcopal chairs, and baptismal fonts, indicates.

In concluding this discussion of the architecture of the catacombs we ought to take cognizance of the fact that the entire construction of the catacombs, demanding an enormous amount of labor, testifies to the thrift and mutual love of the early Christians. Theirs was to be a "communion of saints," both living and dead. They desired to surround themselves with a "great cloud of witnesses"; and no task was counted too difficult of accomplishment that would foster a common bond of fellowship between them. The physical peculiarities of the catacombs are a monument to the fraternity of the early believers; providing a common burial ground for all, rich and poor, bond and free, young and old, Jew and Gentile, all interred where those who remained, united with them in a common faith, might come and rejoice in happy recollections of mutual love and service, and in joyous anticipation of future reunion and eternal bliss.

The second source to be considered is the testimony of the paintings in the catacombs to the thought and practice of the early Christians. These paintings adorn the walls of the galleries and the walls and ceiling of the cubicula. The outstanding characteristic of the paintings in nearly all of the

catacombs is the joy they depict and the atmosphere of cheer they create. We would naturally expect to find the spirit of bitterness and abject hopelessness, which the cruelties of persecution so often produce, reflected in severe and somber paintings. However, the very opposite is discovered as the pictures reveal to us the beauty of Christian love and forgiveness. Furthermore, the cheerful paintings are a suggestion of the psychology of the early believers: what they needed most in their hours of persecution and bitter affliction was not a daily reminder of their misery, but rather something cheerful and invigorating to strengthen them in their weakness and sustain them in their trials. "There are no ghastly crucifixes; no dances of death; no fiery mouths of hell; no devils spitting the damned for an eternal roast; no frightful judgment scene." The message of the paintings in the catacombs is the joy of the Christian life, coupled with the promise of the resurrection from the dead—death is swallowed up in victory. Here is seen the spirit of the Christians under suffering, their faith, their hope, their love, and the greatest of these is their love. You will find no suggestions of revenge, no portrayal of bitterness, and no picturing of the torture or death of the martyrs.

The early paintings reveal the influence of pagan art; many of the ideas and some of the details have been transferred to Christian art and preserved for us in the paintings of the Catacombs. Several discovered are in the most classic style and are scarcely, if at all, inferior to contemporary pagan art. Especially is this noticeable in the fine stuccos that adorn the walls and ceilings of the cubacula. The Greek influence is seen in the paintings in the life and vigor of the color, the naturalness and sweetness of the countenance, the depth of the eye, and the beauty and grace of the form. Most of this early influence is lost in the stereotyped Byzantine forms which dominated the art of the state church. The paintings in the catacombs of St. Domitilla are the best examples of classic influence: these have been assigned to the second century by De Rossi.

Most of the subjects of the paintings are biblical. Of those taken from the New Testament the picture of the Shepherd occurs most frequently; in fact, this seems to be the popular picture that best represented the central thought in the religious life of the individual and of the church. It is found painted usually in the center of the ceiling of the cubiculum with other pictures surrounding it, although in some catacombs it is the only picture which distinguishes them as Christian burial places. It may be true, as has been suggested, that Hermes, Orpheus, and Mercury with the Ram, were pagan forerunners which influenced the shepherd representation in the catacombs; but the shepherd of the catacombs is not pagan, he is distinctively Christian. He is usually a youth with a staff or a shepherd's pipe in his hand, sometimes surrounded by many sheep, at other times portrayed carrying tenderly a lamb upon his shoulder or holding it close to his breast. This popular figure, suggestive of eternal youth and immortal love, tells us that the religion of these people was one of kindliness, fearlessness, grace and love. Here is the projection in form and color of a childlike faith in a gracious and gentle Shepherd who tenderly cares for his sheep.

The painting of the Vine is found in many of the catacombs. The followers of Jesus endeavored to visualize his words, "I am the Vine," and appropriated for their use the mural decorations associated with Bacchus, the god of the vintage. They stripped it of its god and made the vine an emblem of their faith. It adorns the ceiling and walls of the chambers, its branches and tendrils running in all directions clothed with leaves and laden with clusters of luscious grapes. All thought of its former significance in pagan art was dismissed from the minds of the Christians. To look upon the vine in the city of the dead was to recall the words of the Saviour, "As the branch cannot bear fruit in itself except it abide in the vine, no more can ye except ye abide in me." What a sense of communion must have been theirs! The leaves and clusters of fruit suggested the life-giving potency of the vine. There is also the suggestion of pure joyousness in the vine. "In eastern

countries the vintage is the great holiday of the year. In the Jewish church there is no festival so gay and so free as the Feast of Tabernacles, when they gathered the fruit of the vineyard and enjoyed themselves in their green bowers or tabernacles." As many of the Christians were Jews it was to be expected that the memories of former feasts with their joyousness would linger and be recalled at the sight of the vine. The Jewish observance of the Feast of Tabernacles was free from the licentious revelry of the later Empire. But unquestionably, the prevailing idea associated with the vine in the thoughts of the Christians was their relation to Christ and through him their relation to one another. The vine was a constant reminder of Christian unity: the twisting and twining tendrils connected the many loculi in the tomb and joined them all to the vine. So were the band of believers reminded that though separated from loved ones by persecution or even death yet were they all bound together by a common life in Christ. Though earthly tyrants might tear them limb from limb, they had the constant reminder in the vine of him who said, "they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand."

That John's gospel exerted considerable influence on the popular mind in those early days is to be inferred from the painting of the raising of Lazarus from the dead found in many of the catacombs. The quality of these paintings and the materials used indicate an early date. How appropriate that in the subterranean city of the dead the chambers should picture the power of the King to raise the dead unto life! This painting is more than the expression of a desire that they who are interred within the chambers might attain unto the resurrection of the dead. It is a constant reminder that every burial is made with this assurance; that as Lazarus came forth, so they who fall asleep in Christ shall hear their Lord's voice and rise from the dead. That this was the belief of the Christians at that time is attested by the writings of Eusebius when he tells of the treatment accorded the bodies of the martyrs; how they were exposed for a number of

days, then burnt and their ashes scattered upon the waters of the Rhone: and all this done that the Christians might have no rational claim to the bodily resurrection. The custom of embalming the body in myrrh, spikenard, and medicated ointments, surely indicated a desire to preserve the body as if the dead were but sleeping, awaiting the call that will awaken them to a brighter and more joyous life.

In addition to the evidence of the baptismal fonts mentioned in a previous paragraph, there are paintings to show that baptism has been a rite in the Christian church since its earliest days. Most of the pictures indicating baptism show it as an act of "pouring" although the candidate stands in the water disrobed as for immersion. In the catacomb of St. Pontianus there is a representation of Jesus standing in the water with John beside him pouring water over him. It is to be borne in mind, however, that painting is not an art that can easily represent an act of immersion, so we can scarcely argue from these pictures that affusion was the only method of baptism in practice at that time.

Prior to Constantine pictures of the Virgin Mary are confined to strictly scriptural subjects; pictures of the Nativity and the Visit of the Magi abound. These all represent the happiness of family life and are free from suggestions of theological dogma. In the cemetery of St. Agnes there is a fresco of Mary and Jesus which seems to be an extra-scriptural portrait. Its lines are Byzantine, however, and suggest an influence of the fourth century or later. Even in this picture Mary is not receiving the worship of others, but is herself in the attitude of prayer. There is no *Ora pro nobis* connected with the picture.

While considering the subject of the Virgin Mary it might be well to speak of the *Orante*. These are the portraits of men or women in the attitude of prayer. Far from leading to an inference of Mariolotry or hagiolotry they suggest rather the practice of prayer by the believers themselves. The *Orante* are found very frequently in the catacombs, and in the earlier pictures there is revealed a grace of form that is distinctly

classical. The most perfect representation of this figure in Christian art is found in the catacomb of St. Priscilla. A bronze figure of this period has been discovered which is a relic of pagan art, and it corresponds remarkably with the paintings in the catacombs. On the basis of this evidence we are led to conclude that the Orante, or praying men and women, were imported from pagan art and clothed with a significance peculiar to the Christian. Admitting the influence of pagan art and customs on early Christianity it is easy to understand how this figure was adopted by the Christians to serve as a constant reminder of their dependence upon God as "the giver of every good and perfect gift." Deprived of this world's goods, in danger of losing even life itself; whence shall they seek the blessing they require except from heaven?

Returning to the subject of the New Testament representations in the paintings we find, among many others, The Feeding of the Multitudes, Zaccheus in the Sycamore, Healing the Paralytic, The Washing of Pilate's Hands, and Peter's Denial, occurring most frequently. The painting of the loaves probably represents the eucharist which we are reasonably certain was celebrated in the catacombs. However, there is nothing in the paintings, symbols, or inscriptions, that warrants an inference of their belief in transubstantiation. Let us bear in mind the fact that the catacombs were not centers of theological discussions: in fact many, if not most, of the early believers were of the great uneducated class to whom pictures were a necessary expression of their fundamental beliefs. Only such pictures were painted as portrayed to them the essentials of their faith. The feeding of the multitudes told them the story of their Master's powers, and gave them the assurance of his sympathy and his provision for their needs. Zaccheus reminded them that they had been called from a life of dishonesty and selfishness to be the hosts of the Saviour who had come to sup with them.

Recalling the fact that Christianity was the fruition of Judaism and recruited many of its adherents from the Jewish

faith, we are not surprised to learn that Old Testament subjects are pictured in the catacombs: in fact almost as many as there are from the New Testament. Those occurring most frequently are: The Creation, The Sacrifice of Isaac, The Striking of the Rock, Noah and the Ark, Jonah and the Fish, Jonah under the Gourd, Daniel in the Lions' Den, and The Three Children of the Fire. Susanna and the Elders is the picture most frequently found from the Apocrypha. The large number of paintings from the Old Testament seems to Lord Lindsay to suggest that the Roman Christians adhered to a system of "typical parallelism," i.e. they endeavored to veil the great incidents of redemption, of the sufferings, faith and hopes of the church, under the parallel and typical events in the Old Testament. It seems far more likely that the early Christians were more interested in the immediate than in the mediate teachings of these paintings. Thus, for example, The Creation provided a starting point for their trust in God and their belief in his goodness; The Sacrifice of Isaac reminded them of the promise fulfilled in Christ; and The Striking of the Rock was a warning against spiritual pride as well as a reminder of a nation's perversity, and despite their murmurings of God's loving care.

There are other paintings which may be termed extra-biblical, but which truly represent the joy and hope of the Christians. The peacock was taken from pagan art and made the symbol of immortality. There are birds, typifying the Holy Ghost, also symbolical of purity and innocence; wreaths of roses; winged genii and playing children; mirrors that reflect the simple faith and love of the early believers.

Our third source of information for the beliefs and practices of Ante-Nicene Christianity are the symbols. The symbols are the designs that are engraved on the slabs that seal the *loculi* or graves. The earlier symbol seems to have been the Fish, sometimes rudely carved in outline, at other times represented by the word ΙΧΘΥΣ.* During the fourth century this symbol fell into disuse and by the end of the fifth century

*Ιε. Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ Υἱὸς Σωτήρ

had almost disappeared from religious art. This warrants us in assuming it was a secret sign which represented deep religious truths to the believer, but was quite meaningless to the uninitiated; so that when persecution ceased, and Christianity became a state religion, there was no further need for its use. Just what the full meaning of this symbol or word was to a first-or-second-century Christian is beyond our knowledge, but it is unquestionably the expression of a firm belief in a divine Christ. Theirs was no uncertain faith: for, indeed, these letters might well be an abbreviation of the saying of Paul, "I know whom I have believed." It is true we cannot draw too many inferences from the mere symbols as to what the Christians actually believed. However, in this particular case of the fish, we have the writings of the contemporaneous Church Fathers who interpret the sign for us. We are told that as fish was used as a savory accompaniment of bread which in turn was the "staff of life," so the symbol typifies the wholesomeness of the doctrine of Christ to savor the ordinary experiences of life. Furthermore, as Jesus and his disciples spent much of their time about the inland lakes of Palestine, and as fish entered into several of his miracles, the early writers see in this symbol the constant reminder of the earthly ministry of Jesus. But the Fathers seem to see, most of all, in this symbol the portrayal of the Lord's relation to believers. Christ is the big fish and we are all little fishes. As water is essential to the life of the fish, so water in the rite of baptism is a necessity to the life of the Christians.

The Cross is found occasionally as a symbol, but rarely as a Latin cross. This may seem strange, for to us it is the most eloquent expression of the sacrifice of Christ. And so it was to the early Christians as the Scriptures and the writings of the Fathers testify. The fact that the cross symbolized Christ's death on their behalf deterred them from making a promiscuous use of it, especially where it might be profaned.

The Monogram of the first two letters of the word *Χριστός* was in use in the catacombs and became quite common during the fourth century. No doubt the use of this monogram

grew out of a desire for a simple sign which the Christians might recognize, but which the pagan would not associate so readily with the despised religion. In time this symbol gave way to the use of only the first letter X, which later became what we now call St. Andrew's cross.

The Anchor was the symbol of hope. How expressive of the artless faith of the Christians! Tossed about and sorely buffeted by the storms of persecution, they saw in the anchor the symbol of him who had promised to hold them fast. It served also as a testimony of those whose bodies the inscription-marked slab hid from view. Their faith had not been in vain! Though death had claimed them, they had fallen asleep anchored to the Rock of Ages! Birds are carved upon the graves as well as painted on the walls. As suggested before they represent the Holy Ghost, purity, innocence, and the soul winging its flight to heaven. The palm branch has been interpreted by some as an indication of a martyr's grave. There is hardly warrant in assuming that it represents more than the Christian's triumph over sin and his faith in the ultimate triumph over the grave. Some slabs have been found on which representations of instruments are cut. These have been understood by some investigators as suggestive of the torture suffered by the martyr; especially where the forceps and pronged comb are depicted. We have observed, however, both in the paintings and thus far in the symbols, that the chief characteristic of the catacombs was to reflect the brighter aspects of life. What seems more in keeping with this thought is to make these instruments the implements of the trades formerly followed by the deceased.

Our final consideration is the testimony of the epitaphs to the beliefs and practices of early Christianity. At first the message was brief and simple. As the bird represented the soul winging its flight, so the inscriptions merely designated the resting place of the body. Amid the persecutions of Rome the Christians had no thought of perpetuating the records of their dead: they buried them deep in the heart of the earth, where they alone read their inscriptions. They simply en-

deavored to make possible the identification of the place which held the body of a loved one, that they might go from time to time to show their affection and give vent to their grief. Thus beside the name of the dead the early inscriptions carried simple messages of love and piety. When peace came to the church the style of inscriptions was changed and the thought of preservation entered. Here again we cannot expect to deduce a perfect system of theology based on the inscriptions of the catacombs, but we can expect to learn something of the religious beliefs of the early Christians, and draw some inferences as to social conditions.

It would be well for us to compare the epitaphs in the catacombs with those found on pagan graves. The earlier Christian inscriptions differ from the pagan in the simplicity of expression. They say nothing of the birth and parentage, country or social rank of the deceased. The pagan inscriptions usually contain an appeal to the good feeling or religious prejudices of the passers-by not to violate or in any way profane the tomb, adding an imprecation against all who do. Of all the Christian tombs examined there has been found only one example of this kind, and this one exception seems to emphasize the rule of Christian love. There is one inscription that reads,

"If anyone shall violate this sepulchre
Let him perish miserably and remain unburied;
Let him lie down, and not rise again:
Let his portion be with Judas."

The pagan inscriptions have no hope of a future life of joy. While there is a belief in existence in a world of shades below, it is to be a dreary, uneventful life. For example:

"Ossa Nicenis hic sita sunt.
Supera, Vivite, Valete;
Inferi, Havete, Recipite Nicenem."

This is at best an effort to bolster up a joyless hope by an appeal to the shades to receive and welcome the departed. Death is usually mentioned as a never-ending sleep, the grave as an eternal home, and the body as returning to the dust. The word *Vale* is typical of the pagan's exit from life: it was "Farewell."

The Christian epitaphs, while they do not always actually express a firm belief in the reality of a future life, usually imply it. At times the only difference between the Christian and pagan inscriptions is the omission of the phrase *Di Manes* and the addition of the fish or anchor. During the days of persecution, those who lost their lives in the witness of Christ were interred by their fellow-believers who had no idea of perpetuating their honors, wisdom, or talent; but having buried them they uttered a prayer, and, if time permitted, they inscribed the name and the hope upon the grave. The expressions of a belief in a future life that occur most frequently are "In Peace" and "Live in God." "*In Pace, Pax tibi, Pax tecum,*" are some of the forms in which the first idea occurs. This idea came from the Jews. It reveals a belief that to these Christians all was well with their departed loved ones.

The idea of immortality is given fuller expression in the phrase *Vivas in Deo*. This is an advance on the simple thought of the peace of the departed; it gives the ground for that peace. Living in the presence of God there can be nought but peace. Such expressions as *Ivit ad Deum*, and *Vocitus iit in pace* show the hope of a blessed future for the departed, not afar off but into which they have already entered. There is no mention, directly or inferentially, of a belief in purgatory; the inscriptions witness to the belief in the immediate blissful entrance into Paradise.

There is a strong intimation of their belief in the person of Christ as more than human in the inscriptions. The Greek letters Alpha and Omega used as symbols testify to the belief in his eternity. Such inscriptions as *Vivas in Christo Deo*, *Θεους Χριστους Ομνιποτες* and *Deo, Sanc, Χρ, Uni*, link him with the Father in power and honor.

There are suggestions of the organization of the early church found in the catacombs, but it would be exceedingly difficult to prove the existence of the hierarchy. None of the early graves contain the word bishop. The tomb that has been designated as that of the first Roman bishop simply bore the

name Linus. Presbyters are frequently mentioned, some of the epitaphs showing that they followed trades at the same time. Other officers mentioned are deacons, sub-deacons, lectors or readers, acolyths, exorcists, and fossers or official grave diggers.

We catch a glimpse of Christian home life reflected in the epitaphs. The high esteem in which purity and virtue were held is attested by the inscriptions to faithful wives as well as to virgins. Most endearing terms are used to show the relations between the deceased and the other members of the family. There is no mention of slaves in the catacombs, although we are reasonably certain many were buried there. Social distinctions were forgotten by the Christians in death as well as in life. Inscriptions are found of foster children, (*alumni* and *alumnae*,) those outcasts from pagan homes who had been taken in by Christians and brought up in "the fear and admonition of the Lord." Love and tenderness were the prominent Christian characteristics in a selfish pagan world. *Amicus pauperum* and *amatrix pauperum* are the lasting monuments to men and women who "loved the poor." It is true the pagan inscriptions sometimes contain these words, but they are usually followed by a eulogy in an effort to boastfully parade the virtue of the deceased.

An interesting contrast between Christian and pagan epitaphs is seen in the consideration of the matter of resignation to death. The Christian inscription reveals nothing of bitterness, nothing of disappointment, nothing of dread, but rather a calm faith in the future. The pagan epitaphs exhibit the disappointments of life, some profess to mock death, others contain injunctions to enjoy life for death ends all. Only once do we find the sentiment of pagan parents approximating the resignation of Christians: at the death of a three-year old child the following inscription is found, *Quam Di amaverunt, haec moritur infans*.

The question of martyr worship requires brief consideration. That there was no worship of the saints or martyrs during the first three centuries the writings of the Fathers

prove. It is not difficult to understand how this later became the practice of the church. The martyrs were usually buried in the chief places in the catacombs, if possible in the large chambers or cubicula. When persecution ceased and Christians came to the catacombs to visit their dead the martyrs received more attention than those who were buried in some obscure gallery, until a reverence for the martyrs grew up which later developed into worship. Augustine remarked in the fourth century, "It quite passes the strength of my understanding how the martyrs can help those to whom they certainly do render assistance." Prudentius, toward the close of the fourth century, speaking of a visit in the catacombs says, "To such secret places is the body of Hyppolytus conveyed, near to the spot where now stands the altar dedicated to God. The same table (*mensa*) gives the sacrament and is the guardian of its martyr's bones, which it keeps laid up there in expectation of the eternal Judge while it feeds the dwellers on the Tiber with holy food.—Here (at the altar) have I, when sick with ills both of soul and body, oftentimes prostrated myself in prayer and found relief—I know that I owe all to Hyppolytus to whom Christ has given power to obtain whatever anyone asks of him."

This concludes our investigation of the various sources in the catacombs which enable us to secure a knowledge of the beliefs and practices of the early Christians. In summing up we can say that the religion of the Good Shepherd would best express the joy and the childlike trust of the primitive church; no place given to envy, hatred, or desire for revenge. Purity of home life commended, social distinctions forgotten, enemies forgiven, Christian love and brotherhood emphasized, these are the outstanding virtues of the early believers. The catacombs testify to an organization, a creed, crudely but vitally expressed, a glorious hope in the future life of bliss, and a reverence for all that is holy.

Glenolden, Pa.

CHARLES F. DEININGER.

THE ADOPTING ACT OF 1729 AND THE POWERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A document entitled "An Affirmation designed to safeguard the unity and liberty of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America" has quite recently been "submitted for the consideration of its ministers and people." It bears the signatures of one hundred and fifty ministers; and is occasioned, we are told, by "certain actions of the General Assembly of 1923" as well, as by "persistent attempts to divide the church and abridge its freedom." The gist of the "Affirmation" is that these actions were *ultra vires* and imperil the liberty of office bearers under the broad terms of their subscription to the Standards of the Church. Appeal is made to the magna charta of Presbyterian liberty, the Adopting Act of 1729, which, it is asserted, anticipated and provided for dissent by individuals from portions of the Confession. This is a sweeping claim and if it can be justified will go far to support the contention that a minister may be in good and regular standing in the Presbyterian Church even though he does not accept the clear teaching of the Confession of Faith and the Catechisms or even the Brief Statement regarding such doctrines as the Infallibility of the Scriptures and the Virgin Birth and Bodily Resurrection of Christ. But a careful reading of the Adopting Act and of the interpretations put upon it by the adopting Synod gives no warrant for the loose terms of subscription which the "one hundred and fifty" are claiming.

As is well known, the original Synod, although Presbyterian in its character, was in existence twelve years before it adopted a written constitution. In 1728 an overture framed by the Rev. John Thompson was presented to the Synod by the Presbytery of New Castle. Mr. Thompson was a native of Ireland who came to this country as a probationer in 1715, and was ordained over the congregation of Lewes in 1717. The specific design of the overture as stated at the time was to prevent "the ingress and spreading of dangerous errors

among either ourselves or the flocks committed to our care." The errors specifically alluded to were Socinianism and Arminianism, and it seems that these errors were creeping into the churches in this country, having prevailed to a certain extent in Scotland and in more alarming measure in Ireland. Already the Synod had rejected a ministerial applicant coming over from Ireland because of his unsoundness in the faith. The ranks of the American Presbyterian Church were being recruited by men from the Irish Presbyteries, and the main purpose in preparing an Adopting Act was to allay the fears and perplexities of mind "lest we should be corrupted with the new schemes of doctrine which for sometime had prevailed in the North of Ireland." These "new schemes" which caused alarm two hundred years ago and compelled the Synod to safeguard the faith by adopting the Westminster Standards are most illuminating in relation to discussions now going on in our Church.

In the influential City Presbytery of Belfast there was a group of brilliant young ministers led by the Rev. John Abernethy, a man of undoubted talents and learning, and who uniformly maintained a high character for piety and integrity. These young divines organized themselves into a Society and began to teach, among other things, that the Church has no right to require candidates for the ministry to subscribe to a Confession of Faith prepared by any man or body of men, and that such a required subscription is a violation of the right of private judgment and inconsistent with Christian liberty and true Protestantism. The first public pronouncement of the Society was a sermon preached by Mr. Abernethy under the title "Religious Obedience Founded on Personal Persuasion," and the position maintained was essentially that the Ritschlian of today, viz: "He taught that every man's persuasion of what was true and right was the sole rule of his faith and conduct—that there was no culpability in error after what each man believed to be a deliberate and impartial investigation of the truth—that it was in the highest degree unjust and unscriptural to exclude from Chris-

tian fellowship any who walk according to their own persuasions, however palpably erroneous in the judgment of the Church on non-essential points—and that all doctrines were non-essential on which human reason and Christian sincerity permit men to differ.”*

In the course of time the members of the Belfast Society began to acknowledge their doubts regarding “the Deity of the Saviour,” asserting that even if the doctrine were true, it was by no means a fundamental doctrine. At the meeting of the Synod of Belfast in 1721 in response to memorials that came in from seventeen congregations, supplicating the supreme judicatory to silence the aspersions of enemies and remove the apprehensions of her own people by making subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith obligatory upon all ministers of the Presbyterian Church, a strong deliverance was proposed by the Synod to this effect: “The doctrine of the essential Deity of the Son of God, his essential divine perfections, particularly his necessary existence, absolute eternity and independence, has always been regarded by this Synod as an essential article of the Christian faith.” This declaration, however, was not unanimously adopted, the members of the Belfast Society, taking refuge under the cardinal principle of religious liberty, and refusing to vote in the affirmative. The minutes of Synod state that they declined voting for it not because they disbelieved the article of Christ’s supreme deity, for this article they professed in the strongest terms to believe, but because they were against all authoritative human decisions as tests of orthodoxy, and because they judged such decisions unreasonable at the time. This was regarded as a very subtle distinction: to feel at liberty to profess in the very strongest terms their belief in a doctrine, and yet to feel it to be a grievous infringement of Christian liberty to be required to concur with their brethren in a resolution to the same effect. Dr. Reid, the Irish historian, in recording the refusal of the Belfast Society to adopt the declaration of Synod makes this significant comment: “It

* J. S. Reid, *History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland*. Vol. III, p. 117.

must be added, also, that, in this debate, several of the Society drew another nice distinction, which tended still further to raise doubts, even in the minds of the most candid, of the soundness in the faith of those who urged it. They distinguished between the truth of the doctrine of the Saviour's Deity, which they professed to hold, and its being an essential or fundamental doctrine of the Gospel, the belief of which was necessary to Christian or ministerial communion, which they denied—a distinction which, if carried out in harmony with their doctrine of personal persuasion, prepared them for admitting to the ordinances, and even the ministry of the Church, an Arian or Socinian." To meet this situation, that of a divided church, it was proposed not to enjoin, but simply to *permit* all the members of the Synod who were willing to do so, to subscribe the Westminster Confession of Faith. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Faculty of Cambridge Divinity School has recently made the same suggestion for the ministers of the Protestant Episcopal Church with reference to the Apostles' Creed. The result of the proposal in the Irish Church was to separate the ministers into two parties, *subscribers* and *non-subscribers*, and to precipitate a controversy, the lessons of which have a direct bearing upon the plea that is now being made for individual liberty in the interpretation of the Standards and for the privilege of dissent from portions of the Confession.

It is to be noted that the members of the Belfast Society who were opposed to any objective standard of truth and of faith drifted in a sure and constant shift away from the moorings of the evangelical faith. And although they resented such epithets as "Arians" and "Socinians," it became quite evident that their doctrine of the person of Christ was widely divergent from the teachings of the Scriptures and of the Confession. Consequently, in the year 1726, the Synod was compelled to take clear and positive action regarding subscription to the system of doctrine embraced in the Standards, believing that only in a straightforward adoption of

these standards was there any remedy for dissension, or any hope for peace and unity. This action was carried in the Synod, we are told, largely through "the faithful and honest eldership of the church," and the historian of that whole distressing chapter makes this illuminating remark: "Let the Presbyterian Church in Ireland learn the important lesson of abiding faithfully by her Confession of Faith. That Confession may be enlarged or abridged or varied to suit abounding error; but let her ever 'hold fast the faithful Word she hath been taught' in a definite and authorized confession, and let her suffer no latitudinarian pretext of Christian liberty to absolve those who seek to exercise the ministry in her communion from declaring their concurrence in her recognized standards."

This experience of the Irish Presbyterian Church contributed directly to the action of the General Synod in 1729, for it reveals the "new schemes" of doctrine which alarmed a majority of the early American Presbyters, coming recently as they did from Ireland, where controversy regarding the standards had been going on, and also from Scotland where "moderatism" had occasioned a similar agitation regarding the evangelical faith. These agitations abroad made it obvious that something must be done in the American Church to safeguard that Church from the inroads of error and also prevent the blunders incident to loose terms of subscription. The overture presented in the year 1728 by the Presbytery of New Castle under the leadership of Mr. Thompson, was laid over for one year and then at the meeting of the Synod in 1729 "An Act preliminary to the Adopting Act was after long debate upon it agreed to and is as follows:

"Although the Synod do not claim or pretend to any authority of imposing our faith upon other men's consciences, but do profess our just dissatisfaction with, and abhorrence of such impositions, and do utterly disclaim all legislative power and authority in the Church, being willing to receive one another as Christ has received us to the glory of God, and

admit to fellowship in sacred ordinances, all such as we have grounds to believe Christ will at last admit to the kingdom of heaven, yet we are undoubtedly obliged to take care that the faith once delivered to the saints be kept pure and uncorrupt among us, and so handed down to our posterity. And do therefore agree that all the Ministers of this Synod, or that shall hereafter be admitted into this Synod, shall declare their agreement in, and approbation of, the Confession of Faith, with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, as being in all the essential and necessary articles, good forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine, and do also adopt the said Confession and Catechisms as the confession of our faith. And we do also agree, that all the Presbyteries within our bounds shall always take care not to admit any candidate of the ministry into the exercise of the sacred functions, but what declares his agreement in opinion with all the essential and necessary articles of said Confession, either by subscribing the said Confession of Faith and Catechisms, or by a verbal declaration of their assent thereto, as such Minister or candidate shall think best. And in case any Minister of this Synod, or any candidate for the ministry shall have any scruple with respect to any article or articles of said Confession or Catechisms, he shall, at the time of his making said declaration, declare his sentiments to the Presbytery or Synod, who shall, notwithstanding, admit him to the exercise of the ministry within our bounds, and to ministerial communion, if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge his scruple or mistake to be only about articles not essential and necessary in doctrine, worship, or government. But if the Synod or Presbytery shall judge such Ministers or candidates erroneous in essential and necessary articles of faith, the Synod or Presbytery shall declare them incapable of communion with them. And the Synod do solemnly agree, that none of us will traduce or use any opprobrious terms of those that differ from us in these extra-essential and not necessary points of doctrine, but treat them with the

same friendship, kindness, and brotherly love, as if they had not differed from us in such sentiments."

This was adopted in the morning, and in the afternoon took place the "Adopting Act" proper of which the following is the record:

"All the Ministers of this Synod now present [names are omitted], after proposing all the scruples that any of them had to make against any articles and expressions in the Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster, have unanimously agreed in the solution of those scruples, and in declaring the said Confession and Catechisms to be the confession of their faith; excepting only some clauses in the twentieth and twenty-third chapters, concerning which clauses the Synod do unanimously declare, that they do not receive those articles in any sense as to suppose the civil magistrate hath a controlling power over Synods, with respect to the exercise of their ministerial authority; or power to persecute any for their religion; or in any sense contrary to the Protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain."

"The Synod observing that unanimity, peace and unity, which appeared in all their consultations and determinations relating to the affair of the Confession, did unanimously agree in giving thanks to God in solemn prayer and praises."

Regarding this historic document, attention needs to be called to the fact that its design was to keep "the faith once delivered to the saints pure and uncorrupt among us, and so handed down to our posterity," and that provision is made for dealing with any scruples held by a minister or candidate for the ministry with respect to any article or articles of said Confession or Catechisms. According to the Adopting Act proper, it is evident that the scruples particularly in mind at that time had reference to the powers of the civil magistrate and not to the body of doctrinal truth contained in the Confession, entire loyalty to which was clearly and emphatically expressed at the time, and subsequently in repeated

deliverances. Furthermore, it is specifically stated that it is the function of the Presbytery or of the Synod to decide whether the scruple in question relates to an essential and necessary article of the faith. In other words, it is not permitted a minister or a candidate for the ministry to decide whether his personal scruples regarding doctrines taught in the Confession are incidental or essential. The Presbytery must take "his sentiments" into consideration, and if the Presbytery cannot reach a decision, an appeal is to be made to the higher court where a final verdict is to be rendered.

This is precisely what took place in 1909 and 1910. Three candidates, applying for licensure in New York Presbytery, had scruples regarding certain doctrines: the Infallibility of the Scriptures, the Virgin Birth, the Bodily Resurrection of Christ, His Atoning Work, and the Miracles which He wrought. The Presbytery, by a majority vote, decided in effect that the articles to which assent could not be given are not necessary or essential articles of the Confession. A complaint was made to the Synod of New York, and when not sustained by that body, was carried up to the General Assembly. This complaint was found in order by the Standing Judicial Committee and so referred to the Judicial Commission. This Commission, as the records were lacking in the case, could not reverse the decision of the Presbytery, though it called the decision hasty and unwise. It therefore requested the Assembly to make a declaration regarding the necessary and essential character of the doctrines to which the candidates for licensure in New York Presbytery had refused assent. This the Assembly did in a series of five propositions. Six years later, when complaint was made against the same Presbytery for licensing men who expressed doubt concerning the same five doctrines, the Assembly at the suggestion of the Commissioners from the Presbytery of New York, along with the Commissioners from the Presbyteries which had lodged the complaint against the Presbytery of New York reaffirmed the declaration made in 1910. The Assembly of

1923 was overtured to deal with the same troubles, issuing from the same source, and again the General Assembly made affirmation as to the necessary and essential character of doctrines which had been for the third time called in question.

This action, instead of controverting the principles of the Adopting Act, as the "one hundred and fifty" claim, is in direct accord with that act and carries out almost to the letter its provisions regarding scruples. And furthermore, it is based upon the specific powers granted to the Assembly by the Constitution, and as defined in Chapter XII, Section V, of the Form of Government: "To the General Assembly also belongs the power of deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine,—and of suppressing schismatical contentions and disputations."

It is true that the Adopting Act was a compromise between those who desired a literal subscription to the Standards and those who preferred some loose form of subscription or no subscription at all, but the act itself which aimed to secure "in essentials unity, in non-essentials liberty, and in all things charity," makes provision whereby in an orderly way it may be determined from time to time whether an article or articles concerning which there may be difference of opinion are essential and necessary. The statement is made for the case of liberty that in the reunion of 1870 a divided church came together "each recognizing the other as a sound and orthodox body," and that in 1906 a union was consummated with the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, even though there was objection in certain quarters to such a union. It should, however, be noted that such unity was effected through the agency of the General Assembly as being the bond of union and of mutual confidence among all our churches. That is to say, the differences between the Old and New School bodies, between the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and our own, were settled not by subordinating these differences "to recognized loyalty to Jesus Christ and united work for the kingdom," but by subordinating them to a joint

acceptance of the standards of the Church including the Form of Government in which the powers of the Assembly are specifically defined.

It has been frequently asserted of late that the Presbytery is the source of authority in our Church and that the Assembly is something like a large Conference or Convention whose main function is to give "strong advice." This theory is built upon the notion that the Assembly is the creature of the Presbyteries; that just as the original States organized a Federal United States Government, so the original Presbyteries and Synods brought into being the General Assembly, which, therefore, is not authorized to act without the concurrence of its constituent parts. But in fact the process of organization was just the reverse. It was the original Presbytery which expanded and in time constituted itself a Synod, dividing itself up into a number of Presbyteries, and it was this Synod which as the result of prosperous development found it necessary to organize itself into a General Assembly. It has thus by a true Apostolic succession maintained itself as the original Presbytery, embodying in itself all the Presbyteries and "the collected wisdom and united voice of the whole Church."

Therefore, the action of the Synod in 1729 when the Standards were adopted was not superseded by the organization of an Assembly in 1788 and the necessary constitutional changes that were involved. The wise and generous provisions of the original Adopting Act were at no time modified or qualified by the Synod, nor has the Assembly ever in any way revoked or reversed the action taken in 1729. It would seem then that the Assembly is fully within the scope of original powers when in response to complaints or appeals regarding erroneous teachings it declares whether the doctrines involved are necessary and essential.

No one will question the desirability and necessity of safeguarding the unity and the liberty of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., but if the experiences of two hundred years

and more of history are to teach us anything, it is surely this: a smaller part of the Church should not govern a larger part and determine matters of controversy which arise therein, but a representation of the whole "should govern and determine in regard to every part and to all the parts united."

Princeton.

J. ROSS STEVENSON.

JOHN DEWITT

John DeWitt was born, October 10, 1842, in Harrisburg, Pa., where his father was for nearly half a century pastor of the Market Square Presbyterian Church. Graduated from Princeton College with the class of 1861, he studied law for a short time and then became a candidate for the ministry, pursuing his studies at Princeton and at Union Seminary, New York. He was ordained by the Third Presbytery of New York, June 9, 1865.

The first seventeen years of his public ministry were spent in the pastorate. He was pastor of the Presbyterian Church at Irvington, N.Y., for four years (1865-1869), pastor of the Central Congregational Church of Boston, Mass., for seven years (1869-1876), and pastor for six years (1876-1882) of the Tenth Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia.

The last thirty years of Dr. DeWitt's active ministry were spent in the service of the church at large, his three pastorates being followed by three professorships. Historical sermons preached on Sunday afternoons in Philadelphia attracted such wide attention and showed so plainly his rare gifts as historian and theologian, that in 1882 he was called to the chair of Biblical and Ecclesiastical History in Lane Seminary. Six years in Cincinnati (1882-1888) were followed by four years in Chicago (1888-1892) as professor of Apologetics in McCormick Seminary, after which he returned to Princeton Seminary as professor of Church History. In 1912, after twenty years of service he resigned from his professorship and was made professor emeritus. He continued to live in Princeton until the time of his death which came suddenly, after a brief illness, on November 19, 1923.

Dr. DeWitt was for five years (1903-1907) the chief editor of the Princeton Theological Review, and he remained until 1912 a member of the editorial committee. A sketch of his life will appear in a subsequent issue.

NOTES AND NOTICES

CRITICAL NOTE ON EXODUS VI. 3

In criticising a document there are at least three fundamental principles upon which we should proceed: *First*, the document must be supposed to be in harmony with itself and interpreted accordingly. *Secondly*, it must be presumed to be in harmony with its sources of information. *Thirdly*, it should be in accordance with its supposed time, place, and circumstances.¹

I. The Critical Theory is Inconsistent

1. The critics hold that Exodus vi. 3, which the RV renders, "And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob as God Almighty (*El Shaddai*); but by my name Jehovah I was not known unto them," belongs to P and that P means to say that *El Shaddai* and not *Jehovah* was the name of God known to the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Therefore they assign four passages, Gen. xvii. 1, xxviii. 3, xxxv. 11, and xlviii. 3 to P., since *El Shaddai* is found in them. It is to be observed, however, regarding these passages that, in xvii. 1, it is said that *Jehovah* appeared to Abram, saying, I am *El Shaddai*; and in xxxv. 11 that *Elohim* appeared to Jacob saying, I am *El Shaddai*. In xxviii. 3 Isaac says to Jacob, *El Shaddai* bless thee; and in xlviii. 3 Jacob says in the presence of Joseph and his two sons, *El Shaddai* appeared unto me. In a fifth passage, Gen. xliii. 14, Jacob uses this appellation in his prayer for his sons who are starting for Egypt. But this verse is assigned to E or J by the critics and the *El Shaddai* attributed to the Redactor. Is it not singular that if P thought *El Shaddai* was a proper name for God he should have used *Elohim* about seventy times before Ex. vi. 3 and *El Shaddai* only four times? Is it not extraordinary that, if the writer of Ex. vi. 3 meant that God "appeared" to the patriarchs under the name of *El Shaddai*, only once in P should it be said that *El Shaddai* "appeared," just the same number of times that P says that *Jehovah* "appeared" and that *Elohim* "appeared"? *Jehovah* alone (or *Jehovah Elohim*) is alleged to have occurred in J, and *Elohim* alone in E; but *El Shaddai* is found but four times in P and *Elohim* seventy times.

¹ Briggs, *The Higher Criticism of the Hexateuch*, p. 4.

If P alone thought that El Shaddai was the only name of God known in the time of the patriarchs, how about Gen. xliii. 14, which the critics assign to E or J? We have seen that they escape the consequences of this assignment simply by asserting that El Shaddai is an interpolation of the Redactor. But did the Redactor also think that the patriarchs used El Shaddai rather than Jehovah? Why, then did he not cut out Jehovah and put El Shaddai into the text of J? Besides, if P alone thought that Shaddai was a specifically patriarchal designation, how about its use in Gen. xlix. 25 and Num. xxiv. 4, 16, which are assigned to J or JE? All of these questions will be appropriately answered if we take Shaddai and El Shaddai as appellations, "the Almighty" or "a mighty God," and not as proper names.

2. A historical or ostensibly historical document should, if possible, be interpreted in harmony with its sources and with earlier histories supposedly known to the author. What then were the sources of P? According to datings advocated by the critics they could have been only J, E, D, H, and Judges, Samuel, Kings, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Hosea, Amos, Obadiah, Nahum, Zephaniah, and parts of other books. Now the only one of these sources or earlier works in which El Shaddai occurs is Ezek. x. 5, "And the sound of the cherubim's wings was heard unto the outer court as the voice of Almighty God (El Shaddai) when he speaketh." Shaddai alone occurs in the Pentateuch only in Gen. xlix. 25 (J) and in Numbers xxiv. 4, 16 (JE). In Gen. xlix. 24, 25, we read in the Blessing of Joseph that "the arms of his hands were made strong by the hands of the Almighty One (**אֱלֹהֵי**) of Jacob (from thence is the Shepherd, the stone of Israel) even by the God of thy fathers, who shall help thee, and by the Almighty (Shaddai) who shall bless thee." The Samaritan Hebrew text and version of this verse both read El Shaddai instead of Shaddai, a reading supported by the Syriac and apparently by the Septuagint. If we take the latter reading we would find God Almighty to be parallel with the Almighty One of Jacob who is also called the God of thy fathers (*i.e.*, of Jacob). This psalm of Jacob refers in verse 18 to Jehovah in the words, "I have waited for Thee, O Jehovah"; so that if P got his information about El Shaddai in this psalm he would have known that Jehovah was

used by the patriarch Jacob at least. Nothing is said in this psalm about either Jehovah or El Shaddai having "appeared." In Num. xxiv. 4, 16 Balaam uses the phrase: "which saw the vision of the Almighty (Shaddai)."² Since this chapter is assigned to JE, P must have known, if he got his information here, that Shaddai was supposed by his sources to have been used after the declaration made in Exodus vi. 3; for JE certainly places the episode of Balaam about forty years after the event recorded in Exodus vi. 3.

These being the only places in the old Testament where Shaddai occurs in the portions assigned by the critics to a date before 550 B.C., it follows that the critics' interpretation of Ex. vi. 3 makes P to be out of harmony with all its known sources.

3. In documents which in their opinion were written after 550 B.C. we never find El Shaddai; but Shaddai alone occurs thirty times in Job, and in Ruth, i. 20, 21; Isa. xiii. 14; Joel i. 15; Ps. lxxviii. 15, xci. 1. Not one of these passages refers to the patriarchs or to God as "appearing" to them or to anyone else. In twenty-seven of them Shaddai is used as parallel to other names of God, to wit: nine times to אֱלֹהִים, thirteen times to אֵל, once to עֲלִיִּין, and four times to יְהוָה. There is no intimation that Shaddai was a more ancient designation than these other terms. It follows, therefore, that, as interpreted by the critics, P in its use of El Shaddai is not congruous with the usage of these other books which the critics allege to have been written in post-captivity times. To be sure, if Job was written in the time of the patriarchs we can see where the author of P got his idea that they had used Shaddai as a name for God. Or even if some of the other passages came from the time to which they have been assigned by tradition we might see how he got the idea; even though they say nothing of revelation or the patriarchs. But as the case stands for the critics we find that the author of P must have invented the whole conception. For neither Ezekiel, Job, J, E, H, D, Joel, Jonah, Deutero-Isaiah, Ruth, nor the Psalms, furnish any ground for supposing that the patriarchs used this appellation for God; and the certainly late writings such as Daniel, Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, Esther,

² Shaddai is rendered in Greek and Syriac by "God," in Arabic by "the sufficient one"; and in the Samaritan version by "field," they having read *sadai* for *shaddai*.

Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah, never mention the name at all. Whether we take the traditional view of the post-captivity literature, or the radical, there would therefore be no contemporary evidence to show that the hypothetical writer of P, provided that he lived in post-captivity times, was in his use of Shaddai in harmony with contemporaneous usage and ideas.

II. Correct Exegesis Supports Unity of Pentateuch

Having shown that the interpretation of Exodus vi. 3 advanced by the critics is out of harmony with the rest of P, that it does not agree with the rest of the Pentateuch, and that it does not fit into the time at which P is alleged to have been written, it remains to see whether this passage can be so interpreted as to be brought into agreement with the traditional view of the Pentateuch as the work of Moses. This we shall attempt to show by an examination of the text, grammar, and vocabulary of the verse, under the following heads: 1) "appeared," 2) "as" (אֲשֶׁר), 3) "God" (El), 4) "Almighty" (*Shaddai*), 5) "but" (*waw*), 6) "name," 7) "known," 8) the form of the last sentence,—can it be interrogative?

1. The "appearing" of God to men is described in several different ways in the Old Testament.

a. The most usual expression is that found here in Ex. vi. 3, where the Niphal of the verb "to see" (רָאָה) is used. With the Deity as subject this verb occurs forty-three times as follows:

(a). Jehovah, Gen. xii. 7 *bis* (J), xvii. 1 (J), xviii. 1 (J), xxii. 14 (J), xxvi. 2, 24 (J), Ex. iii. 14 (E), iv. 1, 5 (J), vi. 3 (P), Lev. ix. 4 (P), xvi. 2 (P), Num. xiv. 14 (JE), Deut. xxxi. 15 (JE), 1 Kings iii. 5, ix. 2, 1 Chron. i. 7, iii. 1, vii. 12, Jer. iii. 13, Zech. ix. 14.

(b). The glory of Jehovah, Ex. xvi. 10 (P), Lev. ix. 6, 23 (P), Num. xiv. 10 (P), xvi. 19 (P), xvii. 7 (P), xx. 6 (P), Isa. lx. 2, Ps. xc. 16.

(c). The angel of Jehovah, Ex. iii. 2 (J), Jud. iii. 21 *bis*, vi. 12, xiii. 3, 21.

(d). Jehovah of Hosts, Mal. iii. 2.

(e). Jehovah, God of Israel, 1 Kings xi. 2.

(f). Elohim, Gen. xxxv. 9 (P).

(g). The man (*i.e.*, the angel of Jehovah), Jud. xiii. 10.

(h). El, Gen. xxxv. 1 (E).

(i). El Shaddai, Gen. xlviii. 3 (P).

b. Other expressions are the following:

(1) In the following cases it is said that man "saw" the Deity, the Kal of the verb **ראה** being used:

(a). Jehovah, 1 Kings xxii. 19, 2 Chron. xviii. 18.

(b). The glory of Jehovah, Ex. xvi. 7 (P), Isa. xxxv. 2.

(c). The angel of Jehovah, Num. xxii. 31 (E), 1 Chron. xxi. 16, 20.

(d). The majesty of Jehovah, Isa. xxvi. 10.

(e). **יה יה**, Isa. xxxviii. 11.

(f). The King, Jehovah of Hosts, Isa. vi. 5.

(g). Lord (*Adonai*), Isa. vi. 1, Am. ix. 1.

(h). The Holy One of Israel, Isa. xvii. 7.

(i). Elohim, Gen. xxxii. 30 (J), xxxiii. 10 (J), Jud. xiii. 32, 1 Sam. xxviii. 13.

(2) The Hiphil of **ראה**, with the Deity as subject, occurs in the Old Testament twenty-two times: Gen. 1, Ex. 2, Deut. 3, Judg. 1, 2 Kgs. 1, Pss. 4, Jer. 3, Ezek. 1, Nahum 1, Hab. 1, Zech. 2. In the Pentateuch it is found in J in Ex. ix. 16, in E in Gen. xlviii. 11; in P in Ex. xxv. 9, Num. viii. 4; in D in Deut. iii. 24, iv. 36, and v. 21.

(3) The verb **הוזה** "to see" is used in Ex. xxiv. 11 (J) with Elohim as object, in Job xix. 26 with Eloah as object, and in Num. xxiv. 4, 16 (JE) with Shaddai as object.

(4) Of the words for "vision" *mar'eh* is used in Gen. xv. 1 (E), in connection with Jehovah and *mahazeh* in Num. xxiv. 4, 16, with Shaddai.

(5) The verb "to reveal" (**גלה**) is found in the Pentateuch only in Genesis xxxv. 7 (E). Isaiah employs it in xl. 5, liii. 1, lvi. 1. It is found also in 1 Samuel in ii. 27, iii. 7, 21.

It is clear from the above evidence that the Deity is said in all the documents J, E, D, H, and P to have "appeared" and that the Niphal of **ראה**, "to see," the most common expression used to describe it, is found in *all* of them.

2. The preposition **ב** which occurs in Ex. vi. 3 before El Shaddai is the so-called *Beth essentialiae* and is to be translated ordinarily by "as," or "as being," or "in the character of." It is found in Gen. xxi. 12 (P), in Ex. xviii. 4, xxxii. 22, (both E), and in Deut. xxvi. 5, xxviii. 62, xxxiii. 26, and in Lev. xvii. 11 (H). It occurs also in Jud. xi. 35, Pss. xxxv. 2, xxxvii. 20,

xxxix. 7, liv. 6, lv. 19, lxviii. 5, 33, cxviii. 7, cxlvi. 5, Prov. iii. 26, Ecc. vii. 14, Job xxiii. 13, Isa. xxvi. 4, xl. 10, xlvi. 10, Ho. xiii 9.

In Ex. vi. 3 we should translate "as being El Shaddai," and "as being Shemi Jahweh" or "in the character of a mighty God" and "in the character of my name Jehovah," the force of the proposition being regarded as carried over to the second phrase.

3. *El* occurs about two hundred and twenty times in the Old Testament, in Gen. 9, Ex. 4, Num. 11, Deut. 10, Josh. 3 (or 35 times in the Hexateuch, J 2, E 5, D 10, P 5³), 1 Sam. 1, 2 Sam. 2, Isa. 25, Jer. 2, Ezek 7, Dan. 4, Hos. 3, Jonah 1, Micah 2, Nahum 1, Zech. 2, Mal. 2, Pss. 71, Job 55, Prov. 1. It frequently takes after it an attributive adjective, or a noun in construction. Thus E represents El as jealous, D as great and terrible and merciful, JE as jealous, merciful, gracious and living; and J speaks of a seeing God (*El Ro'i*) an eternal God (*El 'Olam*), Deut. xxxii, of a God of a stranger (or a strange God), a god of trustworthiness, and a God who begat us, 1 Sam. ii. 3 of a God of knowledge. Gen. xiv. four times calls El the Most High (*'Elyon*), and Deut. xxxii. 8 names him simply *'Elyon*. From this evidence it seems clear, that El was in use in all periods of Hebrew literature and also that the limiting adjectives and genitives did not denote names of different gods, but were generally at least nothing but appellations of attributes or characteristics.

4. As to the word Shaddai, there is uncertainty as to its root, form, and meaning. If it were from a root שָׁדַד, it would be of the same form as *sadai* which is sometimes read in the Hebrew text instead of *sadé* "field."⁴ In Babylonian the root *shadu* means "to be high," and derivatives mean "mountain," and "the summit of a mountain" and perhaps "majesty." In this case, we might take *shaddai* as a synonym of *'elyon* "Most High," as used in Gen. xiv.

A second derivation is from the root *shadad* "to be strong" The ending *ai* is found also in חָרִי (Isa. xix. 9) and in גִּבּוֹרִי (Am. vii. 1, Neh. iii. 17) and perhaps in כִּלְיִי (Isa. xxxii. 5;

³ It is not found in H.

⁴ In fact, the Samaritan version reads Shaddai as *sadai* in Num. xxiv. 4, 16.

Olshausen, *Lehrbuch* p. 216). This ending is found also in Arabic and Ethiopic (Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, I. p. 220; Dillmann, *Aethiopische Grammatik*, p. 204). If from this root the word *shaddai* would mean "might, strength." The Greek translator of Job apparently had this derivation before him when he rendered *shaddai* by παντοκράτωρ, "Almighty,"⁵—a translation which has been generally followed in the English version. In the Syriac an equivalent word *hassino* "strong" is found in Job vi. 4, viii. 3, 5, xi. 7, xiii. 3, xv. 25, xxvii. 2, 13, xxix. 5, xxxvii. 23.

A third derivation is from the relative pronoun (וְ) and the word "sufficiency" (יָדָה). The Greek *ικανός* found in Job xxi. 15, xxxi. 2, xxxix. 32, Ruth i. 20, 21, Ezek. i. 24, comes from this interpretation. It also accounts for the usual rendering of *shaddai* in the Samaritan version and in the Arabic version of Saadya. The Arabic always renders it *Alkafi*, "the sufficient," and the Samaritan always *safuka*, except in Num. xxiv. 4, 16, where it had read *sadai* (field).

Our ignorance of the real meaning of the word is further illustrated by the fact that the Greek translators of the Pentateuch invariably render both Shaddai and El Shaddai by *θεός*, that the translation of Job renders it eight times by *κύριος*, that the Syriac version renders it twenty-two times by *Aloho* (God), and in the Pentateuch usually transliterates it.

In conclusion, the evidence clearly shows that the Hebrews who translated the Old Testament, or part of it, into Samaritan, Syriac, Greek, and Arabic, knew nothing of a god called Shaddai or of Shaddai as a name for God. Only in the Greek of Ezek. i. 24 and in the Syriac of Gen. xvii. 1, xxxv. 11, and Ex. vi. 3 is there any indication that either El Shaddai or Shaddai was ever considered to be a proper name like Jehovah.

5. The particle *Wau* usually means "and." The meaning "but" is comparatively seldom the correct one.

6. *Shemi* has been taken by most interpreters and translators as meaning "my name." The Syriac, however, renders it "the name of," taking the final *i* as the old nominal ending, as in בְּנִי (Gen. xlix. 11), הַבְּלִילִי (Gen. xlix. 12), אֲסֵרִי (Gen. xlix. 11), נִנְבְּתִי (Gen. xxxi. 39), שְׁכֵנִי (Deut. xxxiii. 16), בְּרִיתִי

⁵ Fifteen times in all, to wit: v.17, viii.5, xi.7, xv. 25, xxii.17,25, xxxiii. 16, xxvii.2,11,13, xxxii.8, xxxiii.4, xxxiv.10, xxxv.13, xxxvii.22.

Lev. xxvi. 42),⁶ or else having read but one Yodh where the Hebrew text now gives two.⁷

As to the syntactical relation of the phrase "my name Jehovah" the ancient and modern versions vary. Some take it as the preposed object "my name Jehovah did I not make known" (so the Septuagint, Latin Vulgate, Syriac, and the Targum of Onkelos) and seem to have read the Niphal as a Hiphil. The Samaritan Targum gives a literal rendering. The AV puts "by" before "my name" and inserts "the name of" before El Shaddai. The RV puts "as" before El Shaddai and "by" before "my name." The RV margin suggests "as to" before "my name" and omits "the name of" before "El Shaddai." The Targum of Jonathan renders literally except that it explains "and my name Jehovah" as meaning "but as the face (or presence) of my Shekina." By this simple interpretation the Targum of Jonathan, without any change of text, brings the verse into agreement with the preceding history of the Pentateuch.

As to the meaning of "name" it can scarcely be held that any post-captivity writer really thought that the mere sound of the name itself had never been heard before the time of Moses. But if the writer of P did think so, it is preposterous to suppose that the Redactor who put J and P together should have accepted P's opinion and then allowed the Jehovah of J to remain

⁶ See other examples in Ex. xv.6, Isa. i.21, xxii.16, Ho. x.11, Ob. 3, Jer. x.17, xxii.23, xxxiii.20, *bis*, 25, xlix.16, *bis*, li.13, Zech. xi.17, Lam. i.1, iv.21, Ezek. xxvii.3, Mi. vii.14, Pss. ci.5, cx.4, cxiii.5-9, cxiv.8, cxvi. 1. See Gesenius-Kautzsch, *Hebrew Grammar*, §90 *l, m*, Olshausen, *Lehrbuch*, and Ewald *Ausführliches Lehrbuch*.

⁷ That is the original text may have read יה שם where we now have יהוה שם. Jehovah was possibly written יה here, as in Isa. xxvi.4, Ps. lxviii.5, Ex. xv.2 and other places, and the Yodh was read twice. This monographic writing where the letter is to be doubled in reading is to be found on the inscriptions as well as in the Scriptures of the Old Testament. It is familiar to all Semitic scholars in the so-called intensive stems where the second radical is written once and read twice. E.g. כּתּל may be read kit̄t̄el. So, in the Panammu inscription (l.19) כּרַכַּב is to be read Bar-rekab; in Clay's *Aramaic Indorsements* כּנְשָׂא is to be read Bana-neshaya. So, also, in the *Spicilegium Syriacum* (p. 21), כּכַּבּל is to be read Kokab-Bel, and in Jud. vi.25 ירַבְאֵל is Yerub-Baal. Massoretic notes also give an example in Lam. iv.16, suggesting that *u* should be read twice. The ancient versions, especially the Septuagint, afford many cases of this doubling of the letters of the Hebrew text, e.g., Hos. vi.3, 2 Chron. xii.2, Neh. x.7.

in Genesis as the ordinary name of God. The Redactor at least, and the people who accepted his composite work as the work of Moses, must have interpreted this verse in a sense agreeing with what had gone before. Now such sentences as "my name is in him" (Ex. xxiii. 21), "to put his name there" (Deut. xii. 5), "for his name's sake" (Ps. lxxix. 9), "according to thy name so is thy praise" (Ps. xlviii. 11), show that the name meant the power, visible presence, honor, or repute, of the person named. The Targum of Jonathan explains "my name Jehovah" as "the face (or presence) of my Shekinah."

7. That "knowing" the name of Jehovah means more than merely knowing the word itself, is apparent from Is. xix. 21, where we read: And Jehovah shall be known to Egypt and Egypt shall know Jehovah in that day.

The form used here in Ex. vi. 3 may mean: I was known, I was made known, or I allowed myself to be known.

8. Questions in Hebrew and other Semitic languages may be asked either with or without an interrogative particle. The following evidence goes to show that the last clause of Ex. vi. 3 might be read "was I not made known to them?" This interpretation would remove at one blow the whole foundation of the critical position, so far as it is based on this verse.

In *Arabic* "a question is sometimes indicated by the tone of the voice" (Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, II, 165); *Potest quidem interrogatio solo tono notari* (Ewald, *Grammatica Critica Linguae Arabicae*, §703).

In *Syriac* there is no special syntactical or formal method of indicating direct questions. Such interrogative sentences can only be distinguished from sentences of affirmation by the emphasis. Thus **ܐܠܗܐ ܪܒ** may mean "God is great," or "Is God great?" (Nöldeke, *Syriac Grammar*, §331). "Il n'existe de particule Syriaque pour l'interrogation; le phrase interrogative ne se distingue donc que par la sense general" (Duval, *Grammaire Syriaque*, §382). "Generally, the interrogative is denoted by the inflection or connection without any particle" (Wilson, *Elements of Syriac Grammar*, §132. 2.).

In *Ethiopic*, the question can be denoted by the arrangement of the words or by the tone; though ordinarily a particle of interrogation is used (Dillmann, *Aethiopische Grammatik*, §198).

In *Hebrew* "frequently the natural emphasis upon the words (especially when the most emphatic word is placed at the beginning of the sentence) is of itself sufficient to indicate an interrogative sentence" (Gesenius-Kautzsch, *Hebrew Grammar*, §150). "Ist der Satz im ganzen fragend, so stellt sich das Wort welches die Kraft der Frage vorzüglich trifft in seiner Reihe voran; und die kräftliche Voranstellung dieses Wortes kann allerdings in Verbindung mit dem fragenden Tone ohne jedes Fragwörtchen genügen" (Ewald, *Ausführliches Lehrbuch*, §324).

As examples of this type of interrogative sentence, the following may be cited: Gen. xviii. 12, After I am waxed old shall I have pleasure, my lord being old also? Gen. xxvii. 24, Thou art my son Esau? Ex. viii. 22, Should we sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians before them, would they not stone us? Ex. ix. 11, As yet exaltest thou thyself against my people, that thou wilt not let them go? Ex. xxxiii. 14, Shall my presence go, then I shall give thee rest? (So Ewald, *Gram.* §324, and Gesenius, *Gram.* §150). Jud. xi. 23, And shouldest thou possess it? Jud. xiv. 16, Behold I have not told it my father nor my mother, and shall I tell it thee? 1 Sam. xi. 12, Shall Saul reign over us? xx. 9, If I knew certainly that evil was determined by my father to come upon thee, then would not I tell it thee? xxii. 7, Will the son of Jesse give every one of you fields and vineyards? xxii. 15, Did I then begin to inquire of God for him? xxiv. 14, If a man find his enemy, will he let him go well away? xxv. 11, Shall I then take my bread and my water? xxx. 8, Shall I pursue after this troop? 2 Sam. xi. 11, Shall I then go into my house? xvi. 17, Is this thy kindness to thy friends? xviii. 29, Is the young man Absalom safe? xix. 23, Shall there any man be put to death this day in Israel? xxiii. 5, Verily will he not make it to grow? 1 Kings, i. 24, Hast thou said Adonijah shall reign after me? xxi. 7, Dost thou govern the kingdom of Israel? 2 Kings v. 26, Went not mine heart with thee? Hos. x. 9, Shall not the war against the unjust overtake them in Gibeah? (Ewald, Henderson, *et al.*). Is. xxxvii. 11, And shalt thou be delivered? Jer. xxv. 29, Like a hammer which breaketh the rock in pieces? xlv. 5, And seekest thou great things for thyself? xlix. 12, And art thou he that shall go altogether unpunished? Ezek. xi. 3, Is not the building of houses near? (Ewald). xi. 13, Wilt thou make

a full end of the remnant of Israel? (Ewald). xxix. 13, And shall I be inquired of by you? xxxii. 2, Art thou like a young lion of the nations? (Ewald). Jon. iv. 11, Should I not spare Nineveh? Hab. ii. 19, Shall it teach? Zech. viii. 6, Should it also be marvelous in my eyes? Mal. ii. 15, And did not he make one? Job ii. 9, Dost thou still retain thy integrity? ii. 10, Shall we receive good? x. 9, And wilt thou bring me into dust again? xiv. 3, Dost thou open thy eyes? xxxvii. 18, Hast thou with him spread out the sky? xxxviii. 18, Hast thou perceived the breadth of the earth? xxxix. 2, Canst thou number the months? xli. 1, Canst thou draw out Leviathan? Lam. i. 12, Is it nothing to you, all ye that pass by? iii. 38, Out of the mouth of the most high proceedeth not evil and good? Neh. v. 7, Do ye exact usury every one of his brother?

In view of the exegetical problems which are involved in the interpretation of this verse, the Versions, both ancient and modern are of unusual interest. The following may be cited:

1. The Greek Septuagint: And God (ὁ θεός) spake to Moses and said to him: I am (the) Lord (κύριος) and he appeared to Abraam and Isaac and Jacob, being their God, and my name κύριος I manifested not to them.

2. The Latin Vulgate: And spake the Lord (*Dominus*) to Moses, saying: I am the Lord who appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as (*in*) omnipotent God, and my name Adonai I did not show (*indicavi*) to them.

3. The Targum of Onkelos: And spake Jehovah with Moses and said to him: I am Jehovah, and I was revealed to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob as God Almighty (באל שדי) and my name Jehovah I did not make known (אודעתי) to them.

4. The Targum of Pseudo-Jonathan: And Jehovah spake with Moses and said to him: "I am Jehovah who revealed himself unto thee in the midst of the bush and said to thee, I am Jehovah, and I revealed myself to Abraham, to Isaac, and Jacob as an Almighty God. (באל שדי) and my name Jehovah, but as the face of my Shekina (באפי שכינתי) I was not made known to them.

5. The Peshito: And spake the Lord (Moryo) with Moses and said to him: I am the Lord and I appeared to Abraham and to Isaac and to Jacob as the God El Shaddai (באיל שדי אלהא) and the name of the Lord I did not show to them.

6. The Samaritan Hebrew text agrees with the Hebrew, except that it has Jehovah instead of God in verse 2, reads **וַיֹּאמֶר** instead of **וַיֵּאמֶר** in verse 3, and adds Wau (and) after Abraham.

7. The Samaritan Targum is a literal rendering of the Hebrew.

8. The Arabic of Saadya: Then spake God to Moses and said to him: I am God who named myself to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as the Mighty, the Sufficient, and my name is God.

9. The English version: And God spake unto Moses and said unto him: I am the Lord (RV, Jehovah) and I appeared unto Abraham and unto Isaac and unto Jacob by *the name of* (RV, as) God Almighty; but by (RV, or "as to") my name Jehovah was I (RV I was) not known (RV or *made known*) unto them.

10. The Dutch translation: Then spake God unto Moses and said unto him: I am the Lord and I appeared to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as God the Almighty; but by my name Lord I was not known to them.

11. Luther's German version: And God spake with Moses and said unto him: I am the Lord and I appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob that I would be their Almighty God but my name Lord was not revealed to them.

On the basis of the investigation of the verse given above the writer would suggest the following renderings: And God spake unto Moses and said unto him; I am Jehovah and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob in the character of the God of Might (or, mighty God) and in the character of my name Jehovah I did not make myself known unto them. Or, if the last part of the verse is to be regarded as a question, the rendering should be: And in the character of my name Jehovah did I not make myself known unto them? Either of these suggested translations will bring this verse into entire harmony with the rest of the Pentateuch. Consequently, it is unfair and illogical to use a forced translation of Exodus vi. 3 in support of a theory that would destroy the unity of authorship and the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

DR. J. LEIGHTON STUART'S *New Commentary on the Apocalypse of St. John the Divine*

This book, recently published in China, is of more than ordinary interest. This is due primarily to its being a commentary prepared for the use of native Christians. The development of a distinctively Christian literature is one of the great problems of the missionaries, especially in a country like China, which, despite the abysmal ignorance of the great mass of the population, has a vast native literature and sets a very high value upon education. It has an added interest because its author is President of Peking University, one of the great union educational institutions of China, and consequently occupies a position of great influence and responsibility in the field of Christian education. This Commentary has not been translated into English. The third of the "Introductory Discourses" is here given in full with a view to indicating its general character. The translation was made by Rev. Hugh W. White, D.D., and was carefully revised by Rev. Henry W. Woods, D.D., and verified in part by Rev. H. Maxcy Smith.

INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSES. THIRD DISCOURSE. THE APOCALYPTIC BOOKS.

What has been said above about the relations between the church and Rome gives the general basis of interpretation. While the main purpose of the book can be thus in a general way understood and judged, yet the style is strange, ancient, deep, not easy to fathom. In past generations illustrious men of the church, by not interpreting the text obscured the meaning. Also some, following out their own lines of thought, in reading deeply symbolic passages, would add extraneous interpretations, and thus unavoidably ran into confusions and errors. Happily some modern theologians in taking up the Jewish apocalyptic authors, know that this kind of style was begotten in the Jewish apocalyptic books. Taking up the origin of this class of apocalyptic writers, we would say a few words. The prophets of the Old Testament times had a foretelling insight so high and clear, a spiritual vision so vast and great that we can know them without being told. But the prophets had shortcomings.

(1) They stressed their own times too much. In saying that future kingdoms of the earth should have wonderful blessings, a new heaven and a new earth, it was all centered on Jerusalem, and did not go beyond the purview of their own times.

(2) They spoke of nations rather than individuals. Their mind bore on the perpetuation of the kingdom. Although successive generations had come and gone, they had not in earlier times taken notice of this. The result was this. The beautiful hope of the prophets had proved empty. The Israelites had broken the commandments, left the true way; God had sent strong neighbors to attack them, caused them to suffer;

as a final punishment he had transferred the populace to Babylon; they had spent several tens of years there; those who returned were few; the nation was poor and weak; what the prophets had said had not come to pass; then they changed their ideals and entertained other hopes, thinking that God's teachings would not conquer, that the prophets' words were without results, that the strong neighbors had not succumbed, and there would have to be heaven-shaking, earth-moving, supernatural, transcendent miracles to overturn things. The Old Testament phrase, the Day of the Lord, must be so interpreted. As to the Messiah, some spoke of Him as a great ruler, some as a hero, some as a god-man. While allowing for these differences, yet all thoughts of the Messiah embodied the idea of a great Jewish kingdom. After suffering in the Babylonian exile, some of the Jews became affected by gentile influences and left the old church. In the times of the return the descendants of these Jews not only stressed the kingdom but even more stressed individual good and evil, believing that when Messiah should come, He would reward the good and punish the evil, and furthermore they said that their forebears, although dead, must in that time all come before the Messiah, the good to be rewarded and the evil to be punished, and the wicked angels also must be judged.

Because they held such views, the writers of this apocalyptic literature had three especial characteristics.

The First Characteristic. This kind of literature generally appeared in times of distress. In ancient times there were two seasons which were prolific of this kind of literature.

(1) In the times of the Syrian King Antiochus, *i.e.*, 175 B.C. to 154 B.C., Antiochus wanted to destroy the old Jewish church and compel the people to submit to Grecian instruction. A minority of the Jews "helped Chieh" (a Chinese ancient tyrant) in his tyrannies and heartily cooperated with him. So the writers of Apocalyptic books anathematized those Jews who helped the king. The Book of Daniel appeared about this time. The writer of the Book of Daniel used the Stories of Daniel, on the one hand to stimulate the Jews in religious faith and from religious faith beget patriotism, coordinate the strength of the mass, and thus throw off Gentile oppressive governments and break their fetters; and on the other hand to anathematize the Gentile-toadying Jews. The visions and wonders used in the book, being secretly aimed at national and international affairs, either already past or contemporaneous, all had their deep significance.

(2) The times when Rome was destroying Judea. In the final struggle between Rome and Judea, when Jerusalem was being destroyed, those Jews who were rich in faith, thought that God must protect the holy capital and the holy temple, that he could not give them up; so then, with dangers imminent and disaster impending, half believing and half doubting, terrors arising off and on, for this reason many wrote apocalyptic books to comfort the people, and strengthen them in the hope. But when Jerusalem was destroyed, their quondam hopes perished. The Jews dispersed abroad, then took a very pessimistic view of things and

said they must wait for the Day of the Lord when there would be wonderful, cosmic, stupendous changes to then carry out the hope of a great Jewish kingdom,—that except for this there was no hope.

Furthermore in those times, not only did the Gentile oppressions give rise to apocalyptic literature, but also the Maccabean priest-kings and the Sadducees worried the Pharisees, and the Pharisees also wrote apocalyptic books anathematizing them. The expressions used to anathematize the Maccabeans and Sadducees were unusually fierce, similar to those used to anathematize Antiochus and the Roman government. While this kind of apocalyptic literature was intended to be comforting, yet its thought and expression breathed the most violent spirit of all. Ancient and modern literature utterly lack mild, loving language, and this class of apocalyptic books is exceptionally so. It is no wonder the New Testament apocalypse follows this apocalyptic style. The expressions used towards the wicked disclose a fierce tone which causes it to lose the New Testament's original spirit of benevolent love.

The Second Characteristic—strong in borrowed imagery. The imagery used, all wonderfully fine symbolism, has a fixed interpretation. Thus stars, horns, wild beasts, numbers, letters, all have their allegorical significance. The reason writers used this kind of illustrative style rather than speak out men's faults in direct language was the fear of exciting a hostile reaction on the part of the government, just as the modern book, "The Record of the Stones" uses names with allegorical meaning. But this book reveals the living Christ and deals with realities, not like the things in the "Record of the Stones," all fictitious, similar to the "Dream of the Red Chamber." Thus it cannot be classified with these works of fiction.

The Third Characteristic—using the names of ancient saints and former worthies as though what is related really took place in the times of those saints and worthies. For example, the books of Daniel, Enoch, and Jeremiah tell of Baruch, Ezra, Moses, Isaiah, etc. The authors, fearing that readers might treat their books lightly, purposely introduced the names of these illustrious men to make impressive the special meaning they wished to convey. Furthermore, as the matters treated of were different from what the Old Testament prophets spoke of, they felt it would not be easy to make men believe. And besides, if in the books the real names were used, the rulers would certainly take the matter up. Therefore they borrowed and used the names of ancient men with cryptographic meaning. And further, by using the names of ancient men the meaning was manifest and no interpreting was needed.

Not a few of the other books of the New Testament were influenced by literature of the apocalyptic class, but there is no need to discuss them, and we will only discuss the Apocalypse. It uses entirely the apocalyptic style of writing. The Messiah it speaks of is the same as he whom the other apocalyptic books speak of as the victorious warrior with bloody garments. The New Testament constantly uses the slain lamb to represent Jesus as the Messiah. The Apocalypse, although like other apocalyptic books it borrows the figure of the victorious

warrior, also sometimes uses the New Testament figure of the slain lamb, and indeed makes this the central topic of the book. As to the origin of evil it is rooted in Satan's opening the bottomless pit, or when illustrations are used of the scorpions and locusts, they are all illustrations used in other apocalyptic books. The phrase, "Millennium," is borrowed from "The Mysteries of Enoch." ("The Mysteries of Enoch" was written in the times of Jesus.) Further, as to the first resurrection, the Old Serpent being chained, the lake of fire, the tree of life, the ministry of angels, and such things, they are all taken from other apocalyptic books.

The value of the New Testament Apocalypse is not in its points of resemblance with other apocalyptic books, but in the differentials. The most important of these differentials are given below.

(1) This volume opens with the name "John." But there is more than one man named "John," and who is the man this book calls "John"? This question is open to discussion. If we can prove that the name is really "John" and is he whom the believers of the Province of Asia knew and honored, the matter is settled. (2) The books of Daniel, Enoch, etc., have a secret purpose; the hidden meaning of the books is not disclosed. But the New Testament Apocalypse is different. He who makes the announcement wrote plainly—Seal not the words, *e.g.*, 1: 11; 12: 10. This seems to show intention to reveal. (3) This book is written to the believers of the Province of Asia just as a modern pastor writes to his church members. From the above three points we can see that the writer directly received the revelation of God and published it to men, thus fulfilling the prophet's function, and the value of the book is thus known.

Also a great distinction between the New Testament Apocalypse and the other apocalyptic books of the class is the New Testament conception of the Messiah, after Jesus became man. Among those conscientious Jewish church members what they saw was the good weak, and the evil strong; God's rewards and punishment not yet in operation in the world, and there must be sometime a day of great overturnings, coming all of a sudden. This book, on the other hand, is based on the reality of Jesus' humanity, he being still on the earth as a living Christ, such as cannot be compared with the vaporings of the other kind of apocalyptic literature. So, then, as to the conflict of good and evil, although the prince of demons is still on the earth, He who conquers that prince of demons is not an imaginary Christ, but an actual Christ who has begun his work.

The author fully believes that in the contest between Rome and the church, Christians will certainly be triumphant, because the principles of Jesus will promote the evolution (or progress) of the world. The matters discussed in this book through nineteen and a half chapters are all historical realities. After finishing the discussion of matters relating to the issues of the times, then it speaks of the final judgment of good and evil and the last things of heaven and earth. From this can be seen that the main topic of the book is the new relation between Christ and the life of men. The use of the apocalyptic style is accidental (not es-

sential). The use (of the book) lies in the essence and the deep significance of the book and not in the external style. It is like old skins holding new wine. Regarding the other apocalyptic books, the writers as to the state of the world all take a pessimistic view of things. Their view is that the wicked do as they please in the earth, although God is in heaven, seeing but not looking, paying no attention to them, and giving the evil free rein, yet in the end there must be a day of wrath and punishment. This book declares that all things even now are under the sovereignty of the Lord Christ, unlike the hopes of those men based on the future. The phenomena attending the great physical changes of nature spoken of in the book, how can they be anything but the voice of the Lord Christ warning the world? If not heeded, this voice will in the future turn into wrathful judgment. When believers suffer persecution for the Lord, it is really because the Lord is in the world. And furthermore He is contending with Satan, with evil spirits, and is victorious. So then this book reveals Christ in history, already helping the good and fighting the evil and not waiting for a future day. He will certainly enable the good to fully accomplish their work in the world and manifestly bear fruit. The future has hope and the present also has hope.

So the writer is at one with the prophets of Old Testament times and also holds the various important ideas of the apocalyptic books, and he also enlarges their conception and extends their vision, e.g., as has been mentioned, the resurrection, the judgment, the future life,—all of which were beyond the scope of the prophets, and are only spoken of in this book. So that what the prophets told of pertaining only to present times, in this is revealed its greater depth, and with greater value, for the present and the future, though differing in name, are really directly connected.

The following points are worthy of especial notice: the attitude assumed toward Prophecy and Apocalypse in general, and toward the Book of Daniel and The Apocalypse in particular.

Prophecy and Apocalypse.—Apocalypse is represented as a popular reaction or revolt against Prophetism, an attempt to make up for its deficiencies. The prophets were provincial, "all centered on Jerusalem." They were short-sighted, "did not go beyond the purview of their own times." They had proved mistaken in their views, "The beautiful hope of the prophets had proved empty," and "What the prophets had said had not come to pass." In view of the "shortcomings" of the prophets the people "changed their ideals and entertained other hopes." These found expression in the apocalyptic literature. The apocalypses appeared in times of distress. They were pessimistic and fierce, symbolical and cataclysmic, and they were pseudonymous.

The Book of Daniel.—The Book of Daniel “appeared” in a time of distress, “the Maccabean period.” Its “visions and wonders” were “secretly aimed at national and international affairs, either already past or contemporary.” This means of course that they were pseudo-prophecy. It was also pseudonymous, the name of Daniel like those of other “illustrious men” being used to make “impressive” its special meaning, and also to save the real author or authors from persecution at the hands of the “rulers.”

The Apocalypse.—The key to The Apocalypse lies in the study of “the Jewish apocalyptic literature.” “Illustrious men” of past generations misinterpreted The Apocalypse because they failed to realize this. “Some modern theologians” have discovered it. The Apocalypse has borrowed its symbolism largely from these apocalyptic books, *e.g.*, “the phrase ‘millennium’,” the conception of “the origin of evil,” and in part, the conception of the Messiah. Its “fierce tone” comes from this literature and “causes it to lose the New Testament’s original spirit of benevolent love,”—which, Dr. Stuart says, is “no wonder”! Apparently the distinctively apocalyptic features are to be regarded as in the main decidedly detrimental to the value of the book and we may be thankful for the “differentials,” which give to it its permanent value. Nineteen and a half of the chapters are history in apocalyptic dress. The writer of The Apocalypse believed in the triumph of the Church “because the principles of Jesus will promote the evolution (or progress) of the world.”

It is difficult to reach a perfectly clear understanding of Dr. Stuart’s position regarding prophecy and apocalypse, because his statements are by no means consistent and harmonious. Thus, the statement, “The prophets of the Old Testament times had a foretelling insight so high and clear, a spiritual vision so vast and great that we can know them without being told,” might seem to those ignorant of “modernist” phraseology to amount to a recognition that the prophets as inspired men could predict the distant future. But the meaning of such words as these ought to be plain to everyone, when the author goes on immediately to assert that the prophets had “shortcomings” and were provincial, shortsighted and mistaken; and when he restricts the “visions and wonders” of Daniel to events “already past or contemporaneous,” despite the fact that the language is distinctly

that of prophecy and that in the New Testament Daniel is expressly called "Daniel the prophet." It is plain that occasional statements to the contrary notwithstanding the language which Dr. Stuart speaks most readily is that of the theological liberal.

In an article entitled "Modernism in China" which appeared in this REVIEW (October 1921), Dr. W. H. Griffith Thomas, after commenting on certain statements made by Dr. Stuart in lectures delivered at the Y.W.C.A. Secretarial Conference in Sungkiang in 1919 and published in the *Annual Report* of the Conference, made the following summary statement (*ibid.* p. 655): "Reviewing this teaching, I do not hesitate to say that it is not safe teaching to give to the Y.W.C.A. secretaries, or, indeed, to anyone else, in China or in America." The Third Introductory Discourse of the *Commentary on the Apocalypse* shows that, as Dr. Thomas contended, Dr. Stuart's attitude in matters of first importance in the sphere of Christian truth is in direct conflict with the plain teachings of the Scriptures.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Idea of Immortality, The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in the year 1922. By A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON, LL.D., D.C.L., Fellow of the British Academy, Emeritus Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch. 1922. 8vo., pp. xii, 210.

"These lectures may be regarded as in some sense a sequel to those delivered on the Gifford Foundation in the University of Aberdeen and afterward published as 'The Idea of God.'" Indeed the striking similarity between them and the earlier series of lectures referred to, even without the author's statement just quoted, would suggest this. There is evident on every page the same wide and careful reading which rendered *The Idea of God* almost unique in its class. There is the same instinctive and usually successful use of the method of "construction through criticism," which has made Professor Pringle-Pattison at once both the most constructive of critics and the most critical of constructors. And, finally, there are the same sincerity and earnestness which, perhaps, are our author's most distinguishing and most valuable characteristics. "Truth" is for him more important than "the search after truth." In both courses of lectures his aim is, not to air his own opinions; it is to present the argument that will establish his reasoned conviction.

This conviction is that the "belief in personal immortality is not based by the religious man on any personal claim for himself, or even for others"; it seems rather to be "an inference from the character of God." That is, God being what He is, our immortality as persons must follow. As our author adds, "Too good to be true" is a saying often on our lips; and the mood it expresses is on the whole a prudent one when it is a case of worldly good and prospect. But as someone has said "Too good not to be true" is a more fitting expression when it is the question of the ultimate ideals and hopes which have been the nursing fathers and nursing mothers of mankind. For serious philosophic reflection nothing can be more foolish than the common talk which tries to set them down as the baseless dreams of subjective fancy—as if man were self-created, and as if he developed his ideas in the internal vacancy of his individual mind. Man can no more rise spiritually above himself in his own strength than he can raise himself from the ground by tugging at his own shoulder straps. We did not make ourselves, and we do not weave our ideals out of nothing. They are all derived; they point to their origin in a real Perfection, in which is united all that, and more than, 'it hath entered into the heart of man to conceive.' The essential meaning

of the old ontological argument, I have argued elsewhere, is that the best we think or can think must *be*." In this respect the idea of immortality is like the idea of God. Such, in a word, is the argument. In tracing the history of this idea and thus validating it, certain positions are taken or avoided which call for comment, if not for criticism. Our limits permit us to notice only the following:

1. Is not our author mistaken when he identifies the Platonic doctrine of the soul with "Christian tradition" (as he does on p. 63)? Does Christianity teach that man is a composite being, whose two constituents are brought together and, as it were tied, together without possessing any organic or inherent relation to one another? On the contrary, is it not the doctrine of our religion that "man is a created spirit in vital union with an organic material body"? Were this not so, why should Christ rise from the dead in the body, "the first-fruits of them that slept"? The fact and doctrine of the resurrection, both Christ's and ours, which is the cornerstone of our faith, renders the body, not, as it were, the artificial "casket of the soul," but itself an essential element of complete humanity. Sin may make it a "burden," but even sin cannot keep it from being a real part of the man. In a word, the Christian tradition as to the essential union of soul and body does not come from Plato; it is from supernatural revelation. It differs from the Platonic doctrine *toto coelo*."

2. Dr. Pattison's restatement of the old "psychological argument" for the immortality of the soul, so far from strengthening the argument, repudiates it. This old psychological argument is that the soul is a simple indissoluble substance or individual; and that because it is indissoluble, and death consists in dissolution, the soul cannot die. It is conceivable that it might be destroyed, that God might will it out of existence as he willed it into existence; but that it should be destroyed by *death*—that is contrary to its nature, and so impossible. That is, the soul is naturally immortal. This old psychological doctrine, of which the Schoolmen made so much, Dr. Pattison restates. He denies Hume's position, that the succeeding and varying states of consciousness are merely so many detached and evanescent facts; he avoids James' error, that the bald fact is that when the brain acts a thought occurs. In opposition to both of these, he finally says: "No psychology can do away with the conception of a subject. We must recognize, as Stout puts it, that 'there is a mind, and not merely states or processes.' The would-be neutral term, states of consciousness, is an unsuccessful attempt to avoid the acknowledgment that every conscious or mental state is the state and expression of a conscious individual. The universal conscious fact is not feeling and thought, but 'I think' and 'I feel'" (p. 155). Does he not, however, take the point out of this declaration when he teaches (p. 72): "The soul weaves itself a body. From the point of view I am at present emphasizing one might rather say, the body grows itself a soul. The two modes of statement are not absolutely inconsistent with one another, although both are obviously metaphorical. To put the position more prosaically, the organism in commerce with the environment is the medium in which the soul comes into being; and because the organ-

ism is a natural body derived from the parents, there are represented in its spiritual product all the influences summarized under the head of heredity." "A man's soul will then be for us the coherent mind and character, which is the result of the discipline of time, not some substantial unit or identical unit present in his body all along." But what is this, if not to deny the substantiality and so the permanence of the soul? A subject,—and this he demands—cannot be a mere process of action; it must be itself a substance. Any other position sets aside the psychological argument. Only a soul or subject which is itself a simple substance can survive the dissolution wrought by death, and in the nature of the case a simple substance must.

3. Our author would seem to overlook entirely the teleological argument for immortality. He would appear to be quite unimpressed by the inadequacy of this life and the consequent necessity of the eternal life, if the soul is to realize itself.

4. Specially noticeable and regrettable is Dr. Pattison's estimate of the moral argument for immortality, whether as presented by Butler or by Kant or by Sidgwick. This argument he regards as outgrown. "There is, at any rate, a growing consciousness among thoughtful people, and especially, I should say, among those who have practically to do with the administration of the law, that punishment is not an end in itself; it can be rationally defended only in so far as it seeks to reform the criminal or, failing that, to secure the community against the repetition of that particular kind of crime." On the other hand, "the claim for compensation or reward, in the ordinary sense of these terms, does not seem to form a part of the moral or religious consciousness itself." In a word, "distributive justice, considered either as punishment or reward, is altogether too finite and legal a thing—one might almost say too petty a thing—to be the central fact or business of the universe." But what is the ground on which our author bases his judgment? It is nothing more substantial than "a growing consciousness." The question is scarcely raised whether that consciousness is growing as it ought. In a word, the moral order of the universe, if accepted, is ignored. This order it is that demands personal immortality, so that unless we grant the latter, we must give the lie and, indeed, the death-blow to the former. And this Dr. Pattison, at an earlier stage of his development, admitted. Otherwise how could he write (*Hegelianism and Personality*, p. 151), "Immortality is the most pressing question of human destiny," and maintain that were there no immortality, "it would ultimately act as a corrosive skepticism on morality itself" (*ibid.* p. 228)?

5. Indeed, our author's discussion itself begins to reveal this corrosive skepticism. Otherwise, how can we explain its favorable attitude toward the doctrine of annihilation and toward that of restoration? Though far from dogmatic with regard to either, it does not deny them. It is ready to entertain them. One or the other of them appears to be even demanded. If God's goodness or love is not rooted in justice, then it must require, either that the impenitent be suffered to drop out of being, or that they be reclaimed and restored. That is to say, Dr. Pattison's

position is one that could not be taken unless his hold on the retributive justice of God had begun to weaken. But what does this mean if not that his faith in the moral order of the universe has been affected?

6. Not the least interesting part of our author's discussion is his treatment of the question of the ultimate absorption of the soul in God. This question comes up because, though "from the first dim beginning of his planetary history man has refused to see in death the end of his being and activities," the thought of eternal life has been, and is by no means so widely welcome. In the East it has been regarded as the "stern penalty of obstinate wickedness." It is not altogether otherwise in the West. Here, too, the fear of it we find prompting the hope "that even the weariest river winds somewhere safe to sea" (Swinburne, "Garden of Proserpine"). "Eternal rest is the deepest longing of many an overdriven body and tortured soul."

"Sleep after toil, port after stormy seas,

Ease after war, death after life, does greatly please"

(*Faerie Queen*, Bk. I, ix, 40).

Probably even earnest Christians have known what it was, at least for the moment, to long for "an eternal sleep in an eternal night." Indeed, the desire may have been more than a longing. Eternal life may have been so conceived as to oppress us like a burden that cannot be borne. "'Is it never to end?' The thought appals. I 'little I, to live a million years—and another million—and another. My tiny light to burn forever.'"

It is clear, then, that there is a real question here, one that must be considered even if it cannot be answered. This difficulty Dr. Pattison proceeds to meet by reminding us that "this impression is produced only because we allow ourselves to be gorgonized by the idea of empty time and the endless succession of its moments, apart from the experiences which fill them. As each moment of time, looked at thus abstractly, is exactly like every other, progress inevitably appears as a change which is no change. But if we think of the content of our experiences, it is argued, the afflicting illusion will disappear. In thinking of an immortal life, we may and ought to think of it, not as the simple continuance of a being in existence at the same level of all his powers and attainments, but as a progress or advance in a real sense, a continuous growth toward the stature of a perfect humanity. The idea of growth, it is urged, liberates from the oppressiveness of an unchanging identity. With ever new insight opened to us and ever new conquests achieved, there can be no question of existence palling upon the taste. In the nature of things the process can have no end, but absorbed in each stage as it opens before us, we need not be distracted by the empty thought of the series of future stages still to be traversed. The future, in such a case, would not break upon us until it was present." "Not that we can discard the time-form altogether. Duration is an essential element of any notion we can form of reality; and we must clothe the thought of immortality in the language of time, if the meaning is not to evaporate altogether. If we try to avoid this necessity by speaking of

an 'eternal now,' 'a timeless present,' we must carry into that now the feeling of 'that which was and which is and ever shall be': otherwise it shrinks to the abstraction of a mathematical point." "Nevertheless, as I have suggested, we do well to remember that the 'hope of immortality is not to be regarded like the scientific prediction of an eclipse, or any other event in the temporal series. It is the supreme assertion of spiritual values, above all the assertion of the infinite value of the human spirit that has realized its vocation and entered into its heritage. And just for that reason the life beyond remains something which we cannot translate into concrete detail. In this region,

Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichniss.

'Beloved, *now* are we sons of God; and it doth not yet appear what we shall be.'

7. In bringing this review to a close we may be permitted to remark:

a. Our author's rational argument has not demonstrated the "life everlasting." It has, however, proved that there is no contradiction between the best that reason can say on this subject and what supernatural revelation has said; and to have done this is well worth while.

b. Just because he cannot translate the "life beyond" into concrete detail, he points us to him who has "brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel." The prospect of "the ages to come" cannot alarm us or even weary us when we appreciate that "God, being rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead through our trespasses, made us alive together with Christ (by grace have ye been saved), and raised us up with him, and made us sit with him in the heavenly places, in Christ Jesus: that in the ages to come he might show the exceeding riches of his grace in kindness toward us in Christ Jesus" (Eph. ii. 4-7). He who "knows the love of Christ" will see that the "gracious kindness of God" must be "the gift that cannot be told through," the one gift that can and must give eternal value to eternal life.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Birth and Growth of Religion. By GEORGE FOOTE MOORE, Professor of the History of Religion in Harvard University. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Cloth, pp. 178. Price, \$1.50.

The Religion of the Primitives. By MONSIGNOR A. LEROY. Superior General of the Fathers of the Holy Ghost. Translated by the Rev. Newton Thompson. New York: The Macmillan Co. Cloth, pp. 334. Price, \$2.50.

Dr. Moore was selected to give the Morse Lectures of 1922 in Union Theological Seminary. These lectures are now published and furnish an interesting study in the way of a naturalistic interpretation both as to the origin and development of religion. Dr. Moore has undertaken to show how man has created religion under the impulse of self-preservation, this impulse followed in time by the higher one of self-realization. Under such a spur, the human race unaided by any objective revelation or special intervention of Providence has struggled along down through

the centuries, gradually advancing from a pre-animistic stage into such Animism as is found today among savages, coming gradually into the higher realm of Polydaemonism, then of Polytheism, and finally emerging into Pantheism or the ethical monotheism of the Jews. Dr. Moore regards religion as being so complex and so infinitely diverse that it cannot be defined. However, he indicates, that in all its phenomena it exhibits certain marks. These are the following:

1. Man believes that there are powers, however conceived, upon whose behavior toward him, his well-being is in manifold ways dependent.
2. He believes that these powers are actuated by motives like his own, and therefore comprehensible.
3. He believes that it is possible for men in some way or other to work upon the powers so as to keep them from doing harm or to make them serve him.
4. And, finally, he acts on this belief.

One means of making the powers subservient to man's will is by induced possession, Shamanism, to use the Siberian name. From time to time have appeared men with the gift or art of getting themselves possessed by a spirit. They are usually subject to mental and nervous disorders, such as epilepsy, and able to induce trance states, in which states they can avail themselves of the knowledge and power of the spirits. This, we are told, is "the origin of the idea of revelation." Consequently, religious knowledge, whether it comes through sages, prophets, or apostles, is mediated by personalities more or less neurotic. One is tempted to remark that this induced possession, this abnormal subjectivity, seems to characterize the modern psychological and anthropological interpreters of religion in their attempts to explain away a divine objective revelation and resolve the whole development of religion into a naturalistic and evolutionary unfolding of the human consciousness. Even Christianity, it is alleged, is not to be regarded as the ripened or final fruit of this process of growth, for it combines within itself the endeavors and aspiration of Jewish ethical Monotheism, Hellenistic Soteriology and Greek Philosophy, and consequently when weighed in the balances of the skeptical, philosophical and scientific thought of our time is found wanting.

It is interesting to note that the Morse Foundation, on which Dr. Moore delivered this course of lectures, bears the honored name of the inventor, Professor S. F. B. Morse, who evidently intended to show forth through the lectures given year after year "the relations of the Bible to the Sciences"; his thought being that the divine revelation which the Bible contains is not contradicted or superseded by discoveries in the realm of nature, but is confirmed and glorified by the advancing thought of the ages. Dr. Moore's line of reasoning repudiates the Biblical account of the birth and growth of religion, for he casts aside as being mythical and unscientific the Scriptural teaching that man at the beginning of human history had a knowledge of God, of His eternal power and divinity, such as was showed unto him by God Himself. Nor will he admit that this revelation was forfeited by sin, in consequence of

which religion has not been a growing but a declining factor in racial experience, except when there has been divine intervention through chosen leaders inspired by the Divine Spirit, and lifted by the grace of God out of a degenerating environment. According to this school of naturalistic thought, the religion of the New Testament is the product of human endeavors, carried on through countless ages, and not of divine purpose and grace revealed and brought nigh through God's prophets and His only begotten Son, the Saviour of mankind.

In contrast with Professor Moore's academic conception of religion, which leaves nothing to Christianity worthy of propagation, we have opposite conclusions in Monsignor Le Roy's notable book. This distinguished scholar, a missionary of the Roman Catholic Church, was called to the chair of the History of Religion in the Institut Catholique of Paris by virtue of his great linguistic attainments and scholarly investigations in the realm of Anthropology and Psychology. As a further qualification for the right interpretation of the History of Religion, he served for twenty years as a missionary in Africa, where he had the opportunity of making a comprehensive and faithful study of the beliefs and practices not only of the large Bantu race, but also of neighboring and kindred tribes, giving particular attention to that most primitive of all present-day races, the Pygmies. Although anthropologists like E. B. Tylor have scornfully maintained that missionaries have been so occupied in hating and despising the beliefs of the heathen that they have had little time or capacity left to understand them, the author of *La Religion des Primitifs* can certainly qualify as being a competent witness, surely more competent than one who has had no living contact with these races of men, in the light of whose beliefs, cultus and manner of life so much has been written bearing on the subject of the history of religion. Professor LeRoy's conclusions contradict those which have been set forth by Dr. Moore in his recent course of lectures. This eminent Catholic divine states regarding the principle of evolution as applied to religion that it "should not be a directing principle; and it can be admitted as a conclusion only when the facts support it." He alludes to the strange procedure of the naturalistic school in placing in relief such facts as support a theory while carefully removing those which contradict it. Over against that conception of religion which regards it as a human achievement, LeRoy defines religion on its subjective side "as the ensemble of beliefs, obligations and practices by which man recognizes the supernatural world, performs his duties towards it, and asks help from it." By the "supernatural" he means "the world of revelation and grace existing outside of and above the exigencies and possibilities of our nature," and his contention is that man everywhere and in all ages has recognized his dependence upon such a world, which goes to show that a primitive revelation was granted to him. This does not mean that God gave to primitive man a course in catechetics, but He who spake at sundry times and in diverse manner to the fathers by the prophets has given a revelation, fortifying and directing natural lights and interior illumination, to all the children of

Adam, so that they might have the necessary means to attain their salvation. These essentials LeRoy summarizes as follows: "The general organization of the family, the belief in God, the foundations of morality, the survival of the human soul, the idea of the beyond, worship by prayer and sacrifice." This necessary basis of primitive religion and of all religion he finds alike in the religion of the Pygmies and in the Catholic Church. In fact he concludes that "the human species in its general make-up, is essentially religious and fundamentally Catholic." Magic on the other hand, he holds to be not only not religion but "it is the conscious counterfeit and decided enemy of religion. Its avowed and universal claim is, in fact, a claim to accomplish its purpose in spite of religion, to force the activity and secrets of the invisible world to its service, to use them, and to use them against God." That religion is genetically related to magic as many evolutionists maintain he denies very emphatically.

The hypothesis of evolution, according to which the religious development of a people must be parallel to its social, political, literary, artistic and other development, is not confirmed by an intimate observation of the religious beliefs and practices of African tribes. LeRoy's studies have convinced him that the wretchedness of primitive man could not have been lower than that of the Negritos or pygmies, yet these poor people, though in a very low social state, have religious and moral ideas relatively pure and are free from many superstitious encumbrances, being found superior not only to the black populations in whose midst they are scattered, but "even superior to the Greeks and Romans of the 'best periods'"—an assertion which he holds to be "clearly proved," however "unlikely" it may sound.

One would suppose from Dr. Moore's account of the birth and growth of Religion that the idea of a supreme God ruling the universe is altogether foreign to the savage mind, and can only be acquired by a prolonged civilizing process. But *per contra*, Professor LeRoy states that when you have lived with our primitives a long time, when you have come to be accepted as one of them, entering into their life and mentality, and acquainted with their language, practices and beliefs, you reach the conclusion that behind what is called their naturism, animism or fetishism, everywhere there rises up real and living, though often more or less veiled, the notion of a higher God, above men, manes, spirits and all the forces of nature. Other beliefs are variable, like the ceremonies attached to them, but this one is universal and fundamental. Consequently even Reville was forced to admit, in spite of his evolutionary bias, "we never greatly surprise the negro when we speak to him of one, sole, truly existing God." Years ago Bishop Colenso sought to Christianize some Zulu lads by training them first in the arts of civilization, maintaining that such a preliminary tutelage was necessary if they were to accept the truths of the Christian religion. But when the education preliminary to the inculcation of Gospel truths was completed, instead of becoming naturalized to the Christian way of salvation, they acquired an aversion to it and ran away to their savage haunts and

customs. Today our Presbyterian missionaries are discovering among the Fang tribes minds "naturally Christian," so that the evangel is readily apprehended and a fine type of Christian character produced, not by a prolonged process of development, but by a quick apprehension of and a ready response to the highest religious truths. This does not mean of course that they are Christian in the sense of knowing and believing the Gospel. Christianity is more than theism. To be a monotheist, even an ethical monotheist of a rather high type is one thing; to have a saving knowledge of God in Jesus Christ is a very different thing. But the one is the foundation upon which the other rests. Professor LeRoy's book in proving the survival even among the most "backward" peoples of a primitive theism, a belief in one supreme God, is consequently a message of encouragement for all who are looking for the ultimate and speedy triumph of Christianity; not because it implies that the heathen are essentially or potentially Christian or Catholic in their beliefs,—in this respect we feel that Professor LeRoy should guard his statements more carefully,—but because they have that conception of the one God which prepares them to welcome the glad tidings of His grace which the missionary makes known to them. Dr. Moore's lectures, the product of great erudition and of searching criticism, are a rebuke to Christian assurance, and put a blight upon evangelistic and missionary enthusiasm.

Princeton.

J. ROSS STEVENSON.

Scientific Christian Thinking for Young People. By HOWARD AGNEW JOHNSTON, PH.D., D.D., President of Chicago Church Federation. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1922. 8vo., pp. 238.

This book is written for "young people who think." Its aim is to show "that one is in full harmony with scientific thinking when holding to the fundamentals of the Christian religion." This aim it admirably fulfils. Indeed, it would be difficult to find any other discussion that quite takes its place. Specially sane, sound, up-to-date and convincing is its refutation of the theory of evolution. On this ground as well as on others our author has put every pastor under lasting obligation. They have been looking long and impatiently for just such a book.

We regret to have to add that Dr. Johnston is not always so satisfactory from the theological as from the scientific standpoint. In the former sphere he is occasionally caught napping. Thus, is it true (pp. 101 and 102) that God is under obligation to do all that He can do at any time to help on man's redemption from sin? If so, then, not to refer to other considerations, salvation is no more of grace but of debt. Again (p. 104), it is true that miracles are never violations of God's laws. In that sense, they are always natural. But is this their unique distinction? Are they not miracles because they are supernatural? They are the bells which, by putting out His own hand, God Himself rings to call men to hear His Son. Once more, is there not (p. 112) a confusion of revelation and inspiration? Only a part of the Bible is revelation, but it is all, and all equally, inspired. Only some of it has been communicated from Heaven;

all of it, however, has been so superintended by the Holy Spirit as to be errorless and what He would say. Is it the fact that "there can be no holy life without the presence and the withstanding of evil"? If so, was Adam unholy before he fell, and was there evil in the world when God "saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good?" These examples are real blemishes, but they need not seriously impair the usefulness of the book. A fair critic must point them out. Most readers would overlook them.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Practical Basis of Christian Belief. An Essay in Reconstruction.

By PERCY GARDNER, D.LITT. Charles Scribner's Sons. 288 pp. \$3.00.

Professor Gardner believes that there is an urgent need of a reconstruction of Christian belief on a new and more trustworthy basis. He has long been engaged in the task of setting forth those modifications in the basis and expression of Christian belief necessitated, in his judgment, by recent tendencies of thought—the most important of which, in his opinion, are (1) the spread of the doctrine of relativity; (2) the drift in psychology toward a recognition of the supremacy of the active and practical faculties over the theoretic faculties of man; (3) the dying out of the spirit of "intolerant exclusiveness" as a result of the comparative study of religions; (4) the change in our views of early Christian history due to the adoption of scientific historical methods. The occasion of this his latest book, as he tells us in his preface, is the fact that consciousness of advancing age leads him to feel that it is time to set down in final form the conceptions of Christian belief to which he has been led by the studies and experiences of many years. In this book, therefore, may be found the confession of faith of a leading English modernist, who, though a layman, has been president of the Churchman's Union.

It is in the light of history and psychology, especially, that Professor Gardner revises the creed of Christianity in this volume. He believes that the application of the scientific method to history has rendered untenable the historical views of the early Christians. He is unable to account for the startling phenomena of early Christianity "except on the hypothesis of a fresh turn, a new orientation of the spiritual power which is at the heart of the world of life and humanity" but he will not admit any intrusion of the supernatural in the form of the miraculous, as this, in his judgment, would be inconsistent with historical method and principle. He believes, moreover, that the revolution that has taken place in psychology necessitates our seeing the creeds of Christendom in quite a new light. "The greatest of the discoveries which have resulted from the better application of the methods of psychological study," he writes, "is the recognition of the primacy in man of will, as compared with the powers of perceiving and judging. We recognize in man, in the first place, a force working from within outward. It is his very essence to strive, to try to impose his own forms upon the outer world. He is not a passive but an active being; and thought, in all its elaboration, must be regarded as a product, and not the primary product, of living." It is in the light of this activist psychology, with its low estimate of the cognitive

and reflective faculties, that we must revise and defend the creeds of Christendom, according to Professor Gardner. Moreover this activist psychology, as adopted by him, carries with it a full recognition of the part played by the unconscious. The discovery of the unconscious element in the human mind he regards as undoubtedly the greatest recent discovery in psychology. In this unconscious element he distinguishes sharply between what he calls the sub-conscious and the super-conscious. Large use is made of this unconscious element in his explanation of the evolution of personality and religion, and especially in what he says of revelation and inspiration.

Professor Gardner believes that the progress of historical criticism and the growing science of psychology have been destructive in the highest degree of conventional Christian belief. This does not mean, however, that he believes they are equally destructive of the beliefs of the Founder of Christianity and his immediate followers; for, in his judgment, present-day orthodoxy is far removed from first-century orthodoxy. He holds, in fact, that after modern historical criticism and modern psychology have done their work "a great part, if not the whole, of Christian doctrine turns out to be based upon fundamental facts in the nature of man and the spiritual world." And what he seeks to do is to show the grounds upon which a modern Christian—that is one who adopts the empiricist philosophy and who recognizes the supremacy of the active and practical over the theoretic faculties of man—may hold these Christian beliefs.

We would welcome, in a measure at least, this attempt of Professor Gardner to indicate the "practical basis of Christian belief," if we could first persuade ourselves that the belief whose grounds he is concerned to point out are rightly called Christian beliefs. It would at least be interesting, and perhaps profitable, to observe how one who adopts the activist or pragmatic point of view performs as a defender of Christianity. It seems to us only too clear, however, that the beliefs which Professor Gardner retains, and which he defends, are not Christian beliefs at all. There is only a superficial resemblance between his beliefs in regard to Christ and the Holy Spirit, for instance, and those beliefs which have been designated Christian throughout the ages. It is scarcely necessary to offer proof of this statement; it must be evident to even the most casual reader of Professor Gardner's book who has any intelligent conception of what real Christianity is. Even if the beliefs of Professor Gardner, then, should "turn out to be based upon fundamental facts in the nature of man and the spiritual world" this would have no bearing on the question whether *Christian* beliefs rest on a similar basis. What Professor Gardner has given us turns out to be an additional bit of evidence that Modernism, as held by its leading representatives, involves not the reconstruction but the destruction of Christianity.

St. Davids, Pa.

S. G. CRAIG.

The Reality of Jesus. By J. H. CHAMBERS MACAULAY, M.A. New York: Geo. H. Doran Co. \$1.75 net.

This book is meant as an apologetic. Seemingly trained in Scottish

orthodoxy, from which he is not wholly disenthralled, the author has accepted many of the radical positions. He realizes that the movement is a revolutionary one, and evidently has more misgivings as to the *terminus ad quem* than he is willing to acknowledge. He asserts that in many directions the mould and form of faith and practice is outworn, and that there must needs be perplexity at a time when the foundations of the great deep have been broken up (Introduction). While, therefore, he thinks the time has not yet come for creed revision, he believes he has found a *pou sto* in the Reality of Jesus, especially as the modern mind refuses to tolerate unreality. Our age has reacted from materialism, and its best thinking is disposed to recognize God. Without union with Him, and the ennobling effect of the consciousness of Him upon the soul, the full development of personality remains impossible. In Jesus we behold the highest conceivable reach of this development. He is the true Reality of human life. In proportion as men grow into His experience, will the darkness pass, and the new earth and heavens appear. Personality will be realized in freedom, faith, love and life. "Once Jesus is seen, the vision brings with it the compulsions of a free and complete obedience" (p. 246).

Up to a certain point the author has done his work well; the material collected does constitute a sort of defense against agnosticism and anarchy. The life of Jesus is self-evidently the life worth while, and His principles are the master-key which unlocks the problems of humanity. And yet, the approach to the secret of Christ's power is a quite misleading one, with the final outcome a foregone conclusion. For He is presented in His moral and religious attitude only. To be sure, the Incarnation, Atonement and Resurrection (not the Return) are verbally allowed; but the ultimate finding is, the model self-consciousness of the Galilean as not only the norm of individual, and ultimately social, reconstruction, but the secret spring of power. The problem of sin is virtually side-stepped. Indeed, most difficulties are side-stepped—in particular, the rationale of the acceptance of a colossal Personality as the final Reality, while many of its convictions and teachings are ignored, or frankly cast into the discard. Thus, Mr. Macaulay never ventures to face the Words of Institution, that is to say, that the thing which Jesus wished to be remembered for was not the findings of His consciousness, but His sacrificial death.

That in the course of the discussion we meet with numerous true and weighty statements, together with not a little clear discernment and many real gems of thought, it were superfluous to add. The author's penetration is too keen, for example, to permit him to believe in social and labor reconstruction apart from the righting of the individual soul. Many of the illustrations are superb. There is much of the poet and mystic about Mr. Macaulay. He speaks with passionate conviction often voiced in entire pages of sonorous declamation. And yet, to those who are called, it is the *Crucified* Messiah Who remains the Power and Wisdom of God. We are told repeatedly that religion and the institutions of religion are in the melting-pot, and that nothing unreal will be able

to abide. We feel assured that a compromise religious philosophy will not survive. It is not real; it is man's substitute for the Words of Eternal Life. Either we shall have to hark back to the Bible taken at its face value, or we are within hailing distance of a first dismembered, then rejected and abandoned Christ. The book is rather too introspective and philosophical for the masses, and will make its main appeal to the literati.

Lincoln University, Pa.

EDWIN J. REINKE.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Higher Criticism in Relation to the Pentateuch. By EDOUARD NAVILLE, D.C.L., LL.D., F.S.A., Honorary Professor in the University of Geneva, Foreign Associate of the Institute of France. Translated, with an Introduction, by Rev. Professor John R. Mackay, M.A. Foreword by Sir William M. Ramsay, D.C.L., LL.D., Litt.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 38 George Street. 1923. 12mo. Pp. xxxv, 156.

In this small volume the eminent Egyptologist gives his principal reasons for believing in the Mosaic origin and historical character of the Pentateuch and for his rejection of the methods and results of the destructive Higher Criticism of the Old Testament. Professor Naville follows the historical method of Foustel de Coulanges, formerly professor of History in the Faculty of Letters in Strassburg, who formulated his first principle as follows: "Let us put to one side the absolute logic and intellectual conceptions of the present, and take the ancient texts in their proper and literal sense exactly as they were written. Let us interpret them in the simplest manner possible, and with unsophisticated minds allow them to speak for themselves, mixing nothing of our own with them." On the other hand, Professor Naville rejects the method of the critics, which "consists primarily in dismembering the text throughout, in representing it, not as the work of an author whose name and date are given us by tradition or by the text itself, but as a collection of fragments due to different authors of very different epochs and origin." The principle of these critics is, that in "the study of a document, what gives law is not what the document itself says, but the idea or the theory to which the document gives rise in the mind of the student. That idea it is that is regarded as stable and indisputable—the norm according to which the document is to be judged."

The second principle of Dr. Naville's method is "that we must replace the texts with which we are dealing within the time in which the author actually lived, in the situations with which he was surrounded, with the manner and polity thereof."

The third principle is that "one render to oneself some account of the aim of these writings, of their *raison d'être*."

Following these three principles, Dr. Naville claims to have demonstrated that the Higher Criticism "wrongly claims to be the expression of the truth," which may be summed up in the sentence that we must take an ancient book exactly as it was written and judge it in the light

of its aim and purpose, and of the time and circumstances in which it claims to have been written.

Our judgment is that Dr. Naville has succeeded in his attempted demonstration, and that Dr. Mackay has conferred a great boon on English readers by his excellent translation as, also, by his introduction.

But while approving of Dr. Naville's method, it seems to us that he has himself departed from this method in his treatment of the philology of the Old Testament. No one knows better than he that the geographical lists of Thutmosis III at Karnak represent the language of Palestine in his time as having been what we call Hebrew. Again, the language of Canaan embedded in the explanatory notes of the Amarna letters is clearly Hebrew. Probably not a single Aramaic word is found among the one hundred and eleven explanatory Canaanite words found in these letters and only twenty-six of them have thus far been found in Phenician. The language of the Moabite Stone of king Mesha contains only one word not found in the Hebrew Old Testament; whereas four occur in Aramaic and fifty-three are not found in Phenician. The Samaritan Ostraca have eight proper names compounded with the Hebrew abbreviation for Jehovah whereas the Phenician has no names compounded with this name of God. The Siloah Inscription has twelve or thirteen words not thus far found in Phenician, whereas all but one occur in the Old Testament. Besides *hāyā* is found in the inscription three times. *Hāyā* never occurs in the Phenician, where the verb "to be" is represented by *kūn*. Lastly *wau* converse and the imperfect is found in line 4, a usage never yet found in Phenician.

As to Hebrew's having been the local dialect of Judah, the facts of the Old Testament seem to contradict it. Many of the puns with which the writings are filled would not suit the Aramaic, whereas they do suit the Hebrew. Half of the names of the sons of Jacob are from Hebrew roots and words that do not occur in Aramaic, and the roots and forms of seven or eight are not found in Babylonian. Not merely the names of the kings of Judah, but most of the names of the kings of Israel and Samaria, and of their fathers, relations, and prophets, are Hebrew. Besides, the variations of the Septuagint and of the Aramaic version can be explained on the basis of a Hebrew original better than on the supposition of an Aramaic original. We must remember that Dr. Naville would have us conclude that the transfer into the Hebrew language and script was made about the second century B.C. How then account for the obvious close relation between the Hebrew as we have it, and the version of the Seventy?

Moreover, that Hebrew was not the language of Judah and Jerusalem merely is shown by the names of the kings of Samaria and Damascus which we find on the Assyrian monuments. Hadadezer of Damascus is given on the Assyrian documents as *Dad-idri* (*idri* being the Aramaic form of *ezer*), and Hoshea, the last king of Samaria, has a name whose root is not found in Aramaic. With one possible exception, all the names of the kings of Israel that are mentioned on the Assyrian monuments may be drawn from good Hebrew words.

Why the Jewish colony in Elephantine wrote Aramaic is a mystery; but who knows that it was not composed largely of Jews who had been mustered into the Babylonian and Persian armies from the Israelites and Jews who had been carried captive by Tiglath-Pileser, Sargon and Nebuchadnezzar and settled among the Aramaic-speaking tribes of Mesopotamia and the neighbouring lands?

Finally, if the Samaritan dissidents took over the Pentateuch from the Jews—a book which they have preserved in what is a slight modification of the old Aramaic or Phœnician alphabet—it is hard to see why it is necessary to suppose that the old alphabet was tied up inextricably with the Aramaic language. Both the Samaritan-Hebrew text and the Samaritan-Aramaic version are written in the same old alphabet. Both the Hebrew Massoretic text and the Targums of Onkelos and the Pseudo-Jonathan are written in the square alphabet. If script and language were inextricably interwoven, the Hebrew texts of both Samaritans and Judeans should be in one script and the Aramaic texts in another. That script and language are not thus interwoven should be manifest when we consider how many different languages are written in Roman and, with slight variations, in Arabic script. Besides, look at how many languages are written in cuneiform and in the Phœnician-Moabitic-Aramaic script.

The opinion of the reviewer which was stated at length in a paper read before the world's conference of Orientalists at St. Louis in 1904 is that the oldest post-Abrahamic works of the Israelites were probably written in the Hebrew language and the cuneiform script, and that at some later time, probably during or after the captivity, they were transliterated into the Aramaic alphabet.

From the brevity of the above criticism, let it not be supposed that the reviewer underestimates the value of the contribution to the right valuation of the historicity of the Pentateuch which has been made by Dr. Naville. In his principles of criticism we concur, and with his conclusions in favor of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch we agree. In Egyptian archaeology he is preëminent, and in its application to the times of Moses convincing, and, we think, impregnable.

Princeton.

R. D. WILSON.

Twelve Great Questions about Christ. By CLARENCE E. MACARTNEY, D.D.
New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1923. Pp. 221.

Clearly written, expressing firm conviction, setting forth the reasons for his faith, in a style that is direct and forceful, these lectures or discourses—for the form seems to justify the inference that they were prepared originally for public delivery—will meet the needs of a quickened interest in the fundamental truths of the Christian religion and will contribute to sound thinking and intelligent believing. The historical evidence for the manner of Jesus' birth is first set forth and it is shown that this article of the confession of the Christian Church is well accredited and is congruous with the witness of the New Testament concerning the nature of Jesus' person. Perhaps the order of the subjects

might wisely, for apologetic purposes, have been altered in accordance with Tertullian's suggestion in *Apol.* xxi: "*Sed prius substantiam edisseram, et ita nativitatís qualitas intellegatur.*" The Gospels themselves, though they record the birth of Jesus in the beginning of their narratives, were written primarily for Christians who thus received instruction concerning one of whom certain high predicates were believed to be true. Dr. Macartney's discussion here and throughout his book rests upon the premise, which is well supported by historical evidence and by reason, that the witness of the New Testament is credible and may confidently be accepted in its totality including its testimony to the transcendent and supernatural elements which are woven into its account of the origin of the Christian religion. It is of course not possible that the different aspects of the subjects which Dr. Macartney discusses could be treated with equal thoroughness since to each subject a volume might be devoted, but the discussion does deal with the central matters in each case and presents them in bold, sharp outline. The subjects discussed concern such important matters as the fulfillment of prophecy in Jesus, the teaching and the miracles of Jesus, His deity and His vicarious atonement for sin, His resurrection, ascension, and parousia. In the three concluding chapters the relation of Jesus and Paul, the idea of another Jesus, and certain common and persistent traits of unbelief are considered.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

Some Aspects of the Life of Jesus from the Psychological and the Psycho-Analytic Point of View. By GEORGES BERGUER, Lecturer at the University of Geneva. Translated by Eleanor Stimson Brooks and Van Wyck Brooks. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1923. Pp. viii, 332.

The literature on the Gospels as sources of our knowledge of the earthly life and teaching of Jesus has recently been enriched by contributions from Charles Gore (*Belief in Christ*, 1921), Eduard Meyer (*Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, 1921), George A. Barton (*Jesus of Nazareth*, 1922), Arthur C. Headlam (*The Life and Teaching of Jesus the Christ*, 1923), by the popular and widely read *Life of Christ* by Papini, 1923, and by the learned and valuable collection of Rabbinical material in Strack and Billerbeck's, *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus erläutert aus Talmud und Midrasch*, 1922. Among these Berguer's discussion has interest chiefly because of its point of view. It was to be expected that the method of psychological study generally connected with the names of Freud and Jung would be applied to the Gospels. The method has antecedents in the discussion of the self-consciousness or Messianic consciousness of Jesus as exemplified in Holtzmann's *Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu*, 1907, and in that type of literature which concerned itself seriously with the sanity of Jesus as exemplified in the writings of De Loosten, Binet-Sanglé, Hirsch, and Rasmussen—described by A. Schweitzer in his pamphlet, *Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu*, 1913, and in his *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, 2te. Aufl. 1913, 362. It is like the former in that its concern is primarily with the

consciousness of Jesus, its states and manifestations and their causes, but differs by subordinating the historical to a psycho-analytical investigation; it is like the latter in that it seeks the explanation of the conscious in the subconscious, but differs in finding the consciousness of Jesus to have been normal rather than neurotic.

The discussion is clearly written and is characterized by a sympathetic appreciation of the beauty of the Gospel narratives. It assigns a certain high value and, in the opinion of the author, even a supreme value to the person of Jesus for the religious life of mankind as the author conceives of it. It is also instructive for it expounds the method of psycho-analysis and makes extensive reference to the literature of the subject, much of which is doubtless known only by specialists in this field of study. But ultimately two questions must be asked. Is the method adequate to the task which the author has undertaken, and are the results which are reached by its application valid and true? To each of these questions the answer must be made in the negative. The method of psycho-analysis, whatever may be its value in other spheres, is not adequate to explain and interpret the consciousness of Jesus because of the nature of His consciousness as described in the Gospels and because of the self-limitation of the method as defined by Berguer. For Berguer makes it plain that the method which he employs rests on a strictly scientific basis and is in consequence concerned not with the truth of ideas or conceptions nor with the reality of the objects which appear to be implicated in certain states of feeling. "The psychology of religion," he says (p. 9), "studies facts, not ideas, states of consciousness, not doctrines. It aims to remain scientific; it concerns itself not with religion but with religious phenomena, and it seeks to discover the laws by which they arise and develop, disregarding the entire metaphysical question and taking cognizance, not of the first cause, but of the secondary causes alone." But this is just what the consciousness of Jesus as described in the Gospels does not permit if the analysis and description of it from this point of view be intended and offered as its explanation. It might be possible from this point of view and by the use of the psychological method to recognize the fact that Jesus was conscious of sustaining a unique relation to God—conceived of by Him as existing—and that this consciousness had at its center the thought of God as His Father; but when the psycho-analytic method interprets this in terms of the sublimation of the libido equated with "the vital influx," "the inner urge of energy," "the moral obligation," "the will to live," "the *élan vital*" and in explanation adds to nature supernature (p. 243), it is either transcending its own limits and becoming metaphysical in very inadequate measure or it is offering a genetic explanation of no scientific validity. In fact it is necessary to keep constantly in mind the definite limitation of the method to the analysis of states of consciousness and the equally definite exclusion from the analysis of anything other than secondary causes, for the author is not always careful to make it plain that when he speaks of God he has reference only to the thought or idea of God which constitutes an element in some state of consciousness. And yet even so the analysis more

frequently throws light upon the dialectic subtilty of the author than upon the subject to which it is applied.

The application of the method of psycho-analysis to the Gospel record of the life of Jesus may be illustrated by Berguer's account of the death and resurrection of Jesus. The idea that the death of Jesus was included in the purpose of God is rejected by the simple expedient of definition. "There are many," Berguer writes (p. 259), "who think that it was all decreed in advance and that Jesus, actuated by omniscience, knew from birth what he would have to undergo. Having the knowledge, he had the strength, as a matter of courses; and the events unrolled as in a drama written by a sanguinary god whose son, disillusioned actor and predestined victim, was condemned to play the principal rôle up to and including death. The horror of such a conception is only equalled by its stupidity." The thought of death as possible was however mediated to Jesus, both by the resistance which he encountered and by his reading of the Old Testament. In the end when confronted by the reality of death Jesus was "submissive in his obedience, but he was submissive in spite of the obscurity of his mind which did not perceive whither his obedience was leading him" (p. 260). "He died without knowing it; and that is what constitutes the incomparable grandeur of his death" (p. 261). And "It is precisely this that men must see, and upon which they must reflect, in order to be able to pass through a new birth. They cannot themselves attain this without an inner death, without desiring and accepting the real death as part of themselves" (p. 261). Similarly the resurrection of Jesus is explained as "the new birth realized and made glorious in the heart of men so that they, in their turn, may have the strength and courage to hazard the death of themselves, knowing that life lies beyond" (p. 292). The resurrection of Jesus does not signify the return of a carnal body to life; and the increasing materialization of the Gospel narratives is explained after the manner of the transposition of a moral problem into bodily illness in certain neuroses.

It is not unnatural that the author should find inspiration in and points of contact with the work of Strauss and of Renan or that he should depend for information about historical matters upon Stapfer; but indifferent as he is toward the theological or the historical method it is nevertheless indicative of a certain disregard for scientific accuracy when Mark xvi. 9-20 is said to be "missing in most of the manuscripts" (p. 271), or when the words in the Gospel of Peter ἀνέστη γὰρ καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ἐκεῖ ὅθεν ἀπεστάλην are translated (p. 272), "He is risen, and he is gone whither he was bidden to go, that is to say, to heaven"—a translation which is said to be quoted from Stapfer, who however renders more accurately (*La Mort et la Résurrection de Jésus-Christ*, 1898, iii, 237).

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

The Making and Meaning of the New Testament. By JAMES H. SNOWDEN. New York: The Macmillan Company. 311 pp. \$2.50.

The Professor of Systematic Theology in Western Theological Seminary is alike one of the ablest, one of the most interesting, and one of

the most prolific of those who seek not only to popularize the conclusions of modern scholarship but to apply them to modern life. This volume is the result of his conviction that there was lacking a single book, adapted to the needs of those making no pretense—special scholarship, that covers the New Testament as a whole. Consequently he has given us this book dealing with the making and meaning of the New Testament: its Jewish, Greek, and Roman background, its books, its biographies, especially those of Jesus and Paul, together with what it has to tell us of the spread of Christianity. In his study of the life of Jesus he follows Dr. James Stalker's divisions. In both his study of the life of Jesus and the spread of Christianity only selected points and scenes are presented. Throughout the attempt is made, with no small success, to "paint the picture with some life and color so as to make it realistically vivid and practical."

Dr. Snowden's critical and historical point of view, broadly speaking, is conservative. He expresses no judgment as to the genuineness and trustworthiness of the individual books of the Old Testament—apart from the disconcerting fact that he assigns the book of Daniel to a late date (p. 105)—but at any rate he attaches a high value to their contents, affirming that "these two volumes of the Word of God are indissolubly united, one principle and spirit of unity pervades them, one heart beats in them and one spiritual blood courses through them. They have been divinely joined in the history of redemption, and what God hath joined together let not man put asunder." It falls within his purpose, however, to at least touch on all the books of the New Testament and he accepts substantially the traditional view of their trustworthiness and authorship, with the exception of 2 Peter which he is inclined to ascribe to a later disciple of Peter.

Dr. Snowden's book as a whole is so much superior to most recent books dealing with the same subject matter in a popular manner that one could fain wish that he could refer to it in words entirely commendatory. We regret to be compelled to say, therefore, that it contains statements here and there that, in our judgment, greatly detract from its value. Mention may be made of some of these.

While Dr. Snowden's theological, like his critical and historical, viewpoint appears to be predominantly conservative yet he delights to appear in the rôle of a new theologian. It is true that he ordinarily only means that we should "not be afraid of new theology if it is the old truth interpreted and applied with new power"—a statement to which we can all subscribe—but it seems to us that the general reader is quite sure to get the impression that he is hostile to what is called the old theology. Particularly uncalled for is his identification of the Judaizers with the conservative or orthodox party of the early Church and his representation that the outcome of the Conference at Jerusalem was that "there was no division of the church, but room was found for both, and the unity of the church was maintained" (pp. 273-276). By inference at least Dr. Snowden asserts that the present-day successors of the Judaizers are those who condemn modernism as anti-Christian. He writes, "The Judiaizers were narrow rigid literalists who could see no

room in religion for any difference of opinion. And so they went about among the brethren as spies and heresy hunters, stirring up dissension and subverting souls. We have not yet seen the passing of all the people that say that others must believe after their manner or 'ye cannot be saved.'" (p. 273) This whole representation is without historical warrant. No place was found in the Apostolic Church for the Judaizers. They were preachers of "another Gospel" and Paul meant just what he said when he called them "false brethren unawares brought in." Whatever the faults of the so-called conservative or orthodox party in the church today they are not those of the first century Judaizers, and it is amazing that a man like Dr. Snowden should imply that they are.

Again Dr. Snowden's view of the nature of miracle is not altogether satisfactory because of its indefiniteness. He accepts the historicity of the New Testament miracles. He believes in the Virgin Birth and Resurrection of Jesus together with the so-called nature miracles. But when we find him speaking of a miracle as "only the intervention of a higher power to turn natural law to its own purpose" and saying that "one cannot close a window or lift his hand without doing something that is strictly supernatural"; and when, moreover, we find him explaining Christ's stilling of the storm as an instance of the mastery of mind over matter and quoting, apparently with approval, the statement of Professor James Y. Simpson that "the Resurrection is the supreme proof of the triumph of spirit over matter"; and when in his formal definition of a miracle (p. 56) he refers to it as "an event in the physical world not explainable by *known* natural laws" (*italics ours*)—it is at least questionable whether he believes in miracles as distinct from other natural events. It may be that Dr. Snowden thinks of the miracles of the New Testament as events in the external world due to the immediate power of God (Compare "What is Miracle?" by C. W. Hodge in this REVIEW, April, 1916) but we at least wish he had left us in no doubt as to what he means by miracles.

Yet again—and perhaps this is the main criticism to be brought against the book in view of its chief aim and purpose—Dr. Snowden's conception of the nature and significance of the New Testament itself leaves much to be desired. "The Bible itself," he writes, "is simply so much tradition: it is the religious experience of the chosen people as recorded and interpreted for us by prophets and apostles. . . . Tradition, however ancient and sacred, must always be tested by living truth and experience" (pp. 197-198). "The New Testament is the distilled essence of the religious life and experience of many lands and peoples. The most gifted spiritual geniuses, the loftiest souls closest to God and quickest to catch the light of his face, poured their light into these pages. . . . It is the sifted sum and supreme summit of the religious literature of the race, and thereby is incomparably the most vital and precious book in the world" (p. 34). Apart from the idea that the teaching of the Bible is to be tested by experience—surely it is rather true that experience is to be tested by the teaching of the Bible—there is much truth in what Dr. Snowden says; and yet the real nature and significance of the Bible is not grasped unless it is seen to be primarily not a record of religious

experiences but a record of those great acts of redemption that God has wrought for the salvation of his people. Dr. Snowden, indeed, holds that Christianity is an historical religion but he shows too strong a tendency, it seems to us, to regard the Bible as merely inspiring religious literature. We would direct particular attention to the following passage: "It is an important fact that the New Testament did not create Christianity, but Christianity created the New Testament. These books are only the record of things said and done, and are the consequence and not the cause of the history they relate. They are bits of literature floating on the stream of early Christianity that issued out of the ministry and especially out of the resurrection of Christ, and no more created this stream than all the books written about Niagara have created that river and its cataract, or than any history creates the facts it records" (p. 41)—as it seems to us that it indicates a grave but not uncommon misunderstanding of the significance of the New Testament. It is true that the New Testament did not create Christianity but it will not do to say that Christianity created the New Testament in the sense meant. Should we not rather say that it was the realities back of the written words of the New Testament that created both Christianity and the New Testament? It was these realities, particularly the incarnation, atonement, resurrection, and descent of the Holy Spirit that created Christianity; and conceivably Christianity might have established itself in the world with more or less success if the New Testament had not been written. And yet if the New Testament had not been written, it is certain, humanly speaking, that men's knowledge of these realities would soon have become dim and uncertain, and hence that it is a matter for constant thankfulness that it pleased the Lord "for the better preservation and propagating of the truth, and the more sure establishment and comfort of the Church" to commit His revelation in deed and word to writing. Hence while the New Testament did not create Christianity, yet the New Testament has been and still is an exceedingly important factor in the preservation and spread of Christianity, so important that it is proper to say, as Dr. Snowden somewhat inconsistently says in view of the passage cited that it is "the foundation on which Christianity rests and the fountain out of which it flows." The relation between the New Testament and Christianity as a world movement is certainly far more vital than the relation between the books written about Niagara and the river and cataract that bears that name. Such a representation is in fact absurdly inadequate. No doubt the notion that Christianity created the New Testament in the sense meant has its roots in the supposition that the New Testament is a precipitate of the religious experiences of the early Christians. Such a supposition, however, is untenable, it seems to us, because it overlooks the fact that these religious experiences are themselves the product of the fact and doctrines recorded in the New Testament.

The careful reader will note quite a number of other statements in this book that detract from its value. Such a reader, however, will find such statements the exception rather than the rule, and that even those mentioned do not enter into the substance of the book as much as, per-

haps, it would be natural to expect. The book as a whole, we repeat, is a superior one of its kind. Were it less excellent we would feel less need of pointing out what seem to us some of its errors and defects. As a whole it is good food so attractively served that unless the eater is put on his guard he is apt to swallow the bad along with the good. We need not forget, however, that a comparatively small amount of bad food sometimes produces very distressing, even fatal, results.

St. Davids, Pa.

S. G. CRAIG.

The Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce. By R. H. CHARLES, D.LITT., D.D., Archdeacon of Westminster, Fellow of the British Academy. London: Williams & Norgate. 12mo., pp. xiii, 127.

The subject of divorce is again to the front in books and magazines, occasioned chiefly by the extraordinary statistics as to the number of marriages which end in the divorce courts. It is inevitable that side by side with this discussion of divorce in secular circles, there should go new inquiries regarding the teachings of the Christian churches as they interpret the teachings of the New Testament on this subject. Generally speaking, the Roman Catholic Church interprets the words of Christ as forbidding divorce under any circumstances whatsoever. In this the Roman Church is followed by many in the Church of England. But in the rest of the Protestant communions there exists wide liberty, and consequently, a wide diversity of procedure. A good example of this is found in the Presbyterian Church. The Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church recognizes two grounds for the dissolution of the marriage tie, adultery and desertion. Yet it would be impossible to tell what any Presbyterian minister might do when confronted by a couple coming to be married, and one of whom was divorced. Some would marry them only where adultery was the ground of the divorce, and some where desertion was the cause, and some for almost any cause whatever. Earnest Protestants regret this diversity of practise and wish that some common course might be followed.

But here arises the difficulty. We are to be guided by the Bible. But what does the Bible teach on the subject of divorce? The Roman Catholic Church takes it to declare the absolute indissolubleness of a valid marriage, whereas the Protestant world takes it to mean that, under certain conditions, divorce and remarriage is permissible. Nor is it strange that there is this difference of opinion. It arises partly out of the sayings of Jesus as recorded in Matthew and Mark. In Mark x. 2-12, Jesus says, "Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her: and if she herself shall put away her husband, and marry another, she committeth adultery" (cf. Lk. xvi. 18). But in the two passages in Matthew (v. 32, and xix. 3-9) we have the excepting clause, "saving for the cause of fornication."

Dr. Charles deals first with the teachings of Jesus, especially the above mentioned passages. In brief, his argument is this. The Jewish Law as contained in Deut. xxii. 22, prescribes the death penalty for an adulterous wife, and, of course, there went with this penalty the privilege

of remarriage for the husband. This law was on the statute books when Jesus was teaching in Palestine. But there was another law, Deut. xxiv. 1-2, which permitted the husband to divorce his wife if he found some "unseemly thing" in her. The first law, that prescribing the death penalty, was recognized by Jesus and taken for granted by Him. As an evidence of this Dr. Charles cites the passage in John's Gospel about the woman taken in adultery. The scribes and Pharisees appealed to the law of Moses which commanded that such a woman be stoned, and asked Him what His judgment was. The answer of Christ shows "that He did not question the validity of this law, but that He objected to the jury or judges before Him," and that He would refuse to accept the rôle of judge.

The second Deuteronomic law permitted divorce to the husband who found some "unseemly thing" in his wife. But what was this "unseemly thing"? The meaning is confessedly obscure, and the Jews took advantage of this obscurity to divorce their wives upon almost any pretext. In the time of Jesus a controversy was raging over this passage between two hostile schools, the Shammaites and the Hillelites. The former held that the "unseemly thing" meant unchastity, and that for no lesser offense could a husband divorce his wife. The school of Hillel, on the contrary, held that this passage gave the right to divorce upon any ground whatever, even going to the length of saying that a man could divorce his wife for burning his food.

When we bear in mind this bitter controversy between the rival schools it will help us to understand the meaning of the question the Pharisees put to Jesus, "Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?" This was equivalent to saying, Do you side with the Shammaites or the Hillelites? The answer of Jesus shows that He repudiates the lax interpretation of the school of Hillel, although He does not necessarily identify the "unseemly thing" with actual unchastity. The whole controversy centers around the second law of Deuteronomy and is altogether outside of the prohibition and law which recognized adultery as destroying the marriage relationship and rendering the unfaithful wife guilty of death. Jesus repudiates all divorce upon the trivial grounds then current among the Jews and brands as adulterer and adulteress the man and woman so proceeding; and when asked in surprise by the Pharisees how He could forbid what Moses had commanded, He replies that Moses had not commanded it but only suffered it because of the hardness of their hearts.

On this ground, then, that the whole controversy was over divorce on lesser ground than adultery and fornication, and that Jesus and all Jews of all parties recognized the right to divorce when the cause was adultery, a good case is made out by Dr. Charles for the reconciliation of the two passages in Matthew with that in Mark. Mark quotes Jesus as saying that divorce is adultery, but in this he takes for granted the recognized validity of divorce in a case of unchastity. It was so generally recognized that he did not think it necessary to add any excepting clause to the words of Jesus as did Matthew. In other words, there is

in Mark an implicit recognition that divorce in the case of adultery was permissible, and he writes as if everyone would understand that the whole controversy was not over the right of divorce where there had been infidelity, but only over the right of divorce for "every cause," that is, any of the trivial pretexts that had been read into the second Mosaic law. But in view of possible misinterpretations, and because of the repeal of the law prescribing death for the faithless wife, Matthew, so Dr. Charles thinks, added the excepting clause, "saving for the cause of fornication." Thus, what is implicit in Mark becomes explicit in Matthew. As another instance of how Matthew adds an interpretative phrase to that of Mark, Dr. Charles cites the first beatitude. In Mark it reads, "Blessed are ye poor." But since the meaning of the Hebrew word "poor" might be misinterpreted by Greek readers, Matthew adds "in spirit."

As the passages stand in the Gospels of Matthew and Mark they seem to be in conflict. Some take what appears to be the severe prohibition of Mark as their law and some the words as they stand in Matthew. Whichever side is taken, there seems to be conflict. But if we follow the interpretation of Dr. Charles, then the conflict disappears. In Mark there is implicit recognition of the right to divorce in the case of adultery, and in Matthew an explicit recognition of such right. What our Lord condemns in both is divorce upon any lesser ground than adultery.

In his interpretation of the teachings of St. Paul on the subject of divorce Dr. Charles takes up the difficult passage 1 Cor. vii. 10-15. He shows that the Greek verbs which are translated "depart" and "leave" had a definite technical meaning equal to "to desert" and "to divorce." He quotes a passage from Josephus (*Ant.* XV. vii, 10), where these verbs are used exactly as in the passage of St. Paul. Thus rendered the passage would stand as follows:

"But unto the married I give charge, yea, not I but the Lord, That the wife do not desert her husband (but and if she desert, let her remain unmarried, or else be reconciled to her husband); and that the husband do not divorce his wife."

"But to the rest say I, not the Lord: If any brother hath an unbelieving wife, and she is content to dwell with him, let him not divorce her. And the woman which hath an unbelieving husband, and he is content to dwell with her, let her not desert her husband. For the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified in the brother; else were your children unclean; but now are they holy. Yet if the unbelieving deserteth, let him desert; the brother or sister is not in bondage in such cases; but God hath called us to peace."

Upon first reading it would seem that Paul in the first part of this passage, vss. 10-11, quotes a saying of Jesus which would bar all divorce. There is no excepting clause; the husband must not divorce the wife. They who hold that Jesus forbade divorce on any ground whatsoever appeal to this saying of Jesus as reported by St. Paul as in harmony with the passages in Mark and Luke, where there is no exception noted.

Dr. Charles deals with this in the same manner as he dealt with the apparent disagreement between the words of Jesus as reported by Matthew and as reported by Mark and Luke; that is, Mark and Luke do not add the excepting clause because they assumed the right of divorce in cases of infidelity. What is implicit and assumed by Mark is explicit and asserted by Matthew. So when Paul quotes Jesus to the effect that a man must not divorce his wife, what he means is that he must not divorce her for any lesser ground than adultery. He, too, assumes the right of divorce in cases of infidelity. In Paul then, as in Mark, there is implicit recognition of the right of divorce in the case of adultery.

According to Dr. Charles this right of divorce in the case of infidelity which is assumed but not stated by Paul in his quotation of the words of Jesus in 1 Cor. vii. 11, becomes explicit and is openly asserted in 1 Cor. vi. 15-17. This is as follows:

"Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take away the members of Christ, and make them members of a harlot? God forbid. Or know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body? for the twain, saith He, shall become one flesh. But he that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit. Flee fornication."

The argument here is that the Christian believer is part of the body of Christ, but when he has intercourse with a harlot he becomes part of the harlot's body and ceases to be in union with Christ. As fornication dissolves the union with Christ, so inferentially, it dissolves the union of marriage. Dr. Charles thinks that Paul had before him some early document with the sayings of Jesus on the subject of divorce, and he has little difficulty in showing how the sayings of Paul in these two passages are in agreement with those of Jesus in the Gospels. In the passage of 1 Cor. vi. 15-17, Paul, like Jesus, goes back to the original charter of marriage as a bond of union whereby two become one flesh.

But what of the clause in the saying of Jesus quoted by Paul in 1 Cor. vii. 11, "But should she depart (divorce, desert) let her remain unmarried, or else be reconciled to her husband." Literally interpreted this passage would seem to forbid remarriage after divorce, for the verb which elsewhere must be rendered "desert" can here only mean "divorce," for otherwise there would be no sense in saying, "let her not marry again." It would be absurd, says Dr. Charles, for Paul to quote Jesus to this effect, for the Jewish law never contemplated such a thing as a woman divorcing her husband: such a contingency was not even discussable. Dr. Charles therefore excises vs. 11 *a* (as he does also Mk. x. 12) as not being a genuine utterance of Jesus. With this passage thus disposed of, there seems to be no other passage in the New Testament which would prohibit the remarriage after divorce, and Dr. Charles holds that vss. 12-15 teach that "deliberate and prolonged desertion under certain conditions" is a sufficient ground for divorce.

This shows very clearly the weakness of Dr. Charles' method. He rejects Mk. x. 12 entire and 1 Cor. vii. 11 in part not because he considers them poorly attested—he does not discuss the textual evidence

in their favor—but chiefly because they definitely assert that Jesus discussed a question which a Jew of the first century would have regarded as inadmissible, viz., the possibility of a wife divorcing her husband. But this is a very drastic step. For even had Jesus been merely a man of his country, race, and time, it is certainly conceivable that he might have had something to say about a practice that was recognized by Roman law. Whereas, if Jesus was as He claimed to be “a greater than Moses” and if His utterances on divorce as on many other subjects possessed a universal application which went beyond the particularism of the Mosaic law, He might conceivably have had something to say about such a vital issue as the equality of the sexes in the matter of marriage and divorce under the new dispensation which He had come to inaugurate. At any rate, if Dr. Charles is to be permitted to delete these passages because they do not fit in readily with his theories, he might with equal right reject any of the other verses dealing with this important subject for the same reason. That he should be at such pains to harmonize Matt. v. 32, xix. 3-9 and Mk. x. 2f—a fine bit of constructive reasoning for which many will be very grateful to him—only to treat other passages in the New Testament, passages whose genuineness cannot be seriously questioned on textual grounds, with a ruthlessness which can only mean that the authority of the New Testament means but little to him and that he is ready to cut out any passages however well attested that do not meet his views, is deeply to be regretted. That he should speak of Mk. x. 12 as an “unwarranted change introduced into the text by Mark” makes matters all the worse. Textual corruption we can hope to offset by a thoroughly scientific textual criticism. But if the very writers of the original documents are to be accused of making “unwarranted changes” in their sources, what confidence can we place in the records they have given us? No discussion of the teachings of the New Testament on divorce can be regarded as adequate that does not do justice to all the facts. To cut the Gordian knot is to admit one’s inability to untie it.

Always profound and scholarly in his discussions, Dr. Charles is not equally lucid. His arguments too often take for granted a familiarity with critical questions equal to his own. For this reason the book is one for reference on the part of scholars, rather than a book to which men will turn for a clear setting forth of the New Testament teaching on divorce. After following Dr. Charles through his various explanations and arguments, one is impressed anew with the great difficulty which environs this subject of divorce. Because of the difficulty in arriving at any incontestable position as to what the New Testament teaches on the subject, there are those who say that we must be guided in our attitude on this vexed subject not by any occasional utterance of Jesus or Paul, but by the general principles of Christian morality and justice. If we hold with Dr. Charles that the exception explicitly stated in Matthew is implicit and taken for granted in Mark and Luke, and also in the passages of St. Paul, we have a reasonable method of bringing apparently conflicting sayings of Christ into agreement. This is much to be pre-

ferred to the method of harmonizing the passages in Mark and Matthew by excising the excepting clause of Matthew as an interpolation or addendum as an indulgence to the weakness of human nature, for to do this would break the authority of the New Testament, which Dr. Charles unfortunately does, as we have seen, in his treatment of other passages. On the other hand, it must be admitted that in both Mark and Matthew the whole argument of Christ is based on His appeal to the original charter for marriage as set forth in Genesis, that when the male and the female, the man and the woman, come together they become one flesh, and hence marriage is indissoluble, no matter what the civil court may decree. Hence the commandment of Christ, "What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder."

The conclusions arrived at by Dr. Charles are those reached long ago by the scholars of the Reformed churches. The Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church recognizes two grounds for divorce, adultery and prolonged desertion. Since divorce dissolves marriage, it would seem to carry with it the right of remarriage for the innocent party.

Philadelphia, Pa.

C. E. MACARTNEY.

Old Testament History. By FRANK KNIGHT SANDERS, PH.D., D.D., sometime Woolsey Professor of Biblical Literature in Yale University, Director of the Board of Missionary Preparation. New York: Scribner's Sons. 1922. 12mo., pp. vii, 158.

Old Testament Prophecy. By FRANK KNIGHT SANDERS, PH.D., D.D. New York: Scribner. 1921, 12mo, pp. vii, 102.

[Life and Religion Series, edited by Frank K. Sanders and Henry A. Sherman, Vols. I and II.]

The aim of the little handbooks of this series is "to furnish to the untechnically trained reader or student a succinct yet trustworthy and satisfying introduction to the subject of which it treats." Dr. Sanders has long been known as a zealous advocate of the Wellhausen Hypothesis and these books are written from that standpoint. It is sufficient to point in proof of this to the fact that he dates Deuteronomy in the reign of Josiah, and places the completion of the Hexateuch "early in the fourth century B.C." Isaiah is regarded as composite, and what seems to be considered as the latest section (xxiv-xxvii) is assigned (apparently largely because it is an "apocalypse") to about the time of Alexander the Great. Joel is placed at 375 B.C., and Jonah (called "The Parable of Jonah") at about 300 B.C. The first part of Daniel, with the exception of the second chapter, is assigned to the third century B.C.

A couple of quotations will be of interest as showing the importance which Dr. Sanders attaches to the express statements of the Old Testament Scriptures. Regarding Deuteronomy we read: "The Deuteronomic law in itself must have been approved by Jeremiah. Its spirit of philanthropic friendliness was like his own. Jeremiah 11:1-8 seems to record his active support of the new covenant." We turn to Jeremiah, and find that verses 3-5 of that chapter read as follows: "And say thou unto them, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel; Cursed be the man that obeyeth not

the words of this covenant which I commanded your fathers in the day that I brought them up out of the land of Egypt, from the iron furnace, saying, Obey my voice, and do them, according to all which I command you: so shall ye be my people, and I will be your God: that I may perform the oath which I swore unto your fathers, to give them a land flowing with milk and honey as it is this day. Then answered I and said, So be it, O Lord." Here in these verses the covenant is definitely described as a covenant made with the fathers. This fact is further emphasized in the verses which follow, and in the 10th verse we read specifically, "The house of Judah and the house of Israel have broken my covenant, which I made with their fathers." Clearly it is an *old* covenant, a covenant made before Israel entered the Promised Land, to which Jeremiah is referring. This inference is strongly supported by the Book of Kings which in its final estimate of the reign of Josiah tells us: "And like unto him was there no king before him, that turned to the LORD with all his heart and with all his soul and with all his might, according to all the law of Moses." That the exact phraseology of Deuteronomy vi. 5 should be wrought into a eulogy of Josiah as preeminent for his devotion to the law of Moses is striking, to say the least. Yet Dr. Sanders tells us that Jeremiah "seems to record his active support of the new covenant." It is no longer necessary, in the opinion of the critic, to prove that it is a *new* covenant! This is an example of the worst feature of these popular handbooks. The student is given "the assured results"; and expected to accept them largely if not solely on the authority of the critics.

The Book of Daniel is discussed under the head "Prophetic-Apocalyptic Voices of Later Times." We read that "The Daniel stories (Dan. i, iii-vi) probably passed from mouth to mouth much earlier than the well-established date of Daniel as a whole. Their inaccuracies regarding the events of the exile make it certain that the knowledge regarding those days was traditional." (Apparently Dr. Sanders has not considered it worth his while to read Dr. R. D. Wilson's articles and book in defense of the historical setting and statements of the Book of Daniel). A little later we read the following: "Yet apocalypse fulfilled an important function. It was prolific. The Books of Daniel and Enoch were followed by many volumes of wide circulation. These writers kept alive a confidence in God and His purposes; they reinforced Jewish loyalty to Him; they turned all hopes to the Messiah. Despite the occasional puerility of their conceptions and their over-emphasis of the catastrophic method which God would adopt, they subserved a useful purpose" (*Prophecy*, p. 76). While the language is somewhat ambiguous and it is not certain that Daniel and Enoch are to be classed with "these writers," the fact that Daniel is classed with Enoch is enough to indicate that it is to be regarded as a typical, perhaps an outstanding, apocalyptic production and as characterized by an undue emphasis upon the catastrophic and by occasional puerilities. Indeed to Dr. Sanders, as to the critics generally, apocalypse is the direct antithesis of that orderly development which they have sought so earnestly to read into the Old Testament. Already,

in the introductory chapter (*Prophecy*, p. 1), he has told us: "The Prophets were the real leaders of Hebrew religious thinking. Through them came the gradual shaping of that thinking into so satisfactory an interpretation of God, man, and the universe, that it gained an almost universal recognition as the best constructive religious platform ever developed in the ages before Christ. It was a long and slow process over many centuries." Such being the case, we should not expect Dr. Sanders to entertain a very high opinion of Daniel or of apocalypse in general. "Constructive religious platforms" which gain "almost universal recognition" are not likely to leave much scope for individual initiative, either divine or human.

The interest of these books lies largely in the fact that their author is "Director of the Board of Missionary Preparation and of the Committee of Reference and Counsel of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America." If the attaining to such a conception of the history and religion of the Old Testament as is set forth in these books is any part of the "missionary preparation" advocated by this Board, it is no wonder that "Modernism" is becoming a very live issue with those—both at home and abroad—who are interested in the great missionary enterprise.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

Assyrian Grammar with Chrestomathy and Glossary. By SAMUEL A. B. MERCER, PH.D., D.D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament in the Western Theological Seminary, Chicago. London: Luzac & Co. 8vo., pp. viii. 122.

This little manual for beginners has been prepared to meet the need which, as Professor Mercer points out, has long been felt of a "text-book which is both simple and also well supplied with exercises." There is no question that "the larger grammars are reference books and unsuited for the use of beginners" and that Delitzsch's *Assyrische Lese-stücke* is by no means easy for a beginner, especially if as is often the case said beginner is not thoroughly conversant with German. There are thirty-one chapters in the book, the last four of which deal with syntax; and all except a few at the beginning are supplied with exercises written in the Assyrian character. There is only one exercise for translation into Assyrian. All of the paradigms are given, wisely we think, in translation. The Chrestomathy contains brief selections dealing with history, mythology, religion, astronomy and correspondence taken from the inscriptions of Hammurabi, Shalmaneser III, Ashurbanipal, Nebuchadnezzar, etc. The sign-list follows the order adopted by Delitzsch.

The principal criticism which will we think be made of this book is that in view of the fact to which Professor Mercer himself alludes, that "Assyrian is difficult," the author has gone somewhat too far in his attempt to make his book "as brief and concise as possible." A student who has worked through Delitzsch will find this book a very handy manual. But we are afraid the beginner will find it difficult to master.

It is so very condensed. An example from the verb will illustrate this. Professor Mercer follows Delitzsch in designating the four primary stems (Qal, Paal, Shafal, Nifal) by the Roman numerals I, II, III, IV, adding the arabic numeral 1 to distinguish the simple form from the reflexive (formed by an inserted *t*) which is numbered 2. Consequently the simple Shafal (or causative, cf. Hebrew Hiphil) is described as III.1 to distinguish it from the Ishtafal (or reflexive Shafal) described as III.2. But the numeral 1 is also used to distinguish the stems not characterized by an internal doubling (Qal, Shafal, Nifal) from the Paal and its derivatives, designated 2. Thus, the reflexive of the Shafal, for example is described by the following formula: "III 2 (or st, 1) Ish-tafal *uštakšad*"; whereas the reflexive of the Paal is "II 2 (or t, 2) Iftaal *uktaššad*." This use of the arabic numerals in two senses, to indicate on the one hand that the form is reflexive and on the other that the second radical is doubled, cannot fail to be very confusing to the beginner.

Since it was Professor Mercer's purpose to make his grammar as brief and concise as possible we think he would have done well had he confined it strictly to Assyrian literature of the period and character "covered" by the cuneiform script which he uses. It is decidedly misleading to place before the student a text of Hammurabi, written in the cuneiform character of the Sargonids, without giving him the slightest hint that there is a difference in script between early and late, Babylonian and Assyrian, lapidary and cursive. The same criticism applies in a slightly different form to the inclusion of "early forms" in the paradigms. Where an adequate discussion is impossible it would have been better, we think, to concentrate on the important characteristics of "Assyrian." And why inform the student that *u* may sometimes be pronounced *o*, when no further use is made of this decidedly unimportant and perhaps questionable "fact"?

The reviewer shares the hope expressed by the author that this little volume may "add to the number of students interested in the study of Assyrian." His fear is that it will be found to be true of it as of Delitzsch's *Lesestücke* that as a grammar it is too difficult to be as serviceable as it ought to be to the beginner.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

SYSTEMATICAL THEOLOGY

Mysterium Fidei de augustissimo corporis et sanguinis Christi sacrificio atque sacramento. Elucidationes L in tres libros distinctae. Auctore MAURITIO DE LA TALLE, S.J., Nuper in Universitate Catholica Andegavensi, nunc in Pontifica Universitate Gregoriana de urbe sacrae theologiae lectore. Parisi apud Gabriel Beauchesne. MCMXXI. Net, 50 francs; franco, 55 francs.

The chief aim of this handsomely printed volume is to explain that

sacrifice of the body and blood of Jesus Christ celebrated by the Roman Catholic church and called the Mass. In response to much hostile criticism during the last three centuries Roman Catholic theologians have made many attempts to clarify the ideas that the rite expresses, and although these explanations have been divergent in many points, they have all had a common assumption: namely, that something must be done by us to set forth Christ in the "victim state"; and a common topic of investigation; namely, in what this state consists. The volume under review accepts the assumption, and with extraordinary thoroughness and detail, carries the investigation through to its completion. The thought is briefly as follows: granting that Christ is by His last supper and passion in a "victim state," upon which in virtue of the resurrection and ascension the divine approval rests; and granting that, immortal in His glory, He is immortal also as gift and offering, not only presented but (unlike those figurative sacrifices which acceptable enough as symbols really returned to the earth and saw corruption, and therefore had to be continually repeated), received by the Father's hands as a ransom to be kept for ever more, our task is not to put Christ again to death (for if we did, we should be His executioners) but to renew the offering of that victim immolated once but now immortal, and in so doing make the sacrifice of Christ the sacrifice of the church. The *oblatio hostiae immolandae* is what Christ accomplished in the last supper, when by a non-bloody rite He devoted Himself to a bloody death for the redemption of the world. To the theology of this act the author devotes pp. 1-180. The *oblatio hostiae immolatae* is accomplished in the Mass, and the Mass is defined for us in two expressions: "Do this," namely, what I am going to do; and "In memory of Me," that is, in commemoration of what the supper announced and promised. The Mass, consequently, is the offering of the victim already offered, of His passion and of His death, the ever renewed offering of his redemptive sacrifice. This doctrine is shown to have been the belief of the Fathers of the Church, and the presupposition of the Church's liturgies and practice.

There is little that is new in the foregoing presentation, and the arguments in refutation were amply expressed in the days of the Reformers. Let it suffice, therefore, to reassert that the last supper which the Lord commanded His church to observe in His memory until He come again, is not in any sense a sacrifice, but is a *sacrificial feast*. How can he who is convinced that the latter is the plain teaching of the New Testament narrative ever be persuaded of the truth of the former? Certainly the present volume with all its learning and ingenuity can not do so, for to heap error on error can never make the fundamental error less, but only greater.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Personal Religion and Public Righteousness. By THE REV. PETER GREEN, M.A., Canon of Manchester, Chaplain to H.M. the King. With an introduction by the Lord Bishop of London. New York: Longmans, Green & Co. Boards. 12 mo., pp. 113. Price \$1.10.

The earnest contention of this writer is that "the only obstacle to a better world is the lack of a great many more and a great many better servants of God." The aim of the book is to lead Christians to a deeper experience of fellowship with God with the belief that this and this alone will result in the accomplishment on the part of the Church of its whole task in the sphere of social and civic duties. The discussion is marked by seriousness and earnestness. It indicates appreciation of the baffling problems of the present day and of the fact that only a vital Christian faith can meet the needs of the world.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Life as a Stewardship. By GUY L. MORRILL. Philadelphia: Publication Department, Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Paper, 12mo., pp. 111. Price 25 cents net.

These five Bible studies concern "Man's Relation to Things." They deal with the stewardship not only of money but also of time and talent and strength. The separate studies are entitled: 1. Do You Own what You Possess; 2. The Separated Portion; 3. Budget Making; 4. The Miracle of Money; 5. Business for Profits or Service. While these studies are especially adapted for Young People's Societies and Sunday School classes, they will prove illuminating to all Christians and will be especially helpful to pastors who are seeking to impress upon their people the important truths relating to the stewardship of life.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Studies in Mark's Gospel. By PROFESSOR A. T. ROBERTSON, M.A., D.D., LL.D. New York: George H. Doran Co. Cloth, 16mo., pp. 146. Price \$1.00 net.

This volume comprises a number of articles which appeared first in various periodicals. It does not give an exposition of the Gospel of Mark but it does throw light upon many of the problems which that Gospel presents and does aid in a clearer understanding of its message. The work shows the exact scholarship and spiritual insight of the author and will be of real service to all students of the Bible. The character of the book will be quite easily understood by a glance at the titles of the chapters: "The Making of John Mark," "The Date of Mark's Gospel," "Mark's Gospel and the Synoptic Problem," "Peter's Influence on Mark's Gospel," "The Miraculous Element in Mark's Gospel," "The Christ of Mark's Gospel," "Jesus in Mark's Gospel," "The Example for Preachers," "The Parables and Teachings of Jesus in Mark's Gospel," "Aramaic and Latin Terms in Mark's Gospel," "The Disputed Close of Mark's Gospel."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Confronting Young Men with the Living Christ. By JOHN R. MOTT. New York: George H. Doran Co. Cloth, 12mo. pp. 203. Price \$1.50 net.

These addresses by the General Secretary of the International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association should reassure all readers as to the evangelical position and the evangelistic purpose of the Young Men's Christian Association as represented by its distinguished leader, Dr. John R. Mott. These addresses were delivered on a recent tour which extended over the entire American continent. They were delivered before great audiences of men and boys representing thousands of Christian workers in various centers of the land. Dr. Mott insists that the Association must maintain at all costs its distinctively Christian, pronouncedly evangelistic and aggressively missionary character. He declares that "the battle today is not over mere details or externals, but relates to the very citadel of faith, the superhuman character of Christ and of the revelation which acquaints us with him. Without a divine Christ in an absolutely unique sense, and with only a revelation which differs in nothing essential from the literature of other religions, the word Christian loses its true meaning." Dr. Mott summons Christian workers to a higher spiritual experience and urges upon all the necessity of undertaking more aggressively the work of bringing individuals into a vital contact with the living Christ. The addresses are characteristically strong, clear, arresting and convincing. Among the subjects are the following: "The Conflict of the Christian Worker," "The Faith of Young Men," "How to Increase the Spiritual Vitality of the Young Men's Christian Association," "How to Augment the Leadership of the Christian Forces." The impression produced by these addresses was profound, and their influence will be greatly extended and rendered even more permanent by their publication in their present attractive form.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

A Candle of Comfort. By CHARLES NELSON PACE. New York: The Abingdon Press. Paper Boards Binding, 16mo., pp. 80. Price 50 cents.

This little book contains, as its title indicates, messages of comfort for stricken and saddened hearts. It discusses very briefly "The Ministry of Consolation," "The Strain of Life," "The Problem of Suffering," and "The Immortality of the Soul." The messages spring from Christian faith and are designed to inspire courage and hope.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Book for Catechumens. By C. A. RANDOLPH. Chicago: Wartburg Publishing House. Cloth, 16mo., pp. 116.

This little hand-book is intended for the instruction of children in the Lutheran Churches. The first part prepares those who are twelve years of age for the study of a larger Catechism. The second part contains lessons on topics intended to prepare candidates for confirmation and for active membership in the church.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Golden Rule in Business. By ARTHUR NASH. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 160. Price \$1.25 net.

This surprising story by the President of the A. Nash Company, Cincinnati, is one of the most interesting narratives of the time. In an artless fashion it sets forth the facts of an experiment which proved most successful, namely, the application of the Golden Rule to a business enterprise with the result that the standard of efficiency was immediately raised, the capacity for production immensely increased, the human foundation immeasurably strengthened, and the business made a startling success. The story is told first of all in the words of Mr. Nash, and secondly by Ruth White Colton in an article which appeared first in *Success* for September 1922, and thirdly in an address made more recently by Mr. Nash before the Business School at Harvard University. The three accounts involve some repetition, but only impress the more forcibly the simple and striking testimony of the book to the fact that a man in the face of almost incredible odds set himself to found and develop an organization solely and absolutely on the principle of the Golden Rule. The surprising results stated in terms of receipts for five successive years are as follows: 1918, \$132,190; 1919, \$525,678; 1920, \$1,580,700; 1921, \$2,077,559; 1922, \$3,751,181. It is no wonder that this story of the Golden Rule in a clothing factory has made a stir in the business world and that it is regarded as one of the great romances of modern industrial life.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Miracle Man and The Wonder Book. By FRED J. NELDAU. Chicago: The Bible Institute Colportage Association. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 79. Price 75 cents.

This book is the product of a deep spiritual experience. The author had passed through the dark days of doubt, perplexity and unbelief. An earnest search for the truth resulted in a positive conviction both as to the inspiration of the Bible and as to the deity of Christ. These two are the themes of this brief volume. The Bible by its accuracy, its unity, its fulfilled prophecies, its teachings and its influence, is shown to be "God's revelation." So, too, Jesus Christ by his miraculous birth, his sinless life, his omnipotence, his omniscience, his moral character and his resurrection, is shown to be "God's manifestation." Likewise, Christianity is presented as "God's proclamation." The discussion is condensed, popular, and interesting.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Christ Pre-Eminent. By W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, D.D. Chicago: The Bible Institute Colportage Association. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 125. Price \$1.00 net. Postage 6 cents.

These studies in the Epistle to the Colossians form an admirable exposition of this important letter of the Apostle Paul. Dr. Thomas presents a brief outline of the Epistle and intimates certain books which will aid in its study. He then deals with brief portions of the text, treat-

ing only three or four verses at a time, but covering the whole ground of the Epistle with comments and explanations and practical applications which are illuminating, practical and suggestive. This brief commentary cannot fail to be of great help to a better understanding of the Epistle which presents with matchless power "the person and work of Christ," and which shows that in all things "he holds the preeminence, as the Head of his Body, the Church."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Sent Forth. By W. E. TILROE, Professor of Historical and Pastoral Theology, Maclay School of Religion, University of Southern California. New York and Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press. 1923. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 225.

Professor Tilroe has "sent forth" a unique and glowing exposition of the power of the preached word. It is written from the standpoint of Wesleyan Arminianism, but Calvinists and Evangelical Protestants generally, should find it profitable reading.

"No man really preaches except as he meets God" (p. 45), sounds its keynote. His style runs to the gnomic, and epigrammatical, often striking, and some times eloquent. One chapter is called, "The Thrills of the Bible." The book itself has as many thrills as it has chapters, almost as many as pages. "A preacher who is not a theologian, should be ashamed to draw his salary" (p. 38) is refreshing in an age which too often accounts ignorance of theology a virtue rather than a disgrace. The chapter on "Little Foxes" is full of keen and useful thrusts at the preacher's dangers. "Picknicking with Fascination" is his characterization of an unwise attitude toward womankind. Such a style has its pitfalls. It tends to exaggeration, and may land one in half truth rather than the whole truth. "Jesus Christ is more than a Saviour" (p. xxx) sounds dubious; and even more, "the truth may be an enemy of the whole truth" (p. 219). There is a disheartening paragraph (p. 135) in which the writer intimates his willingness (perhaps?) to surrender to the destructive criticism (see also pp. 109, 110), but it sounds strangely incongruous with the general level of the rest of the book. Per contra, he once slips into Calvinism discerning "an inscrutable divine permission of the Great War" (p. 220). "It was God's policing of anarchy," leading to a league of nations. There is one unaccountable phrase by this gifted author (p. 205), "the intriguing character of Luke's writings." Can "intriguing" be a misprint?

Easton, Pa.

JOHN FOX.

An Adventure in Orthodoxy. By JOSEPH M. M. GRAY. New York and Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press. 1923. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 143.

Dr. Gray is a Methodist pastor who finds "Orthodoxy" a congenial theme and has some suggestions to make as to its future. It is refreshing to hear his paeans of praise over Theology. That ancient *grand dame* does not often hear such an adventurous troubadour serenading under her windows. He quotes Ferrero, the historian, as to "the unity and

stability of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity,"—"the last foundation of order in the world" and laments that "we have largely lost the genius . . . of thorough-going and comprehensive religious thinking" (p. 95). The Nicene Creed he makes his own. Naturally, we read such good words with kindling hearts, hoping that the starless midnight of contempt for sound doctrine must be at last coming to an end. But before we can turn the page there comes a discordant note. The Christians of the Nicene age and later "discovered orthodoxy in the writings of evangelists and the letters of apostles" (p. 98); but apparently this needed correction, for later he says: "The Scriptures however lost their automatic semimagical influence." Then, we are told, "we cannot discover orthodoxy itself, clearcut and unmistakeable in a book however sacred" (p. 101), but "the authentic source of a Christian creed is Christian experience" (p. 124). "The test of right thinking, the source of orthodoxy, is life in the large" (p. 101). After this we are not surprised though sadly disappointed to find that the *Adventure in Orthodoxy* is an attempt to change the meaning of the word. Instead of being a statement of the doctrines of Scripture in language suited to our age, the New Orthodoxy would begin to correct the Scriptures themselves so as to conform with certain notions now very popular. We must not think of God as ancient Hebrew religion thought of him (p. 135). We will probably come after a little, he continues, to think of Him after a manner agreeing with Professor Ellwood's ideal "of a more rational, revitalized, and socialized Christianity" (p. 112). The Scriptures will then be "as Historical Criticism presents them in spite of the Fundamentalists and by way of the natural and mental sciences, notwithstanding Mr. Bryan and his intellectual contemporary, Archbishop Usher" (p. 75). "Modern democracy," he affirms, "must change our ideas of God" (p. 106).

Truly, all's not gold that glitters, and all's not orthodoxy that borrows its plumage. How all this agrees with the Nicene Creed, or the creed of John Wesley, it is not easy to see.

Easton, Pa.

JOHN FOX.

The Realism of Jesus. By PROF. J. ALEXANDER FINDLAY, M.A. New York: Geo. H. Doran. \$1.50 net.

Professor Findlay wishes to show that the ideal described in the Sermon on the Mount is not so much a counsel of perfection as the only really wholesome and natural way of life for men with natures like ours and living in a world like this. The studies (based on Matthew's Gospel) begin with a paraphrase, since the author holds that our inability to express the realities of the spiritual life in the realistic language of the people is one of our greatest handicaps in the interpretation of the New Testament. In the first half-dozen chapters, availing himself of the Koiné MS. discoveries, material selected from rabbinical sources, and occasional post-Revision plausibilities, he presents an interesting and enlightening background for the discussion that follows. On many pages of this discussion, one meets with insight, suggestiveness, and broad and kindly humanitarianism, and now and again with a brilliant flash (*e.g.*

"There is a world of difference between living *in* and living *on* trust").

As to the analysis of the Sermon itself, opinions will differ. To us, Professor Findlay seems to have failed to take into account the larger view of Jesus as He appears in the full-orbed Gospel. We are told, for example, "God may be angry with men, but there are certain lengths to which He will not go. It seems clear that Jesus did not think of God as directly punishing men at all; at this point, He tacitly corrects the Old Testament." How are we to square this with Matt. 18:35: "So likewise shall My Heavenly Father do unto you," etc.? Again, in connection with the question of divorce, the author tells us that in the case of marriages not made in heaven, "It is exceedingly questionable whether we have any right to say, 'What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder,'" and justifies his position by contending that Christ is here speaking of marriage between disciples. He forgets that in Matt. 19:9 we have exactly the same decision, given in reply to a general question proposed by the Pharisees. There is no solid ground for rendering the עֲוֹנוֹתָם of Deut. 24:1 by "Notwithstanding the word about misconduct before marriage"; the identical expression meets us in Deut. 23:14, where "some filthiness" is the only possible rendering. We are therefore not surprised to find that we rise from our reading with the impression that on Professor Findlay's showing, the Sermon on the Mount comprises pretty nearly the whole duty of man; we are not able to see much beyond an encircling social horizon. True, at the very end of the book, the Cross is briefly referred to; but it is not the Cross of Isaiah, of Peter, of Paul.

The synthetical limitations referred to above lead here and there to pronouncements that will call forth sharp dissent. "The first disciples of Jesus were in practice communists." Surely this is an overstatement of the case. Acts 4:32 must be interpreted in the light of 5:4, which proves that the practice was not obligatory, and did not necessarily involve the surrender of all holdings. It was merely the expression of a spontaneous outflow of Pentecostal love; it is inexact to call it an experiment which failed on account of a breakdown in human nature. We are told that the bias of the disciple who has the mind of Christ will always be toward communism (p. 122); and that if we, in the maturer stages of Christian life, do not experiment in that direction, we should gravely question whether, after all, we have the Master's spirit. How, then, does it come that John Mark's mother evidently owned a house (Acts 12:12)? Or, again, take the question: "May we not venture to say that so long as a man is a man, there can be no hopelessly lost soul?" (p. 86). Not while we remember Matt. 25:46. A few out of a number of outright inaccuracies may be noted. To say that Christ never uttered a Thou shalt not, is to fly in the face of such passages as Matt. 5:34, 39. There are some wholly inexcusable slips, as when the prayer, "Deliver us from the Evil One" is called a quotation from John; or when the "essential goodness of human nature" and the "actual depravity of the heart of man" are referred to on succeeding pages (173, 174). The flippant reference to the "self-sufficient God of the Old Testament" is,

to say the least, a blemish on the book as a whole, and fitted to raise the inquiry whether a Jesus whose reverence for the Old Testament can be so easily disregarded really deserves to be followed as the Master of Life.

Lincoln University, Pa.

EDWIN J. REINKE.

The Dynamic Ministry. By OSCAR L. JOSEPH. New York and Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press. \$1.25 net.

Mr. Joseph's book is an attempt to set forth the ideals underlying a dynamic ministry in times of transition. Apparently trained in the Methodist body, and unable to shake himself clear from the influence of an evangelical heritage, he has accepted most of the radical positions. He is sure that Fundamentalism is really Elementarism, with theology of a kindergarten order, and guided by sophistry and sentimentalism (p. 20). He believes in the evolutionary struggle toward perfection, which tends, in a non-static universe, to an enlarged conception of God. Hence the essential truth of Christianity is to be distinguished from its varying interpretations; and the incredibilities mingled with its teaching, which alienate many outside the churches—who are nevertheless sympathetic with its idealism—should be dropped. Traditional Protestantism has at any rate failed to coordinate life, because of its parochial outlook. Hence inheritance must yield to experience, and the man who hopes to move his age must courageously think out and proclaim the new, broader and more efficient conceptions.

Mr. Joseph can scarcely be said to have followed his own advice as to thinking things through. At least, there is evidence furnished the discerning reader that he relies rather too implicitly upon the dicta of supposedly Pythagorean guides. Thus we find F. G. Peabody twice quoted (once *verbatim*) to the effect that the ancient creeds codify Christian opinion rather than modify Christian character. Now, the Westminster Confession, a fairly ancient document, contains a whole Chapter (XIX) on the Law of God, while most people find the Large Catechism quite largely concerned with character. This "weakness of the second-hand" appears elsewhere, as when the author scores the dictation-theory of inspiration, remarking that only on this theory can Leviticus be considered as sacred as the Psalms, or the Gospel of John. As a matter of fact, Leviticus contains more reported utterances of Jehovah than any other book of Scripture; and besides, it is just to this obsolete ritual that we must look for the original of the noble words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Lev. 19:18). And here it may be in order to say that it is difficult to understand how the "simple Gospel" of Evangelicals who hold by this and kindred precepts of traditional Christianity, can fairly be charged with representing an individualistic type of piety—in the last analysis, a species of complacent selfishness (p. 82). Finally, it is rather curious to find Mr. Joseph pointing, in proof of the fact that Jesus is able to save to the uttermost all who come unto God by Him, to such cases as that of Pastor Hsi, of China (the proof-reader has it

Tsi). Was it not the kindergarten Gospel which dispelled his darkness? Prophets are evidently still known by their fruits.

In the second part of the volume, Mr. Joseph treads on somewhat firmer ground, and many of his suggestions will be found to be helpful and stimulating. "If the people are not interested in preaching, first inquire whether the pulpit is an echo or a voice." "What we most imperatively need to recover is the teaching function of the pulpit." The chapter on the Generous Pastorate deserves a reading by all ministers.

Lincoln University, Pa.

EDWIN J. REINKE.

Churches of the New Testament. By REV. GEORGE W. McDANIEL, D.D., LL.D. Pastor of the First Baptist Church, Richmond, Va. New York: Geo. H. Doran Co. Pp. 299. \$1.75.

"The author of this book, who is pastor of one of the largest Baptist churches in the South, has long been noted not only for his power as a preacher but his grace and forcefulness and scholarly ability as a writer." The present book sustains his reputation. "The aim of this book is to show the origin, character, principles and practices of the N.T. churches; to point morals and deduce lessons for twentieth century pastors, laymen, and churches." The book is admirably written; a mine of Biblical and historical wealth; a storehouse of good things, and a cyclopedia of sermonic suggestions. It is true that the writer somewhat unduly accentuates his peculiar Baptist principles, and assumes at times a polemical tone; but among so much else that is admirable we may well forgive his loyalty to his denominational particularities. In Chapter I, The Meaning of the Word Church, he reads from the Scriptures the independence of the local church in N.T. days, and finds that Christ safeguarded his churches against the perils of the Episcopal and Presbyterian forms of government, by establishing a democratic form.

"The form of government of the N.T. church was congregational. One church having authority over another church, or one man, or group of men, exercising jurisdiction over a church or a territory of several churches, is foreign to the New Testament." This feature is a trifle overdrawn, but it is good to find a man loyal to his convictions in a day when the market is short.

After such an introductory chapter the author takes up the various churches of the New Testament: viz., Jerusalem—the mother church, Antioch—the missionary church, Galatian Churches—the unstable churches, Ephesus—the effective church, Colosse—the heretical church, Philippi—the joyful church, Thessalonica—the expectant church, Corinth—the worldly church, Rome—the renowned church, and certain other churches.

In discussing the life and times, character and faith, vicissitudes, and outcome of these churches, it would seem that the writer has omitted almost nothing in all history, literature, mythology, and Biblical references that might throw light on his subject. Here the writer is admirably equipped for his task; with wealth of illustration, and thorough grasp of details; combining the fact-loving grip of the historian with the

imaginative fervor of the poet. The style is clear, terse, brilliant, not devoid of an occasional flash of humor. The treatment is analytical enough to be of homiletical value; *e.g.*, the church at Jerusalem had a six-fold unity of Place, Purpose, Prayer, Power, Practice, Possessions.

Best of all perhaps is the thoroughly evangelical tone of the book. Here are no theological vagaries, no minimizing rationalism. The writer knows what he believes and knows why he believes it. His faith has not suffered rarification till it has attained to the tenuity of next-to-nothing. He reveals not only an evangelical faith, but an evangelistic fervor; realizing that the church that ceases to be evangelistic will not long remain evangelical. *Ad hominem*, the Methodist Bishops who are pleading tolerance for unbelief, and vindicating flappers need not look far for the cause of the inroads of modernism into Methodism. People who are debating what is fundamental and what is not might profit by a careful study of Paul and the Galatians. Paul knew that there were some differences that could not be treated lightly. There is a point of divergence beyond which people cannot walk together. A church divided in faith cannot be united in fellowship. How can two walk together unless they be agreed?

The continued steadfastness of Jerusalem did not reach to Galatia nor to some places this side of the Atlantic. Neither did the power of the Spirit and the sweeping revivals.

"We will meet again at Philippi" passed into a proverb, and Philippi was the spot where destinies were settled. But more than military victories were won at Philippi. The skirmish line of European advance received its first baptism of blood at Philippi, and the line never fell back till it had conquered Europe, Britain, America. That is why we send missionaries to China, and not they to us. Philippi was the *joyful* church. Prominence of women, Abounding joy, Victorious over opposition, Pecuniary liberality, personal attachments,—these sketch Philippi.

Colosse was the heretical church. The Gnostics were the "knowing" ones. Gnosticism was an effort to pervert Christianity by learning and speculation. It repudiated revelation and assumed to reach knowledge subjectively; denied the historical basis of Christianity, and its claim to authority.

The heresy of the Lycus valley is not dead. There is a gnostic danger in our day. A gnostic cosmogony still haunts our universities. Emanations from God through endless aeons to man are no more sophistical than ageless evolution from amoeba to man. The ancient gnostics reasoned on a descending scale; the modern gnostics reason on an ascending scale. Both deny the Deity of Christ, the supreme authority of revelation, and the vicarious atonement. It is no worse for a chemist to poison the food that the students eat than for a professor to poison their minds with false science. Better destroy the human life than wreck the immortal soul. The words of a distinguished educator are to the point: "It would be a calamity if the educational institutions founded by our fathers to foster the Christian faith should come, in time, to destroy the very faith they were founded to foster."

This partial sketch may serve to convey some idea of a really delight-

ful and valuable book. It may also suggest to the ministry a helpful line of thought for pulpit ministrations.

Philadelphia, Pa.

DAVID S. CLARK.

The Healing Shadow. By BISHOP WILLIAM A. QUAYLE, D.D. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$2.00 net.

There is much in this volume of sermons that is unusually helpful, wholesome and timely. We hear today a great deal about Christianity being a life achieved by man. We are told that Christianity is a spirit, and that man in his own power is able to achieve the Christian character. We also hear much about "the living Christ." But when we examine it that phrase just means "Christian character" and may not refer to the Second Person of the Trinity after all. Many are seeming to say today that it does not matter whether Jesus Christ ever lived or not. We have the Christian ideal; in fact, Christ is just the spiritual ideal of the race, and toward that we are to strive. To be a Christian, according to this view, is to be ruled and governed in life by the purpose which governed Jesus. This tends to drop the emphasis on doctrine and place it on life. In the New Testament you have the Christian life as the effect of the doctrine. No doctrine, no life; no cause, no effect. Yet we are being told that the effect is all we have, in fact, all we need to have.

Any one who is troubled by such views will do well to read the third sermon in Bishop Quayle's book. He answers the above view, and answers it thoroughly and effectively. "If a man is to achieve character, how shall he achieve it? 'Let him grow it,' says some otherwise soul, 'as he does the oaks and the apple trees and the cornfields and the wheat. Let him plant and tend.' This sounds so sensible, but is so senile." "We cannot grow character. Character, in the widest view, as regards its origin, is an exportation, and as regards its destination an importation. We do authentically grow character in our fields, but it is after we have got the graft from heavenly fields." "We cannot farm alone. We must get seed to answer to the soil. The richest fields lie sterile until we bring the seed; and the seed-fields of the earth are all located in the skies."

The book is evangelical, thoroughly sound in the faith. One statement about Christ and sin is enough to indicate this. "What a man was is of scant concern with Christ. He has a cure for sin. To be accurate, he has the only cure for sin. 'He shall be called Jesus, for He shall save His people from their sins.' 'From their sins' is the greatest word of enfranchisement this listening world has ever heard. It is the last word in redemption. I need no more." The book is also evangelistic. Bishop Quayle looks upon himself as a saving instrument of God to win men to the Lord Jesus Christ. And this, as he brings out, is the chief and main task of the Christian Church.

In the sermon entitled, "Where is Zebedee?," the most active use is made of the imagination. Because Zebedee is not mentioned among the followers of Christ, the author infers that Zebedee was not a follower of Christ; and that he was kept from following Christ because he was wrapped up in the work of fishing. Now the conclusions may all be

wrong. It may be that Zebedee was a follower of Christ. An imagination, even a vivid imagination, is a help, but the possessor needs to be on guard. The reputation of a New Testament character, regarding whom we know almost nothing, has been blackened by Bishop Quayle's exegesis. And it may be entirely wrong.

The Bishop apparently writes with a rapid pen and occasionally makes a slip. "I feel like I am near the North Pole" (p. 24), and "Christianity is all those appliances which God makes use of to make people like He is" (p. 53), are hardly in accord with good usage.

Norristown, Pa.

J. M. CORUM, JR.

Fifty Short Sermons. By T. DEWITT TALMAGE. Compiled by his daughter, May Talmage. New York: George H. Doran Co. Price, \$1.50 net.

T. DeWitt Talmage was one of the most striking preachers of his day. It is probable that he had a larger reading public than any of his contemporaries. This book therefore needs no elaborate introduction or extended criticism. Those who heard Talmage preach and who wish to revive the impressions then made will be able to have this done by reading this book. Those who never heard him preach will learn from this book something of his style, his vivid imagery, his use of unusual texts, the soundness of his faith and his evangelistic passion.

It is interesting to note that Talmage was something of a prophet. One of his sermons was called "The Coming Sermon." He says "The coming sermon will be a short sermon. Condensation is demanded by the age in which we live. In other days men got all their information from the pulpit. People would sit and listen two and a half hours to a religious discourse, and 'seventeenthly' would still find them fresh. But what was a necessity then is a superfluity now." In regard to the length of the sermon, it seems that Talmage was a true prophet. He also prophesied that "when the coming sermon arrives, all the Churches of Christ in our great cities will be thronged." That has not yet been fulfilled.

Norristown, Pa.

J. M. CORUM, JR.

The Minister and His Parish. By HENRY WILDER FOOTE, A.M., S.T.B. New York: The Macmillan Co. Cloth, 12mo., pp. 179. Price \$1.50.

This is not a treatise on pastoral theology, although the title might so indicate to some. As the author declares, pastoral care is "a subject outside the scope of this book." Nor yet does it deal with the Sunday School, or with the larger field of religious education, or with the conduct of worship. It is "definitely limited to the discussion of the legal, financial, business and administrative problems of the church." The writer wisely contends that "good organization and effective administration mean lessened wear and tear, the minimizing of drudgery, the elimination of needless obstacles and irritations, the freeing of the spirit from a petty bondage that it may aspire to higher things." Something of the content of the book can be imagined by the titles of the chapters: "The Call and Settlement of the Minister"; "The Rights and Duties of the Min-

ister"; "The Legal Organization of the Parish"; "The Working Organization of the Parish"; "The Parish Records"; "The House of Worship"; "The Parish House"; "The Parsonage"; "The Church Finances"; "The Minister's Salary and Fees"; "The Organist and Choir"; "Church Advertising"; "The Church and the Stranger"; "The Ethics of the Ministerial Profession"; "The Liberty of the Pulpit." The author believes that this discussion of problems will be of as much value to laymen who are engaged in the administration of the local church as it will be to ministers, because the problems discussed concern both in almost an equal degree.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Sheer Folly of Preaching. By ALEXANDER MACCOLL. New York: George H. Doran Company. 217 pp. \$1.50.

This volume contains nineteen brief sermons by the minister of the Second Presbyterian Church of Philadelphia. The title was suggested by Moffatt's translation of 1 Corinthians 1:21. Inasmuch as Moffatt's phrase "the sheer folly of the Christian message" is true to the original in that it brings out the thought that the reference is not to the act of proclamation but to the message which God's herald proclaims, the choice of this title is fitted to arouse the expectation that these sermons will emphasize that sacred deposit of truth to which it is the primary function of the minister to bear witness. Such, however, is not the case. They are excellent sermons of their kind—sermons that are well and pointedly expressed, that exhibit reverence and fervor as well as vigor and breadth of thought, that appeal to the heart and conscience, not to mention other excellencies—but they make only slight mention of what have been called the "grand particularities" of the Christian message. This holds good even as regards that "grand particularity" which most of all made the Christian message seem like "sheer folly" to the Greeks, viz., its proclamation of salvation by a crucified Christ. We do not mean to imply that these things are wholly lacking, but it does seem to us that a book with a title taken from such a source should have given them greater emphasis.

Dr. MacColl believes that "one of the greatest bits of service to be done by thoughtful men today is to exercise the ministry of reconciliation within the Church: in perfect loyalty to the truth, to bring into bold relief the underlying unities beneath many of our controversies, to show that opposing groups are not really contradictory, but complementary." This is one of the services he would like to render, and so in the sermon entitled, "What is the matter with the Church?" he seeks to show that there is no difference between Liberals and Conservatives sufficient to justify division, that difference of opinion about the Virgin Birth, the Scriptures, the Second Coming, Social Service, Sabbath Observance, Orders, and such like, would not seem so important to many if they only had "more love." It is, perhaps, not surprising to find a "half-hearted" Liberal like Dr. MacColl supposing that there is nothing fundamental at stake in the controversy between the Liberals and the

Conservatives; but if he were more "thorough-going," it seems to us, he would see what the ablest representatives of both Liberalism and Conservatism see, viz., that the Gospel of the one is radically different from the Gospel of the other. It is surprising, however, to find so scholarly a minister as Dr. MacColl, suggesting that the clause, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy mind" was an addition by our Lord to the Great Commandment. Surely every tyro knows that as used in the Old Testament the word "heart" refers to the intellectual as well as the emotional faculties of man.

In one place Dr. MacColl says. "To the Christian, Christ is God manifest in the flesh—all of God that can be packed into the limitations of our frail humanity." We wonder if he regards that as an adequate indication of the sense in which Jesus is God to the Christian.

St. Davids, Pa.

S. G. CRAIG.

Creative Forces in Japan. By GALEN M. FISHER. Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada, New York; and The Central Committee on the United Study of Foreign Missions, West Bedford, Mass. 1923. Pp. viii, 248.

About the most that Mr. Fisher has done in this book is to bring some facts concerning Japan and Christian missions there up to date. Perhaps few books become so quickly outdated as mission study class textbooks, of which this is one recommended for the current church year. The map of Japan and Korea, pasted at the beginning of the book, is an improvement; and the appended quotations and bibliography are, of course, helpful references. Pretty much the same story, however, is told, and unfortunately, not always in an interesting way. It does not impress us as a good text-book for a mission study class such as we have in our churches today. Here and there it is a bit heavy, some of it is more specifically reference material, the style is not particularly attractive, and the chapters are altogether too long. Thirty and forty pages are too long for a chapter to be considered by the average mission study class today, with only six or eight weeks to devote to it, and which usually prefers to cover a chapter at each weekly session.

If Mr. Fisher's book be compared with the also recently (1923) appeared *Japan on the Upward Trail* by William Axling, it is a question whether the difference in the material given or even in the presentation warrants one in reading both books. And if both of these be compared with mission study text-books on Japan that appeared twenty years ago, such as William Elliot Griffiths' *Dux Christus*, John H. DeForest's *Sunrise in the Sunrise Kingdom*, and Otis Cary's fine (revised) *Japan and its Regeneration*, all three of which appeared in 1904, one receives the same impression. Why so much practically rehashing of the same material at the same time? The plea that different treatments are for differing types of classes is not always vindicated by the character of the text. It is only our own opinion, but it happens to be one supported by some members of classes which have this last Fall (1923) used Mr. Fisher's

book, and that opinion is, that as a text-book for the average mission study class it is not exactly a success.

Lancaster, Ohio.

BENJAMIN F. PAIST.

The Divine Right of Democracy, or the People's Right to Rule; a Study in Citizenship. By CLARENCE TRUE WILSON. New York, Cincinnati: The Abingdon Press.

Democracy made great advances during the War and since. We were called to make the world safe for democracy and the call thrilled, but events since have emphasized the necessity of making democracy safe for the world. This book is one of many which the epoch-making years have called out. The author has read widely and his message is an interesting one. It is popular in its treatment and perhaps on this account, there are extreme statements which may at least be questioned. For instance: it will be conceded that the English Bible influenced the leaders of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, but can it be said, "there was only one Book that every man in that convention knew from cover to cover—the Scriptures." Did every man know the Bible so well? Is it true that no other book had an influence upon the makers of our Constitution? A recent writer claims that Blackstone's Commentaries profoundly affected the results of the Convention. The book pleads for the Initiative, Referendum and Recall; whatever may be said in favor of these, it is not true that they are the logical development of American democracy. They are rather a radical departure from the theory of government which has controlled America and England. American democracy is English democracy and that goes back beyond Runnymede back to the Witenagemot of Sleswick and in that meeting of the Wise lay the rule of the people.

Elkins Park, Pa.

RICHARD MONTGOMERY.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Church Monthly, New York, October: CHAUNCEY B. TINKER, The Church and Society; F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, Evangelicalism; J. H. C. JOHNSON, Some Churches in Spain; CECIL ROBERTS, Jesuit Catholicism; JOHN C. MCKIM, Missionary Methods and Catholic Principles; ROBERT F. LAU, Eastern Jewels in Western Settings; ROBERT J. MURPHY, The Quest of the Ages. *The Same*, November: Modern Attitude toward Miracles; F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, The Oxford Movement; FREDERICK S. PENFOLD, The Church and the Man in the Street; HERBERT H. GOWEN, The Church in the Far East; GEORGE P. CHRISTIAN, Pascal, Renan, and Pasteur; SELDEN P. DELANY, Religion and the new Psychology. *The Same*, December: RALPH A. CRAM, The Eucharist as the Center of Unity; FRANCIS J. HALL, The Eucharist in St. Paul, I; F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, Ritualism; KENNETH R. FORBES, The Church and Democracy; ELIZABETH BARKER, If College Kills Our Faith: Why is it?

Anglican Theological Review, New York, October: G. A. COOKE, The

Unknown Martyr: Zech. 11-12; ARTHUR ADAMS, St. Augustine's Doctrine of the State in Relation to some Modern Theories of Sovereignty; SAMUEL A. B. MERCER, Old Testament and Other Oriental Wisdom; H. C. ACKERMAN, Miracle and the Natural.

Biblical Review, New York, October: CLARENCE E. MACARTNEY, The Preacher and the "Grand Particularities"; WILLIAM E. SCOFIELD, Paul's Place in the Christian Revelation; A. C. WYCKOFF, Chronic Unbelief; T. H. WRIGHT, "The Hound of Heaven"; HERMAN H. HORNE, What Did the Cross Mean to Christ?; VICTOR A. BELAUDE, The Alienation of the Latin-American Mind from Christianity.

Catholic Historical Review, Washington, October: AURELIO PALMIERI, The Bollandists; EDWIN H. BURTON, St. Edmund's College, Old Hall; HARTMANN GRISAR, The Knell of German Protestantism; JOHN K. CARTWRIGHT, St. Bernard and the Papacy.

Church Quarterly Review, London, October: T. W. DRURY, The Epiclesis in the Service of Holy Communion; HENRY WACE, The Revision of the Prayer Book; E. C. TRENHOLME, Revision of the Prayer Book; A. NAIRNE, Job's Interpreters; F. H. MARSHALL, Old Testament Interpretation in Medieval Greek and Slavonic Literature; H. MAURICE RELTON, Divine Revelation; R. B. HENDERSON, Akhnaton and Moses; A. J. G. HAWES, Arminius and His Teaching; A. C. HEADLAM, Little Bishoppics.

East & West, London, October: MISS MACDONALD, Prison Experiences in Japan; W. W. CASH, Religious Life in Egypt; T. H. P. SAILER, Educational Ideals in the Mission Field; M. P. WESTERN, Indian Christian Ashrams for Women; P. J. ANDREWS, Need of Teachers for Western Canada; H. ANDERSON, Church Developments in India; H. T. C. WEATHERHEAD, A School Record in East Africa.

Expositor, London, October: J. E. MACFADYEN, Bethel; C. RYDER SMITH, The Priest-Preachers of Jerusalem; LAUCLIN M. WATT, The Vision; J. ROBERTSON CAMERON, Some Notes on the Development of Jesus; B. P. W. STATHER HUNT, Is Our Second Gospel Complete?; F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK, The Virgin Birth in the Fourth Gospel; T. H. BINDLEY, The Chalcedonian Christology. *The Same*, November: H. W. ROBINSON, An Old Testament Scholar; G. MARGOLIOUTH, Notes on some Difficult Passages in Qoheleth; C. REEVES PALMER, Where did the Earliest Ministry of Jesus Take Place?; G. H. C. MACGREGOR, How Far is the Fourth Gospel a Unity?; J. E. ROBERTS, Story of Eutychus; A. MARMORSTEIN, Attitude of Jews towards Early Christianity. *The Same*, December: ALFRED E. GARVIE, Christian Theology and Recent Psychology; P. J. BEVERIDGE, "I Am" in the Fourth Gospel; B. W. BACON, "Raised the Third Day"; T. H. BINDLEY, Fresh Light on Philipians 2:5-8; F. J. POWICKE, Richard Baxter and the Brothers Herbert; JAMES STALKER, The Kaiser's Chaplain.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, September: H. A. WILLIAMSON, Jeremiah and Jesus; W. S. URQUHART, Glorifying Christ: a Meditation; JOHN E. MACFADYEN, Recent Foreign Theology; EDWARD BEAL, The Face Value of the Gospels. *The Same*, October: RENDEL HARRIS, Origin

of a Famous Lucan Gloss; W. R. INGE, A Reconciling Principle; JOHN E. MACFADYEN, Biblical Scholarship in the Indian Church; EDOUARD NAVILLE, The Seventeenth Chapter of Genesis; H. A. WILLIAMSON, Jeremiah and Jesus—in Comparison and Contrast.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, October: JAMES B. PRATT, Natural Religion: Consciousness and its Implications; CHARLES C. TORREY, Aramaic Origin of the Gospel of John; JOHN R. KNIPPING, The Libelli of the Decian Persecution; KIRSOPP LAKE, A Lost Manuscript of Eusebius's *Demonstratio Evangelica* Found.

International Journal of Ethics, Chicago, October: PAUL H. DOUGLAS, Necessity of Proportional Representation; C. DELISLE BURNS, Philosophy in the University of Cambridge; RAPHAEL DEMOS, Legal Fictions; J. E. TURNER, Personal Immortality as an Ethical Principle; JOSEPH R. GEIGER, Effects of the Motion Picture on the Mind and Morals of the Young.

Journal of Negro History, Washington, October: ALBERT PARRY, Abram Hannibal, the Favorite of Peter the Great; ALRUTHEUS A. TAYLOR, Movement of the Negroes from the East to the Gulf States from 1830 to 1850; ELIZABETH R. HAYNES, Negroes in Domestic Service in the United States; WM. K. BOYD, Documents and Comments on Benefit of Clergy as applied to Slaves.

Journal of Religion, Chicago, September: EUGENE W. LYMAN, Religious Education for a New Democracy; JOSEPH RATNER, George Santayana's Theory of Religion; A. BARRATT BROWN, The Dark Night of the Soul; FRANK EAKIN, Is Bible Study Identical with Religious Education?; MARIO PUGLISI, Present Religious Tendencies in Italy; D. KARL BORNHAUSEN, The Present Status of Protestant Churches in Germany. *The Same*, November: WILLIAM E. HOCKING, Illicit Naturalizing of Religion; A. EUSTACE HAYDON, The Quest for God; WALTER M. HORTON, Reasons for Believing in God; MATTHEW SPINKA, Religious Movements in Czechoslovakia; SHAILER MATHEWS, What May the Social Worker Expect of the Church?

Journal of Theological Studies, London, October: C. H. TURNER, Origen *Scholia in Apocalypsin*; H. J. ROSE, The *Clausulae* of the Pauline Corpus; R. P. CASEY, Clement and the two divine Logoi; F. C. BURKITT, Dr. Sanday's New Testament of Irenaeus, with a note on Valentinian Terms in Irenaeus and Tertullian; J. H. RUFES, St. Luke's Preface; F. H. COLSON, Mark 11:27 and parallels; H. J. M. MILNE, New Fragment of the 'Apology' of Aristides; H. H. STREETER, *Didache* 1:3—2:1.

London Quarterly Review, London, October: JOHN TELFORD, Principal Lindsay's Letters; A. N. ROSE, Freedom and Consciousness; COULSON KERNAHAN, Some Personal Recollections of Sir William Robertson Nicoll; A. M. CHIRWIN, The Strangle-Hold on Leprosy; PERCY L. WATCHURST, Dante's Doctrine of Sin and Atonement; T. STEPHENSON, New Outlook in Biology; HENRY HOGARTH, Some Factors in the religious Development of Pascal; A. E. GARVIE, A German View of Religious and Church Life in England; BASIL ST. CLEATHER, Erasmus.

Methodist Quarterly Review, Nashville, October: WILBUR F. TILLET, Most Fundamental Fact of the Christian Faith; H. M. DUBOSE, The

Atonement: Its Rationale; CLOUGH A. WATERFIELD, The League of Nations Nonpartisan and Inevitable; O. E. BROWN, David Lloyd George; N. H. WILLIAMS, Belief in Miracles; CHARLES L. BROOKS, Miracles of Jesus; CHARLES R. FORSTER, Mars' Hill and Calvary; or, Paul's Answer to the Appeal of European Problems; A. H. GODBEY, Blood: the Cult of the Dead.

Monist, Chicago, October: HOWARD R. MOORE, The Unity of Science; an Outline; R. D. CARMICHAEL, Concerning the Postulational Treatment of Empirical Truth; RAYMOND H. WHEELER, Static and Dynamic in the Logic of Science; MARGARET W. STEWART, Our "Sex Complex" and What Produced it; DONALD C. WILLIAMS, Principle of Alternation; F. LINCOLN HUTCHINS, Psychic Nature.

Moslem World, New York, October: SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, Crown Rights of Christ; DUNCAN B. MACDONALD, Christian Literature for Mohammedans; WM. McE. MILLER, Shi'ah Mysticism; HERBERT E. E. HAYES, Islam and the New Psychology; SAMUEL ANDERSON, Future of Missions in Turkey; J. J. BANNING, The Moplah Rebellion of 1921; J. G. AND J. B. LOGAN, Our Approach to Moslems; S. RALPH HARLOW, Present Opportunity in the Near East; D. MUIR, Some Moslem Objections.

New Church Life, Lancaster, October: W. L. GLADISH, The Golden Rule; R. W. BROWN, Two Essentials of the Educational Method; JOHN E. BOWERS, Reminiscence of Visits to Northern Michigan. *The Same*, November: F. E. GYLLENHAAL, Love alone Effects Conjunction; E. E. IUNGERICH, Infestations and Temptations. *The Same*, December: W. F. PENDLETON, The Word Opened; ALBERT BJORCK, On the True Nature of the Infallibility of the Writings.

Open Court, Chicago, September: WILLIAM E. BARTON, The American Pulpit on the Death of Lincoln; WALLACE N. STEARNS, Shipwreck of St. Paul; EDWARD L. MOORE, The Emprize Supreme—Concerning Evolution and Religious Faith; HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND, Traditions and Basic Ideals. *The Same*, October: EDMUND NOBLE, Theologies Old and New; VICTOR S. YARROS, What are the Problems of Philosophy?—Taking Stock; JULIUS J. PRICE, The Sun in the Talmud; JONATHAN WRIGHT, Wisdom of Herodotus; WILLIAM E. BARTON, American Pulpit on the Death of Lincoln (con.). *The Same*, November: DUDLEY WRIGHT, Religious Opinions of Charles Lamb; CHARLES PLATT, Will and Conscience; JOHN W. TAYLOR, A Forgotten Utopia; HARDIN T. MCCLELLAND, Justice and Social Efficiency; F. VON A. CABEEN, Client by a Client; WILLIAM E. BARTON, American Pulpit on the Death of Lincoln (concluded).

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, October: J. M. SHAW, Can Prayer Count in a World of Law?; A. E. TRUXAL, Meditations continued; C. M. RISSINGER, The Rural Problem; HENRY S. GEHMAN, A Jonah—Parallel in Buddhism; A. E. DAHLMAN, Relations of Dogma to Faith and Life; J. M. G. DARMS, Why Should "Christian Missions" be Included in the Curriculum of our Educational Institutions?; PAUL R. PONTIUS, International Peace from the Minister's Point of View; THEODORE F. HERMAN, "The Church and the Ever-Coming Kingdom of God."

Review and Expositor, Louisville, October: E. Y. MULLINS, Contribution of Baptists to the Interpretation of Christianity; SAMUEL Z. BATTEN, The Unfinished Task of the Baptists; JAMES STALKER, A Notable Leader of the Scottish Church: Professor Henry Drummond; W. E. HENRY, The City in the First Century; FREDERICK EBY, Baptist Principles and Christian Education.

Yale Review, New Haven, October: W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE, New Lights on the Past in Egypt; WILBUR C. ABBOTT, Towards World Association; LEONARD HUXLEY, Huxley and Agassiz: Unpublished Letters; BENJAMIN W. BACON, The Success and Failure of "Liberalism"; HILAIRE BELLOC, On Contemporary Stupidity.

Biblica, Roma, Septembri: E. POWER, The Staff of the Apostles; J. DÖLLER, Der Wein in Bibel und Talmud, ii; F. PELSTER, Echtheitsfragen bei den exegetischen Schriften des hl. Thomas v. Aquin, ii; A. VACCARI, Ancora l' "Apocryphum Ieremiae"; P. JOÜON, Ben "fils de" pour "Petit-fils de"; L. TONDELLI, "Caro non prodest quidquam" Ioh. 6:64.

Bilychnis, Roma, Luglio: S. MINOCCHI, Fatalità e pessimismo sul finire del mondo antico; V. CENTO, Paul Hyacinthe Loyson; R. NAZZARI, Il tempo psicologico e la teoria della relatività fisica; G. LUZZI, Risalendo alle sorgenti; Dio secondo l'insegnamento di Gesù nei sinottici. *The Same*, Agosto-Sett.: M. PUGLISI, Il Problema gnoseologico nella storiografia religiosa; S. MINOCCHI, L'idea di rinascita nella storia delle religioni; M. ROSSI, La Bibbia nell' insegnamento religioso; A. TILGHER, La visione cristiana della vita; F. A. FERRARI, Lo spirito di amore agli albori del cristianesimo; A. CHIAPPELLI, La "distruzione del Tempio e la riedificazione in tre giorni" nei sinottici e in Giovanni; R. CORSO, Paganità; C. FORMICHI, Lo spirito scientifico del Buddismo; G. FARINA, Il mito d'Osiri nei testi delle Piramidi. *The Same*, Ottobre: U. MORICCA, L'opuscolo di Cipriano a Donato; A. HERMET, Dante ignoto.

Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Septiembre-octubre: La Carta Enciclica de S. S. Pio XI en el sexto Centenario de la Canonización de Santo Tomás de Aquino; ANTONIO PELÁEZ, El patriotismo y la moral según Santo Tomás; VENANCIO CARRO, Hay más de una contemplación?; B. BELTRÁN de HEREDIA, Crónica del movimiento tomista. *The Same*, Noviembre-diciembre: ALBERTO COLUNGA, El sentido del "Cantar de los Cantares"; VINCENTE BELTRÁN de HEREDIA, Universidades dominicanas de América Española—Universidad de Santa Fe de Bogotá.

Gereformeerde Theologisch Tijdschrift, Aalten, September: C. BOUMA, De dood van den Apostel Johannes; A. J. TENKINK, Eene taal of vele talen. *The Same*, October: J. RIDDERBOS, Jesaja's gerichts aankondiging over Juda en Israel; N. D. VAN LEEUWEN, De mishandeling der vrouw in Hooglied 5:7. *The Same*, November: J. RIDDERBOS, Jesaja's gerichts aankondiging over Juda en Israel; JOH. JANSEN, Kerklijke samenkomsten.

Gregorianum, Roma, Septembri: G. ARENDT, La tradizione cattolica in favore del Privilegio Paolino nel coniuge infedele battezzato in una setta acattolica; M. DE LA TAILLE, Les offrandes de messes; R. MARCIAL, Les paradoxes de l'action—I. Le point précis de la difficulté que présente le premier paradoxe. II. Les principes de la solution; N. MONACO, Teorie idealiste—I. La filosofia di Giovanni Gentile.

Nieuwe Theologische Studien, Groningen, VI:5/6: G. VELLENGA, De Norma der Ethiek; A. VAN VELDTHUIZEN, Kunst en Ambt; A. VAN VELDTHUIZEN, Litteratuur over Jezus; F. M. TH. BÖHL, Nieuwe Boeken op Oud-Testamentisch terrein. *The Same*, 7/8: HAROLD M. WIENER, The library theory and the Pentateuchal narrative; H. M. VAN NES, Uit den zendingsarbeid; A. VAN VELDTHUIZEN, De Litteratuur voor de sociale kwestie bij Lukas.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Octobre: W. SCHMIDT, Recueil de l'Évolutionnisme dans la sociologie et dans l'histoire des religions au cours des dix dernières années; L. RICHARD, La Rédemption, mystère d'amour—Les idées d'expiation, de sacrifice, de rachat; J. PAQUIER, Un essai de Theologie platonicienne à la Renaissance.

Revue d'Ascétique et de Mystique, Toulouse, Octobre: J. DE GUIBERT, Dons du saint-esprit et vie mystique; M. ASIN PALACIOS, Une introduction Musulmane a la vie spirituelle; M. VILLER, Nider est-il l'auteur de *l'alphabetum divini amoris*?

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, Louvain, Octobre: J. LEBRETON, Le désaccord de la foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans l'Église chrétienne du iii^e siècle (con.); F. CABROL, Les écrits liturgiques d'Alcuin; L. VAN DER ESSEN, Hucbald de Saint-Amand et sa place dans le mouvement hagiographique-médiéval (concluded).

Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuses, Strasbourg, Juillet-Août: J. PANNIER, Recherches sur l'évolution religieuse de Calvin jusqu'à sa conversion (2d article); F. MACLER, Chrétientés orientales; P. LOBSTEIN, L'apologétique chrétienne devant la conscience moderne. *The Same*, Septembre-Octobre: A. CAUSSE, La propagande juive et l'hellénisme; F. MACLER, Chrétientés orientales (concluded).

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Juillet-Octobre: PHILIPPE BRIDEL, Pascal anti-scholastique; AIMÉ CHAVAN, Le manuscrit de l' "Essai sur la manifestation des convictions religieuses" d'Alexandre Vinet.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris, Octobre: G. RABEAU, Le Fait et l'Essence: Quelle peut être la vérité de l'expérience humaine; G. BARDY, Notes sur les sources patristiques de S. Thomas dans la 1^{re} partie de la "Somme Théologique."

Rivista Trimestrale di Studi Filosofici e Religiosi, Perugia, IV:2: G. FURLANI, Studi apollinaristici—II. I presupposti psicologici della cristologia di Apollinaire di Laodicea; T. ZIELINSKI, La bella Elena; A. BIAMONTI, L'escatologia di Metodio d'Olimpo.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, xlvii:4: AUGUST DENEFFE, Perichoresis, circumincesso, circumincesso; JOHANN STUFLER, Zur Kontroverse über die praemotio physica.

Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Tübingen, N.F. 4 Jahrgang: 4: KARL HEIM, Der Zen-Buddhismus in Japan; FRIEDRICH DELEKAT, Rationalismus und Mystik; W. STAERCK, Religionsgeschichte und Religionsphilosophie in ihrer Bedeutung für die biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments; THEOPHIL STEINMANN, Zur Frage nach dem Wesen der Religion (concluded).

CHRISTIANITY AND LIBERALISM

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Price \$1.75.

"This is a book that should be read by every thinking man, whether he calls himself a conservative or a liberal. While evidently the product of a thorough scholar, it is written throughout in simple, non-technical words." S. G. Craig in *The Presbyterian*.

"A book which should be in the hands of every minister and every thoughtful layman of our Church."—LeR. G., in *The Christian Observer*.

"The tone of the book is restrained, considerate of every objection and open-minded to truth from whatever source it may come."—W. S. Plumer Bryan, in *The Herald and Presbyter*.

THE ORIGIN OF PAUL'S RELIGION

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN. The James Sprunt Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia. New York: The Macmillan Company, Second Printing, 1923. Price \$1.75

"Professor Machen's work commands respect. It is worthy of a high place among the products of American biblical scholarship."—B. W. Bacon, in *The Evening Post* (New York).

"Dr. Machen . . . has written a book which, while obviously the result of careful study, is not too academic to interest the general theological reader."—*The Times* (London).

"This is a book which it would be difficult to overpraise."—*The Church Quarterly Review* (London).

NEW TESTAMENT GREEK FOR BEGINNERS

By J. GRESHAM MACHEN, D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923. Price \$2.20.

This textbook is intended both for students who are beginning the study of Greek and for those whose acquaintance with the language is so imperfect that they need a renewed course of elementary instruction. The book does not deal with classical Greek, but presents simply the New Testament usage.

IS THE HIGHER CRITICISM SCHOLARLY?

By ROBERT DICK WILSON, PH.D., D.D., Professor of Semitic Philology and Old Testament Criticism in Princeton Theological Seminary. With a Foreword by PHILIP E. HOWARD. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times, 1922. Price 25 cents. London: Marshall Bros., 1923. Price 1 sh.

"The book is a veritable arsenal of ammunition with which to demolish the critical theories."—Howard Agnew Johnston, in *Scientific Christian Thinking for Young People*.

WITHIN THE GATEWAYS OF THE FAR EAST

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1922. Crown octavo, pp. 128.

As a member of the Princeton Theological Faculty, as a delegate of the Presbyterian Board of Missions and as a leader in a long series of important conferences, Professor Erdman was afforded unusual opportunities for investigating the forces now contending for mastery in the Orient. However, he never centers the interest of his narrative upon mere personal experiences, but upon the avenues of approach, the great wide gateways, opening before those who are bringing to the nations that Christian Gospel which is held to be the hope of the Far East.

THE RETURN OF CHRIST

By CHARLES R. ERDMAN. New York: George H. Doran Company. Crown 8vo. pp. xiv, 108. Price \$1.00.

As the author states, "the purpose of this book is to deepen conviction and to promote harmony of belief concerning the return of Christ." The doctrine is treated not as "the foundation" but as "the capstone of the Christian faith." The writer "does not attempt to explain mysteries . . . he emphasizes the cardinal truth that the great duty resting upon all those who accept the Lord Jesus Christ . . . is to preach 'this gospel of the kingdom in all the world . . . and then shall the end come.'"

—*The Moravian*.